The West’s Brittle Democratic Ties to India

The assassination plots by Indian intelligence in Canada and the United States expose the fragility of a relationship built on shared democratic values.

The revelations in recent weeks of Indian government complicity in the assassination in Vancouver of a Sikh separatist – and in a conspiracy to murder another in New York – may turn out to be what those in the diplomatic business call “manageable”.

The United States and India need a relationship in working order.

But the revelations still raise questions about how we and others in the West should now regard our partnerships with India.

State-sanctioned killings happen. For one, the United States has assassinated enemies in third countries, notably Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq.

However, the alleged actions by India are of a different order. India may see the targets as terrorists. The United States, Canada and others do not. The victim in Vancouver was a Canadian citizen. The target in New York had both US and Canadian citizenship. To plot to kill citizens of a friendly country, particularly a powerful one, in that country, is imprudent.

India’s actions, if substantiated, will resemble Mr Putin’s methodology in dealing with adversaries.

This is not the sort of India we are used to.

When India comes to mind in Australia, it broadly conjures up three sets of images.

The first is valid but dated: the Commonwealth, cricket, Bollywood bling, extravagant weddings, and the obverse of poverty and a sea of people.

The second, increasingly vivid since the beginning of this century, is one of economic growth, technological capacity and increased competence, of an important global diaspora, and of a country that shares our concerns about China.

The third, still emerging, image is of strong nationalism, even nativism, which appeals to many Indians both at home and in the diasporas. These currents of identity are promoted strongly by the Rashtryia Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing Hindu organisation (a member of which was responsible for the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi), that provides ideological sustenance to the ruling BJP.

The RSS concept of government involves an illiberal state that controls key institutions such as the media, the judiciary and the election commission.

Mr Modi himself is a Hindu supremacist, whose government largely ignores the aspirations of Muslims and other minorities. When we in the West talk of shared democratic values we have in mind a secular liberal democracy. This is an entirely different thing from the illiberal democracy that is Mr Modi’s objective.

Another aspect of this third set of images is of an India that is flexing its international muscles.

This has been most apparent in South Asia where India is dominant.

For example, when Mr Modi opened a new parliament building in New Delhi in May he unveiled a mural map that had India stretching from Pakistan to Bangladesh and included Nepal and Bhutan. This was a representation of Akhand Bharat – a Hindu conceptualisation and ideological goal of an undivided India. The map drew predictably strong protests from Pakistan but also anxious questioning from Bangladesh and Nepal.

According to Indian media sources, India’s boisterous nationalism has been manifested in the preparedness of its intelligence agencies to leak information about their own exploits. This is unusual in that world. It suggests excessive hubris.

The exuberant receptions by Indian diasporas to welcome Mr Modi on visits to other countries are designed not only to be played back into India as a sign of his popularity, but as an indication of the international respect in which India is now held. Most Western politicians – not oblivious to the Indian vote in their constituencies – are eager participants.

Mr Modi has also sought to use his chairmanship of the G20 and India’s prominence in the Global South and the BRICS as avenues for extending India’s global influence.

A more powerful and influential India is in Australia’s interest, particularly if one believes that a multipolar world will contribute to global stability.

However, the the vigour with which both the United States and Australia have pursued ties with India has been premised not only on China-driven strategic congruence. It has also been premised on similar concepts of democracy and governance.

This was the view of the Bush administration when it concluded the so-called nuclear deal with India in 2008.

The deal involved American agreement to assist India’s civil nuclear development despite India not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The deal was the turning point in the United States-India security relationship.

Some of the strategic affinity between India and the West has diminished with India’s different approach on Ukraine. The problem we, the Americans and other Western countries now have with India is that the democratic solder which was a factor in our relationships with India has also become more brittle.

Australian interests will continue to dictate a strong relationship with India but let us be clear in our own mind about with whom we are dealing.

It is still to the good that India’s image of cricket, the Commonwealth and bling is fading.  Some aspects of what is taking its place are not necessarily an unalloyed blessing.

John McCarthy AO is a Senior Adviser to Asialink and Vice-Chancellor's fellow at The University of Melbourne. He is former high commissioner to India and several other countries.