The Thais, They are A-Changing

Changing Thai norms are threatening the business model of the country’s traditional, family-based political parties.

Thailand’s conservative forces appear to be riding high. After months of wrangling, conservative political parties overcame mutual distrust to form a government led by the Pheu Thai Party of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, shunting aside the first-placed progressive Move Forward Party.

Thaksin was part of the deal. King Vajiralongkorn slashed his prison sentence the day he appointed the government. Though “prison sentence” is a misnomer. Thaksin has stayed in a police hospital for the past five months—a privilege denied other inmates. He’s unlikely to spend a night behind bars.

Conservative parties’ reliance on patron-client relations would resonate with palace ideals of a hierarchical society with the king at its apex. So it is little surprise that politics has been governed by patronage, powerful families and clique-building.

Many parties — most notably those in the governing coalition — are controlled by a family or individual who, if not overtly leading the party, chooses the party’s titular head. So they naturally look to other families, particularly at the provincial level, to boost their poll prospects.

These patronage networks were strengthened in 1974 by a constitutional requirement that MP candidates must belong to a political party. With independence no longer an option, politicians were compelled to find a party patron.

All this goes a long way to explaining how most of the big parties operate. The two largest members in the current coalition government—Thaksin’s Pheu Thai, and Bhumjaithai, founded by Newin Chidchob—are prime examples.

After entrusting his party to brother-in-law Somchai, then sister Yingluck, Thaksin is now looking to daughter Paetongtarn to protect the family’s interests. She became Pheu Thai’s nominal head in October, just 24 months after entering politics. Though Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is not a Shinawatra, many of his advisors are Thaksin loyalists or family members. And the Shinawatras have the support of many provincial family groups, members of whom make up 37 percent of its 141 MPs, and 70 percent of its executives.

In second-placed Bhumjaithai, the proportions are lower—by my count, 27 percent and 30 percent, respectively. But six are related by blood or marriage to party founder Newin. Another Newin brother, retired police general Permpoon, is the unelected Education Minister.

However, this model has started to fail. The last two general elections show Thais are increasingly rejecting the patron-client relationships on which these traditional parties rely.

In 2019, 6.3 million Thais voted for a new party — Future Forward — putting it in third place. It promoted equality and cultural diversity, and campaigned for an end to customs perpetuating traditional hierarchy. Moreover, it brought into mainstream politics many prominent academics, pro-democracy activists and representatives of marginalised groups — the antithesis of traditional Thai politics.

A controversial 2020 Constitutional Court ruling dissolving Future Forward did not deter the growing numbers rejecting traditional patronage systems. In 2023, 14.2 million voted for Future Forward’s successor party — Move Forward — a plurality.

Thais are voting with their pockets, too. In 2023, they gave Move Forward more than eight times as much as they donated to second-placed Pheu Thai through a 500-baht tax-deductable allowance.

Its candidates lacked the family baggage of the conservative parties (just 1 percent of its MPs have a political family background). And its reform policies clearly appealed more than the cash handouts of the older parties. Pheu Thai even lost ground in some traditional provincial strongholds to its younger rival.

Even were authorities to dissolve the party — a real possibility after a peculiar 31 January court ruling that its campaign to reform the draconian royal defamation law was really an attempt to overthrow the constitutional monarchy — wouldn’t end the movement. Those members not banned from politics would almost certainly create a new party and continue much as before.

Given all this, it’s hard to see the family patronage model prevailing. Nevertheless, the parties that rely on it aren’t looking to reform. After coming second in last year’s poll, Pheu Thai says it’s looking for younger candidates. But many of the “new faces” on its executive are just the latest generation of family stalwarts. And the Shinawatras are still in charge.

Unless Thailand’s conservative parties stop relying on political families and start offering real reforms that address the serious economic and social challenges facing Thailand’s ageing population, they will struggle to regain an electorate whose values and expectations are changing.

Given this, it is time that Thailand made its parliament more representative of its citizen’s aspirations by readmitting independent MPs. Freed from the previous quasi-oligopoly of family-led parties, independents could advance economic, social, and environmental reforms these parties have all but ignored.

In any event, that Thailand’s political landscape will likely look quite different over the coming ten to twenty years, with much greater emphasis on economic, social and political reform; and likely more of a rights-based international outlook. It would behove countries like Australia to start engaging more now with those Thais likely to be leading these changes.

Craig Keating is a former senior analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments (ONA). Prior to joining ONA, he held numerous positions with the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).