A ‘Historic' but Bittersweet Victory for Taiwan’s Ruling Party

Taiwan’s general election was notable for signs of growing apathy among voters. Despite the intense international interest in the outcome, a potential November rematch between Joe Biden and Donald Trump may have graver political ramifications for Taiwan’s fate.

Many longtime Taiwan watchers considered the 13 January general election subdued, if not “dull”, an impression at odds with the intense global media interest and numerous sensational international headlines. Although a respectable 71.86 percent of the electorate voted in the presidential election, this was the second lowest turnout since direct presidential elections were introduced in 1996. Vice President Lai Ching-te led the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to an unprecedented third consecutive presidential term, but he only received a plurality of votes (40.05 percent) in a three-way race. Critically the DPP lost its legislative majority, retaining 51 seats in the 113 seat Legislative Yuan (LY).

The DPP’s mixed success has not translated to the resurgence of the once powerful Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) as a dominant opposition force. KMT candidate Hou You-yi came second with 33.49 percent and is unlikely to recover politically as he returns to his role as mayor of New Taipei City after a long absence during the campaign. With 52 seats in the legislature, the KMT beat the DPP by only one seat, but is now the largest party in the chamber. The opposition party is already signaling an intention to advance its policy agenda, including on contested issues such as the development of nuclear power to address concerns over energy insecurity and a review of national defence expenditures that could affect the indigenous defence submarine program.

The Lai administration’s limited electoral mandate foreshadows a challenging four years ahead, in which the new administration will need to work with opposition parties in the legislature and accede to policy tradeoffs and occasional compromises that will have direct implications for Taiwan’s national security and its relationship with both the US and China.

However, even with two KMT-friendly independent legislators, the main opposition party is still short of a legislative majority and therefore will need to collaborate with the eight legislators of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). This populist party, founded in 2019, is led by former Taipei Mayor, Ko Wen-je, who finished last in the presidential race with a sizeable 24.46 percent of the popular vote. The party’s strength comes from Ko and the TPP’s ability to market itself as a new, alternative anti-establishment force that was able to tap into the younger generation’s growing frustration about bread-and-butter issues such as high inflation, wage stagnation, and unaffordable housing.

TPP’s rhetoric as a party that is beyond the traditional “KMT Blue” or “DPP Green” politics clearly resonates with the youth vote and could have a lasting influence on Taiwan’s political landscape. As a party headed and staffed by a number of political chameleons and turncoats, and with the TPP’s history of spectacularly falling out with its collaborators, whether and how the TPP will leave its mark as a third force remains to be seen. Working too closely with either the KMT opposition or the DPP government could eventually lead to an exodus of its supporters. Yet serving as mere disruptor or obstructor may reduce the chances of the TPP becoming a force in mainstream politics in the long run.

In its first test, the TPP stuck to its guns and refused to endorse either the KMT or the DPP’s choice for LY speaker and deputy speaker in a vote on 1 February. Instead, in a largely symbolic act the party nominated its own member, Huang Shan-shan, for the speaker position. This effectively allowed the KMT to win with a simple majority, with the polarising former Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu elected as speaker.

The 2024 election results also demonstrate that Taiwan’s democratic institutions are vigorous, strong, and stable. Chinese interference in the leadup to the election – public threats, grey zone activities, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and propaganda efforts – provoked no great shocks in Taiwan and fundamentally, did not distort the Taiwanese electorates’ political preferences or determine the electoral outcome. China’s active poaching of Nauru, with the breaking of ties announced just days after the election, was met with general indifference by the Taiwanese public. The diplomatic loss however exposes the limits of “like-minded” countries’ support for Taiwan. For example Australia, arguably Nauru’s most important foreign partner appeared to take no actions when they were informed in advance of Nauru’s intention to switch diplomatic ties. China will continue to punish Taiwan’s electoral choice and to squeeze Taiwan’s international space, with speculation that a new administration in Tuvalu could soon follow Nauru’s path.

Nonetheless, the growing ambivalence among the Taiwanese public to the international manoeuvres and the normalisation of Chinese political and cognitive warfare within the Taiwanese public sphere comes at a huge risk for Taiwan in the long run if left unchecked. Chinese influence operations and disinformation campaigns could heighten societal divisions, undermine trust in public institutions, and exaggerate societal partisanship and political polarisation. Ultimately, China’s preference is to coerce Taiwan into a political union without resorting to kinetic warfare. This is a risk that the DPP recognises and is actively addressing by placing Chinese influence operations expert  Puma Shen as number two on the party’s legislator-at-large list.   

Lai Ching-te is aware of the challenges and obstacles ahead in his presidency, as demonstrated by his conciliatory victory speech on election night. The one-time primaries challenger to Tsai Ing-wen’s presidential re-electoral bid is now officially successor to the moderate and pragmatic path that Tsai maintained during her presidency. This includes Lai’s stated commitment to the cross-Strait status quo and the upholding of the existing constitutional system of the Republic of China. Lai will almost certainly continue the defence and national security reforms that began during the Tsai years in order to address Taiwan’s military preparedness, diversify Taiwan’s trading partners, and continue to draw Taiwan closer into the orbit of the US-led rules-based order, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Without a doubt, these actions will be perceived by China as provocative and the semi-official communication freeze unilaterally imposed by China will remain indefinitely.

Lai is set to become President on 20 May and his inaugural speech will be closely followed by Beijing, particularly with regard to whether and how Lai might interpret the significance of the controversial “1992 Consensus”. However, it is a presidential election elsewhere – in the US – that could determine how China behaves towards Taiwan in the next four years. A return of a Trump presidency would mean greater unpredictability in global politics, and raise further doubts about US commitments in the Taiwan Strait, particularly following a number of questionable comments Trump has made about Taiwan and its semiconductor industry. A second Biden presidency could see a continuation of marginally improved ties between the US and China. However, the US may become more cautious in its engagement with Taiwan, as demonstrated in an off-the cuff response by Biden who said the US does not support Taiwan independence when asked about his views on Taiwan’s electoral results. It is evident that the Lai administration will need to work with whatever administration that comes into power in the US come 2025 and remain agile in an increasingly volatile international environment. One thing that Lai can rely on is his Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim’s international reputation and political clout as former Taiwanese Representative to the US, a period in which Hsiao effectively navigated Taiwan-US relations across the political spectrum.

Roger Lee Huang is a senior lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University.