The West’s interest in a viable Southeast Asia

As Australia’s next government seeks to navigate the shoals of President Trump’s New World, it behoves it to think less about our tariff concerns and AUKUS and more about Southeast Asia.

We now understand that the United States is not the same comforting behemoth it may once have seemed. Some aspects of Trumpism will pass. America may again see better angels. But they will not be the same angels. It will be a different country.

We used to talk of “the West” as the group of like-minded developed democracies extending from North America to Europe and including, in our region, Japan, South Korea and Australia.

The photo-shoot of President Trump and his co-bully Vance berating Ukrainian President Zelensky in the Oval Office brought home that there are now two “Wests”, the United States, on the one hand, and the rest of us, on the other.

There has always been a tension in our international policy between the demands of our alliance with the United States and our regional aspirations. The task of reconciling the two is about to become harder.

We need the alliance. The Trump Administration’s handling of Ukraine and its treatment of NATO has raised doubts as to whether its treaty allies in this region - Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia - will be treated similarly. Thus far, the Administration has claimed that its security commitments are solid. 

But the fear remains that either the Americans could be attracted to a deal with China to the exclusion of the interests of other regional powers or that they could go after China and provoke a kinetic reaction from the latter.

Neither course would suit Australia or its neighbours. But, notwithstanding doubts in the region about American reliability, we are better off with the American alliance structure than without it. It may not, in the end, protect allies. But, while it exists, it offers a measure of reassurance to those in the region - allies or not - who fear Chinese military power. 

And even those who are relatively sanguine about China’s regional role welcome a United States security presence because it helps maintain a balance of power. This enhances stability.

While we and others like Japan might aspire to greater military self-reliance and work towards more effective military cooperation within the region, the only effective counter to Chinese military power - at least in the short and medium term - remains American military power.

Second, on the region. Here’s the thing. The Americans have not paid enough attention to the Southeast Asians. America’s Asian focus has traditionally been on Northeast Asia, where the interests of the major East Asian powers intersect. Even the important exception – the Vietnam War - was premised essentially on fears of the spread of Chinese and Soviet control and influence.

 Since the American Asia-Pacific alliance structure was put in place, the countries involved have prevented economic ruptures from spilling over into the security domain. For example, American differences with Australia on agricultural exports in the eighties and with Japan over the Trade Act in 1988, while severe, did not impact the workings of the United States’ alliances with Australia or Japan.

Trump’s recent tariff explosion targeted Southeast Asian countries more than any other single group. The latter have reacted with pragmatism. Vietnam, the second hardest hit on “Liberation Day”, offered the United States zero tariffs the next day. Indonesia also quickly sent a senior team to negotiate with Washington. 

But that does not mean that the Southeast Asians are relaxed about Trump’s policies. They will suffer from both the direct effects of tariffs and the indirect effects of tariffs on China. Trump’s economic policies will harm them and affect their regional and world views.

Southeast Asia is the area of strongest contestation between the United States and China. As such, Trump’s tariff penalization of most of them enables Beijing - without trying very hard - to portray in the United States as the bad guy. Xi Jinping, touring part of the region, has done just that.

 The impact of soft, or reputational, power is often moot. Indeed, Trump’s transactional, as opposed to values driven, approach to international policy would be attractive to many in the Global South, including in our region. However, adding up the damage Trump is doing to regional economies, the effective abolition of USAID, and the hypocrisy many perceive in Trump’s approach to Gaza, America’s powers of gentle persuasion are unlikely to enjoy a renaissance any time soon.

Where does that leave us? 

The Southeast Asians say they do not want to choose between the United States and China. Putting this another way, they want to be able to work with both and choose how to do so. 

The most legitimate criticism of Southeast Asian countries as regional actors is that they are often too cautious in pursuing their own interests, having recourse to somewhat old-fashioned notions of non-alignment or sheltering under the carapace of ASEAN solidarity.

The Southeast Asians are never going to be on our team and don’t want to be on the Chinese one either. What we need from them is the ability to pursue their own interests, in their own way, with vigour. If the Southeast Asians as individual countries, or under the ASEAN banner, can become a more viable political force in the region, that should suit us.

The best course for us and the other wealthier countries surrounding Southeast Asia - Japan, South Korea and India - is to reinforce policies around trade, investment and technical and defence cooperation with the Southeast Asians, which help them build their resilience. If they are better able to pursue their own interests with a greater sense of their own authority, the better for us. It will cost us money and involve heft. Priorities usually do. If it means we are not on all fours with American approaches on the region, so be it.

Global powers are usually the prime movers of international change. Middle powers react to it. So, there are limitations on what we can achieve. But we have acted with agency in the past and can do so again.

Our envoys to President Trump’s Court will no doubt mainly be urging that together we genuflect at the alter of AUKUS. The more important message should be: “If you want to balance China, get Southeast Asia right.” 

John McCarthy AO is Senior Adviser at Asialink and former Australian Ambassador to the US and several Asian countries.