The US at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2025: Two cheers for Pete Hegseth

The 2025 edition of the Shangri La Dialogue, an annual gathering of defence ministers and senior officials that has been taking place in Singapore for more than two decades, recently concluded. The highlight of the event - as tends to be the case with this event - were the remarks of the US Secretary of Defense. This time, it was current occupant of the office, former Fox News host and US National Guard officer, Pete Hegseth, who outlined the Trump administration’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

The event took place against the backdrop of a world deep in the throes of great power rivalry and confronted with an upsurge of armed conflicts that are undermining the so-called “rules-based order”. Since its inauguration in January, the Trump administration has for the most part been focusing its attention and energies on the Middle East and the Russia-Ukraine War. Against this backdrop, the Indo-Pacific welcomed with bated breath the appearance of Secretary Hegseth at its premier security dialogue. Indeed, while he had made a visit to Manila and Tokyo in March, the dialogue provided him a pre-eminent platform to sketch President Trump’s vision of the region’s security architecture and the US role in it. 

Confirmation of Secretary Hegseth’s participation was a matter of speculation in the buildup to the dialogue, as questions swirled whether he would honor the commitment to attend. At the same time, US regional friends and allies were anxious not to have a repeat of Vice President JD Vance’s performance at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, when he took to the stage to excoriate European allies about their purported lack of commitment to defence burden sharing, a signal theme of the present US administration’s foreign policy. By this token, sighs of relief were palpable at the end of Secretary Hegseth’s speech. 

To be sure, the message on burden sharing was certainly conveyed. But it was done so in a more calibrated fashion, to the appreciation of US allies and partners. At any rate, the fact of the matter is that this message had already been processed in Asia, where responses differed markedly compared to Europe. While Europeans lamented the demise of the trans-Atlantic relationship in the face of Trumpian transactionalism, Asian governments have been more philosophical in their response. Indeed, many have already been taking seriously the Trump administration’s call for them to ask not what the US can do for them, but what they can do for themselves (and the US). 

From Tokyo to Taipei, Seoul to Manila, governments have been calculating how to increase their defence budgets as a percentage of GDP, Washington’s “key performance indicator.” Likewise, declarations that the Trump administration had no intention to conduct foreign policy on the basis of ideology or values would be broadly welcomed, especially in Southeast Asia, where such approaches have obstructed efforts to deepen cooperation with Washington in the past. Quoting President Trump, Secretary Hegseth reiterated that the US is no longer interested in the “moralistic and preachy approach to foreign policy of the past.”

Peace through strength, and deterrence, emerged as key ideas that Hegseth’s speech sought to advance. These ideas would be welcome by the vast majority of states in the Indo-Pacific. Regional states are under no illusion about the risk of conflict in potential flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. Yet arguably without exception, the region also desires that these risks be managed such that they do not impact what is core to their collective interest, economic growth and development. For this reason, the deterrent effect of the US role as an offshore balancer, which it has played since the Second World War, has been instrumental for the creation of a stable strategic climate required for prosperity. Hegseth’s reassurance that the US intends to continue playing this role under President Trump would doubtless be music to the ears of friends and allies in the region. 

Yet therein too, lies the rub. Even as the American security role in the region goes some distance to providing stability for growth, the present course of its tariff policy threatens to work at cross purposes with this objective. What is more, the Trump administration view that trade is an issue of national security - evidenced in its use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to justify blanket reciprocal tariffs - threatens to undermine the strength of regional economies and hence cannot but send mixed signals as to what its priorities and intentions are.

Another major - if unsurprising - theme in the speech was China: specifically, the challenge Beijing poses to the security of the region in both traditional and non-traditional security domains as viewed from Washington. Hegseth described this in categoric terms: “There’s no reason to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent.”

Talk of a China “threat” has always set hands wringing with anxiety in a region that prefers to talk about security “with” rather than “against” one another. This is not because regional states do not have concerns about Chinese intentions and ambitions – most certainly do to varying degrees - but for the fact that the region considers the US-China relationship to be the most consequential for global stability. By that measure, explicit threat narratives, especially when directed by one major power at the other, are seen as provocative and destabilising. A strong and resolute US military presence is arguably sufficient to make the point without necessarily having to ratchet up tensions with bluster.

Foremost in regional minds would be their economic relationships with China that continue to grow even as the Chinese economy is undergoing immense strain internally. Moreover, the absence of the US from the regional trade equation and the Trump administration’s erratic pronouncements of “on again, off again” tariffs has served only to magnify the economic appeal of China. Simply put, no country can afford not to do business with China. By extension then, they tread carefully so as not to be seen as overtly endorsing American sabre-rattling directed at Beijing.

Amid the extensive interest in Hegseth’s remarks, a notable absence was that of his Chinese counterpart, Dong Jun. China has been represented by its defence minister at the event since 2019 (with the exception of the COVID years when the dialogue did not take place). Predictably, this absence prompted widespread speculation. Rumors that Dong Jun could be under investigation as part of the ongoing anti-corruption crackdown quickly proved unfounded with his subsequent public appearances in China. A second theory was that China was concerned that the dialogue was primarily a platform for the voicing of anti-China sentiment. While it is true Chinese officials have always had their backs against the wall at the dialogue, having to explain their adventurism in the South China Sea for instance, this has in fact been a recurring theme so it is unlikely that it features in Beijing’s decision on participation only now. A third theory is that China did not want to be in a situation where the defence minister will have to have a meeting with his US counterpart. Again, this is highly unlikely as a primary reason given that the Chinese delegation can quite easily decline any such orchestrated meeting. More likely is the possibility that Beijing is basically concerned for the diplomatic tact - or lack thereof - of the Trump administration. Given how President Trump himself blindsided his Ukrainian and South African counterparts on “live” TV in the Oval Office, and Vice President Vance’s performance at Munich, the leadership in Beijing would doubtless not want to subject themselves to the risk of such public humiliation.

On balance, there were more hits than misses in the Hegseth speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. That being said, the equities that the US is prepared to commit is where the rubber meets the road on the American security presence in the region. To that end, while the speech contained some details on how the Trump administration plans to maintain its edge in defence technology and further cultivate cooperation with key allies and partners, how it “walks the talk” in the coming months and years will surely be very closely watched in the region.

Joseph Chinyong Liow is Tan Kah Kee Chair Professor in Comparative and International Politics at the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.