Trump Redux: What Matters to Foreign Relations

As the novelty of Donald Trump’s win wears off, we have moved beyond the superficialities of the views of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Ambassador Kevin Rudd about the Trump agenda and persona. 

And we are recognising that the fate of AUKUS is but one of the international issues that face us with Trump Redux. These are some of those issues.

We need to think about several things.

The first is that Trump is more powerful than the last time he served as president.

This time he won the popular vote, not just electoral college. The size of his win gives him a legitimacy at home and even abroad that last time around he did not enjoy.

Moreover, the Republicans will control the Senate and the House. The Supreme Court is conservative. Hence, the extent to which these institutions will provide checks and balances to Trump is moot.

The second thing is that the world is a more contested place than in 2016. Trump’s foreign policy matters more now.

Trump’s key catch cries are MAGA (Make America Great Again) and America First. 

Slogans maybe, but Trump takes them seriously and they have resonance in the United States. They suggest a dogged pursuit of self-interest; no appetite for foreign military adventures; a withdrawal from constructive internationalism; and putting less heft into the US network of alliances.

Trump will still want to be the preeminent figure on the world stage and to be seen and treated as such. But pursuit of the MAGA and America First agendas do not require American global supremacy. Rather, they entail the transactional pursuit of what Trump sees as America’s interests. 

The immediate issues facing Trump are Ukraine and the Middle East.

Trump claims he can stop the war in Ukraine, possibly by threatening further aid to Ukraine and consequently forcing a ceasefire in place. While this would leave Russia with the Ukrainian territory it has seized, Ukraine would likely be compelled to retreat from Russian territory it occupies. 

To the Ukrainians and most of Europe, such a course would be seen as acquiescence in Vladamir Putin’s actions. It would raise the spectre of further Russian pressure in the first instance not only on Ukraine, but on Georgia and Moldova; in the second on the Baltic states; and in the third on Europe as a whole. That spectre becomes more vivid with suggestions that the American commitment to NATO will diminish.

For China, and America’s allies in the Indo-Pacific, such an American approach in Europe would cast doubt on its alliance loyalties both there and in our region. 

In the Middle East, Benjamin Netanyahu will welcome Trump’s election.

Trump may be attracted to brokering a deal involving Israel, the Saudis and those other Arab states that were moving towards assuming diplomatic relations with Israel before the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 last year. 

However, for the time being at least, given the ferocity of Israel’s actions in Gaza and south Lebanon, the politics of the Arab street will be an impediment to Arab rapprochement with Israel.

The probability therefore remains that the initial thrust of Trump’s approach on Gaza and south Lebanon will be increased support for Netanyahu, particularly if the latter’s actions can be construed as opposition to Iran rather than the killing of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. It may be that Trump will look to allies to take a position more akin to his own. For some, including Australia, this will be a tough ask.

The third issue is China – a topic about which Trump has been obscure. 

He has left no doubt about where he stands on economic issues, suggesting a 60% tariff on Chinese imports. But he has adhered to the doctrine of strategic ambiguity (a lack of clear commitment to defend Taiwan if attacked) and has suggested that Taiwan should pay a great deal more for its defence. These is some speculation in Washington that he might be attracted to a deal with Xi Jinping.

However, those around Trump have been sending much stronger messages on China. 

Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s pick for Secretary of State, his National Security Adviser, Michael Waltz, and the nominated cabinet-level Ambassador to the United Nations, Elise Stefanik, are acknowledged hawks on China. 

Of other foreign policy thinkers in Republican circles, Trump’s former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has mooted abandonment of strategic ambiguity and even recognition of Taiwanese Independence. 

Former Trump National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien is an advocate of decoupling from China. Another National Security Council official, Matt Pottinger, has argued the merits of regime change in China.

An American policy on China that combines economic warfare with a more threatening security posture would pose quandaries in the region.
Japan, under Prime Minister Shigero Ishiba, will be accepting of – even comfortable with – security hawks in Washington. However, it will be working overtime to limit damage to Japan from Trump’s economic policies. And Ishiba’s almost academic personal style might not be conducive to the same ease in dealing with Trump that was enjoyed by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump get on. They have populism in common. Bellicose rumbles in Washington about China will not disturb India.

Our neighbours in Southeast Asia will be much less comfortable. For example, Indonesia under Prabowo Subianto wants a positive relationship with China. Vietnam likes to keep a foot firmly in both the Western and Chinese camps.

Most in Southeast Asia would also suffer from Trump’s threatened across the board tariffs and the flow-on effects of a Chinese economy menaced with a 60% tariff.

It will be no win for the Trump administration if its policy on China alienates Southeast Asia. It is not in the Australian interest if the United States loses hearts and minds in this – the most important – contested area between the two great powers.

Finally, the Trump administration will take issue with much of the rest of the world on a host of multilateral issues including trade, debt relief and climate. Some in the Global South will be mollified by Trump’s lack of interest in telling them how to run their countries. But, for many, Trump Redux will be seen as another indication that the positive aspects of American global leadership are in decline.

Over the decades, Australian international policy, at its best, has channelled our political energy in similar amounts into our alliance with the United States, into engagement with the region, and towards the fulfillment of our responsibilities as a global citizen. 

Because of fear of China, in the past decade or so we have placed predominant weight on the alliance.

While there are good arguments against such a predominant weighting, the damage has been manageable because our world view has not been excessively divergent from America’s perspective.

However, the way in which America thinks about itself and its international environment has been changing for some years. There may be now more of a gap between our two national perspectives.

Trump’s Administration will be subject to the vicissitudes of its leader, but with the experience of its earlier term, and with its recent big win, it will be tough and confident. It will have only limited time for the views of its allies in the West. 

A first question for Australia is the extent to which Trump’s America will develop policies with which we agree, which we can accept with reservations, or which will not be in our interest.

A second is whether, if American policy is not in our interest, we will have the determination to disagree.

As a major trading nation, the downsides of a global trade war engendered by Trump’s tariff menaces are clear. 

That said, our bilateral difficulties with the United States on trade are likely to be much less severe than for the Europeans or some of our neighbours, partly because we have a trade deficit with the United States.

Moreover, Australia has always defended our bilateral trade interests with vigour. We are unlikely to behave differently with Trump.

There is no major reason why Trump should renege on the AUKUS deal, unless at some stage it places in jeopardy America’s ability to meet its own requirements. For now, the Americans will get as much out of AUKUS as we do. 

There will however be an American expectation that we toe the line on major security issues, particularly those about China, which may emerge in the region. This expectation is not new. Nor has been our readiness to acquiesce. 

Depending on the circumstances, such an American approach under this administration may prompt an Australian appreciation that what is good for the United States is not necessarily good for Australia.

With Trump Redux – and if our interests so dictate – we may need to display courage of a higher order in dealings with our American friends than has been evident in recent years.

John McCarthy is the former Australian ambassador to the United States. 

A version of this article first appeared in The Australian Financial Review.

Image source: X.com