Rodrigo Duterte’s reckoning

Philippine authorities arrested Rodrigo Duterte, former president of the Philippines, on March 11 after receiving an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant accusing him of crimes against humanity. He is now in The Hague, awaiting trial.

How did this suddenly happen? The star-crossed Marcos-Duterte alliance had been imploding for over a year, as President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and his allies systematically undercut Duterte’s power base. Will Duterte’s arrest lead to widespread destabilisation? Probably not. Does this mean democracy once again thrives in the Philippines, almost four decades after end of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos Sr.? Unfortunately, Philippine democracy is better at making former leaders accountable than it is at constraining powerful incumbents.

Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter, ran together and won in the 2022 elections. In running for the vice presidency, Ms. Duterte, who consistently had topped surveys, relinquished her own presidential ambitions. This avoided a ruinous confrontation and secured a decisive victory. 

Over 15 months ago, however, the political alliance between the Marcoses and Dutertes began to collapse in public view. Hints grew stronger that the Marcos Jr. government would cooperate with the ICC. Despite the president’s promises that they would never do so, there was recent talk of a loophole: the government still had obligations to Interpol despite the Philippine withdrawal from the ICC when Duterte was president. 

Moreover, Marcos allies found common cause with leftist opposition parties in both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries into extrajudicial killings during Duterte’s presidency, which produced exposés of murder and illicit financing. Yet no charges have been filed with local authorities and the inquiry in the Lower House has not finished its work, although it undoubtedly has uncovered crucial evidence that can be used at the ICC trial.

With their backs against the wall, many fear that the Dutertes will fight back without reserve. For instance, in late 2023, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff warned against possible military coup d'etat plots. Nonetheless, there have not been any apparent splits in the military, considering an earlier shake-up in the military and police leadership that may have helped to loosen loyalty to the former president. 

Moreover, in recent months, Duterte tried to rally support in his home seat of Davao City and in Manila, but the crowds in the country’s capital were rather small except for an Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ) rally last January. On balance, while there is still a risk of destabilisation, former president Duterte has not demonstrated an ability to mobilise effectively. It remains to be seen whether protests to “bring Duterte home” will grow and have a real impact.

The weakening of the Duterte power base sets the stage for the third act in this drama: the elimination of Sara Duterte as a contender in the 2028 presidential race. 

Alongside inquiries into the violent excesses of her father’s administration, Ms. Duterte had been subject to congressional inquiries over the embezzlement of huge sums of money in the VP’s office and the Department of Education (of which she had been Secretary). The National Bureau of Investigation also launched a probe into death threats she made against President Marcos, the First Lady and the Speaker of the House, who is the president’s cousin. Congress impeached Ms. Duterte last month and the Senate, which will act as an impeachment court, is expected to begin her trial in June.

Unless public sympathy for Mr. Duterte gains momentum, his arrest may reduce support for allies in the coming May 12 local and congressional elections, which will fill half of the 24-member Senate with new or re-elected members. Senator Ronald dela Rosa, his former police chief (who may also end up in The Hague) as well as Senator Christopher Go, a longtime Duterte aide, are both up for re-election. If they win, they would act as judges in the impeachment court. A two-thirds vote is needed to convict, which means that nine senators can block it. Among sitting senators, Robin Padilla is most likely to vote against impeachment and there could be others.

A conviction would prohibit Ms. Duterte from running for president or holding any public office in the future. This would better the chances of a Marcos-backed candidate winning the 2028 presidential elections (Mr. Marcos cannot himself run due to the constitutional limit of a single six-year term).

Amid what some observers wryly refer to as a battle between the forces of kadiliman vs. kasamaan (darkness versus evil), the question of justice hangs in the balance. Witnesses and victims’ families took great personal risk in filing cases against Mr. Duterte with the ICC while he was still in office. The groups that sustained this international prosecution include the Catholic Church, associations of the victims’ families, and human rights lawyers. The media and civil society have long kept a spotlight on the violence, often vilified for their efforts. Former senator Leila de Lima spent most of her term in detention for launching an inquiry at the height of the violence.

Democracy sometimes runs backwards in the Philippines, where the institutions of checks-and-balances do not constrain the excesses of present leaders as well as they do those of the past. The Marcos Jr. administration was complicit in covering up for Mr. Duterte while it was expedient for their alliance to hold, then opportunistic when the time was ripe. 

The prospect of future justice may prove to be a weak check on President Marcos as he consolidates his power. If the ICC convicts Mr. Duterte and his fellow perpetrators, this at least might discourage a repeat campaign of mass violence disguised as a program to counter crime. After all, the Philippines has a history of extrajudicial violence “to fight crime” and politicians may be tempted to reprise violent populism in the future. The arrest of Duterte should teach political leaders that, to quote Karim Khan, “international law is not as weak as some may think.”

Sol Iglesias is an assistant professor of political science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman. She is currently a visiting research fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University.