Phone scandal set to topple Thai government

Thailand’s Constitutional Court voted 7-2 on 1 July to suspend Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from office pending an ethics investigation into her leaked phone conversation with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen. Regardless of the eventual verdict, this decision is set to trigger significant political upheaval in Parliament and on the streets that could bring down Paetongtarn’s government well before the court renders its final judgment.

The petition, which the court unanimously accepted for deliberation, was filed by 36 senators led by Senate President Mongkol Surasatja. The senators accused Paetongtarn of seriously breaching ethical standards by referring to Hun Sen as “uncle”, denouncing a Thai military commander as being “on the opposite side”, and offering blanket assurances that “if you want anything, just let me know, and I will take care of it.”

The political fallout has been nothing short of devastating. Within hours of the leak, Bhumjaithai — the coalition’s second-largest party — exploited the crisis to abandon ship. The party cited the corrosive impact of Paetongtarn’s diplomatic blunder on Thailand’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interests as justification for its departure. This has the government clinging to a razor-thin majority.

With Bhumjaithai’s departure, the Pheu Thai-led government might, under normal circumstances, have been able to shore up support by courting opposition MPs. However, the toxic nature of the scandal has rendered such political manoeuvring increasingly futile, as lawmakers grow wary of aligning themselves with a government mired in controversy over national sovereignty. If anything, the coalition now risks defections, particularly by conservative parties scrambling to cut their losses and preserve what remains of their credibility, and by opportunistic factions eager to position themselves early for a potential change in government.

The pressure on remaining coalition partners to follow Bhumjaithai’s lead has only intensified as the leaked conversation has breathed new life into anti-government forces that had previously struggled to mobilise widespread public support. Street protests erupted in Bangkok on 28 June, with demonstrators demanding the prime minister’s immediate resignation. Most strikingly, former Yellow Shirts leader Sondhi Limthongkul declared that while he was not calling for a coup, he would not object if the military were to step in should the political crisis deepen. Given Thailand’s turbulent history of coups triggered by mass unrest, the statement could be seen as tacit approval for military intervention framed as a means to restore order and defend national sovereignty.

The collapse of the Paetongtarn administration appears to be a matter of when, not if. Yet, what comes after is far from certain. The timing could hardly be worse. Thailand desperately needs decisive leadership as critical tariff negotiations with the US remain unfinished and a border dispute with Cambodia advances to the International Court of Justice.

Against this backdrop, Paetongtarn’s suspension marks a tipping point in an already unfolding crisis. In theory, the court’s decision to accept the petition and suspend the prime minister does not amount to a judgment. In 2022, for example, former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha was temporarily suspended from office, but later returned after the Constitutional Court ruled that he had not exceeded the constitutional term limit.

At the same time, however, the lopsided 7-2 margin in favour of Paetongtarn’s suspension suggests the majority has already formed strong views about the case’s merits. Even the dissenting justices acknowledged the gravity of the allegations by proposing to strip Paetongtarn’s authority over national security, foreign affairs, and finance.

In the end, it may be the message this decision sends — rather than the final verdict itself — that carries the greatest political weight. The verdict is likely to be shaped not only by legal arguments, but also by how the political winds shift in the weeks ahead.

MPs in the remaining coalition parties are likely to interpret the suspension as confirmation that the conservative establishment has decisively turned against Paetongtarn and will begin to realign themselves accordingly. Protest leaders, meanwhile, will treat the suspension as a mandate to escalate their demands, shifting from calls for resignation to demands for permanent removal. These signals provide the court with the popular legitimacy it needs to remove the prime minister without provoking significant backlash or accusations of judicial overreach. In fact, Jatuporn Prompan, the former Red Shirt leader who has since turned against Thaksin and joined forces with Sondhi Limthongkul, has already announced plans for a major rally in mid-August.

Should events unfold this way, the outcome would amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy: the government collapses before the court delivers a final verdict, and Paetongtarn’s formal dismissal becomes little more than a constitutional formality, clearing the way for the selection of a new prime minister. But quite unlike the swift elite consensus that coalesced to install her as Srettha Thavisin’s replacement following his removal for ethical violations, no such agreement is likely to emerge so easily this time. Paetongtarn’s removal threatens to fracture the very foundation of the grand compromise between Thaksin Shinawatra and the conservative establishment that underpins Thailand’s current power-sharing arrangement. For this very reason, it is difficult to assess what kind of government coalition might form if Paetongtarn is formally removed from office.

Assuming the coalition persists under a broader consensus to keep the People’s Party out of power, it is reasonable to expect that Pheu Thai’s remaining prime ministerial candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, would be put forward as her replacement. However, his viability is far from guaranteed. In addition to widespread concerns about his health, his past support for lèse-majesté reform has been used by opponents to derail his nomination before — and could again.

The coalition’s other options are equally problematic. Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, the United Thai Nation Party’s candidate, is under investigation for alleged ethics violations and illegal shareholdings. Jurin Laksanawisit, the Democrat Party nominee, lacks meaningful support even within his party. Former Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, though technically still eligible, now serves on the Privy Council and is unlikely to return to politics unless called upon to break an impasse and only with endorsement from the conservative establishment.

Outside the current coalition, the only viable candidate is Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnvirakul. However, assuming that a coalition between Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party remains unlikely due to stark ideological differences over the role and status of Thailand’s pillar institutions, the arithmetic suggests that Anutin’s path to the premiership would require Pheu Thai’s support. This would be an awkward proposition, given his party’s central role in destabilising Paetongtarn’s administration in the first place.

The collapse of the Paetongtarn administration appears to be a matter of when, not if. Yet, what comes after is far from certain. The timing could hardly be worse. Thailand desperately needs decisive leadership as critical tariff negotiations with the US remain unfinished and a border dispute with Cambodia advances to the International Court of Justice. With no viable successor in sight and the coalition fragmenting under mounting political pressure, Thailand faces a dangerous political vacuum that could trigger prolonged instability, elite contestation, and the kind of democratic breakdown that could result in yet another lost decade.

Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow and Acting Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.

This article was first published on Fulcrum on 3 July 2025.