The new relevance of middle powers in an era of global disruption

Donald Trump’s second presidency marks a significant disruption to the liberal international order established after World War II. His strengthened "America First" policy—characterised by intensified protectionism, shifting diplomatic stances, skepticism toward traditional alliances, and inward-looking nationalism—has weakened US global leadership, undermined trust within alliances, and emboldened authoritarian states. As the United States recalibrates its global role, and China, Russia, and North Korea advance a more coordinated authoritarian posture, the world is entering a phase of intensified geopolitical contestation, diminished multilateral efficacy, and weakened normative consensus.

The Indo-Pacific, now a fulcrum of strategic competition, confronts twin crises: a leadership vacuum resulting from US retrenchment, and rising coordination among authoritarian actors who are challenging the liberal institutional fabric. Multilateral institutions that once anchored stability—such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and regional fora—are increasingly constrained by gridlock and strategic divergence. These developments have intensified concerns about a retreat from global cooperation and a return to fragmented, competitive, and transactional geopolitics.

Yet, this moment of disruption also offers an opportunity. Middle powers—especially South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, and key European democracies like [DG1] —are uniquely positioned to lead the effort to adapt, reinforce, and renew global governance. Possessing both normative credibility and diplomatic agility, these states can act as stabilising forces and pragmatic conveners in a divided world order. 

To effectively respond, four interlinked strategies are essential:

First, enhance ‘Flexible Diplomacy’ within formal institutions. To counter paralysis in multilateral forums like the UN Security Council, middle powers should expand flexible diplomacy—practices that allow agenda-setting, coalition-building, and norm-promotion when formal mechanisms stall. This includes forming procedural alliances and issue-based coalitions within the UN, WTO, and World Health Organization (WHO).

South Korea’s leadership on digital governance and Australia’s Indo-Pacific dialogues illustrate how such initiatives provide timely, focused responses while reinforcing institutional legitimacy. These approaches are especially vital when major powers are deadlocked.

In this context, middle powers have revitalised the UN General Assembly. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example, emergency special sessions and the "Uniting for Peace" mechanism enabled diplomatic mobilisation despite Security Council inaction. Although not legally binding, these tools preserve the UN’s relevance as a platform for collective resolve.

Ultimately, flexible diplomacy allows middle powers to use procedural leverage to elevate underrepresented voices and advance priorities in areas such as human rights, global health, and climate justice. Embedding these efforts into the workings of formal institutions ensures that multilateralism remains effective and resilient amid strategic rivalry.

Second, advance minilateral frameworks for strategic flexibility. In parallel, middle powers must advance minilateralism—compact, purpose-driven partnerships designed to address specific security, economic, and technological challenges. Frameworks such as the Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia), AUKUS, and various trilateral formats involving South Korea, Japan, and Australia have gained salience by offering faster, more coherent responses to regional threats than broader multilateral mechanisms can provide.

Crucially, these arrangements should be structured with flexibility and functional complementarity in mind. They must avoid rigid institutionalisation or exclusionary bloc dynamics and instead reinforce issue-specific cooperation that aligns with broader international norms. When grounded in transparency and openness, minilateralism can enhance the strategic agency of middle powers without undermining global governance structures.

Third, engage with the Global South amid great power retrenchment. One of the most urgent and under-addressed challenges is the provision of global public goods in a period of great power retrenchment. As the US and other major powers pull back from multilateral leadership, middle powers must step into the vacuum—particularly in their outreach to the Global South. This involves more than development aid; it requires sustained partnership, co-creation of norms, and joint investments in areas such as climate resilience, pandemic response, food security, and education.

By demonstrating that democratic middle powers are willing and capable of addressing shared challenges, these efforts not only mitigate instability but also generate credibility and trust among diverse global actors. Such outreach is particularly important in preventing the Global South from drifting toward authoritarian influence or transactional alignment. South Korea’s development cooperation model, the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, and Canada's feminist foreign assistance are promising cases of how values-based, yet pragmatic engagement can be operationalised.

Fourth, champion ‘hybrid multilateralism’ to broaden coalitions. Middle powers should institutionalise a model of hybrid multilateralism—an approach that combines solidarity among like-minded democratic states with active engagement of non-like-minded yet pragmatically aligned partners. This model recognizes the need to move beyond ideological binaries, especially in a world where many states, such as India and ASEAN members, do not neatly fit into liberal or authoritarian categories, but retain strong commitments to multilateralism, sovereignty, and regional stability.

Hybrid multilateralism enables the strategic layering of cooperation: firming up coalitions around shared democratic values while expanding diplomatic boundaries to include swing states and bridge-builders. It allows for flexible geometry in diplomacy—scaling cooperation where consensus exists and engaging constructively where it does not. This model, led by middle powers, is essential for adapting governance frameworks to today’s fragmented realities without abandoning core principles.

In an era defined by global uncertainty, the vitality of international cooperation depends on actors willing to innovate, convene, and lead. Middle powers cannot and need not replace great powers. But they can sustain the architecture of cooperation by reinforcing institutions from within, creating agile alternatives where necessary, reaching outward to neglected partners, and fostering pluralistic coalitions that bridge ideological divides.

Their leadership will not be marked by dominance but by credibility, commitment, and capacity. Through flexible diplomacy, minilateral innovation, strategic outreach, and hybrid multilateralism, middle powers offer a compelling blueprint for revitalising global governance—one that is adaptive, inclusive, and anchored in a shared vision of stability and cooperation.

Shin-wha Lee is Director of Institute for Interdisciplinary of Unification Studies (IIUS) and Professor of Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University.