The harsh diplomatic and military lessons of the India-Pakistan conflict

The outcome of last week’s brief military clash between India and Pakistan, in which Islamabad was the clear winner, came as a shock to all. This will have long-term ramifications for peace and stability in the region.

In the early hours of 7 May, Indian missiles struck nine infrastructure and training centres in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir that purportedly belonged to two alleged terrorist organisations, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), whose focus of activity is the disputed territory of India-administered Kashmir. According to Indian military sources, these strikes killed more than 100 militants. 

Pakistan had been expecting such an operation following the terrorist attack in India-administered Kashmir on 22 April, which killed 26 people, and responded swiftly. Intense combat in the sky soon followed—prompting contradictory claims of victory and defeat. According to Pakistan military sources, five Indian jets were destroyed—three French-made Rafales, one Russian-made MiG-29 and one Indian-built SU-30.

In military terms, that’s significant. These are some of India’s most powerful warplanes. When asked to confirm those losses, Indian authorities refused to do so. French intelligence, on the other hand, confirmed the loss of one Rafale, if not possibly more. While Pakistan claimed that it had lost none of its aircraft, Indian military sources stated, without being specific, that “multiple” Pakistani aircraft had been shot down.

In addition to the battle in the sky, Pakistan hit 26 Air Force and civil aviation bases in India and India-administered Kashmir with missiles and drones. These targets covered a wide geographic area and included: Suratgarh, Sirsa, Adampur, Bhooj, Nalia, Bathinda, Barnala, Halwara, Avantipura, Srinagar, Jammu, Mamoon, Ambala, Udampur and Pathankot — all of which, according to  Pakistan Army’s chief spokesperson, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, sustained major damage. Some Pakistani news outlets reported, without supporting evidence, that one of India’s S-400 air defence systems had been destroyed at Adampour. 

Outlandish claims aside, it is evident Pakistan dominated the battle air space. Analysts have been left pondering how was this possible given India’s greater resources, manpower, number of platforms, and budget. It is increasingly apparent part of the answer lies in Pakistan’s possession of cutting-edge Chinese-made weapons and platforms. 

According to Pravin Sawhney, a prominent Indian defence commentator, supported by Western analysis, it was the combination of Chinese-made J-10C and JF-17 fighter planes, armed with the Chinese PL-15 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles—whose unconfirmed maximum speed is Mach 5—that tipped the balance. An additional force multiplier was Pakistan’s access to China’s extensive satellite network, which aided missile targeting. This gave Pakistan complete visibility of the battle space. Finally, Pakistan’s nine Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft proved critical. 

India’s poor performance against its significantly smaller neighbour confirmed the Indian military’s worst fears: it wasn’t ready for a head-on confrontation with Pakistan. According to a recent New York Times article, in 2018, a parliamentary report categorized 68 percent of the country’s military equipment as “vintage,” 24 percent as current and only 8 percent as state-of-the-art. Five years later, Indian military officials admitted there had been insufficient change because of the size of their challenge; more than 50 percent of the equipment remained old. The recent purchase of 36 Rafale jets was meant to give a real boost to India’s capability. This is why the potential loss of three of them, each estimated to cost $288 million, is such a psychological and moral blow to India.

While it’s doubtful Pakistan would have been able to sustain such an intense operational tempo for any length of time, given the country’s dire economic situation, Washington’s mediation of a complete ceasefire was a welcome circuit-braker to a situation which could have potentially spiralled out of control. 

But the reaction to Washington’s ceasefire announcement, coupled with President Trump’s statement that he would help find a “solution” to Kashmir, was quite different in Islamabad and New Delhi. With Pakistan finishing distinctly ahead in the military confrontation, President Trump’s decision to put Kashmir back on the international radar screen was warmly welcomed by Islamabad. On the other hand, while India avoided potentially more humiliating damage to its military infrastructure and further loss of costly platforms, PM Modi was not impressed by Washington’s forceful insertion into the on-going behind-the-scenes bilateral ceasefire negotiations. Even more irritating to the lndian leader was that the ceasefire ‘re-hyphenated’ Pakistan and India— putting them on an equal international footing—and internationalised the Kashmir dispute. This is an outcome rejected by all major Indian political parties but absolutely welcomed by all in Pakistan.   

The brief, but decisive, military clash between the two South Asian protagonists is an inflection point in their bilateral relations and for the region in general for several reasons. 

First, by absorbing the initial Indian strike, followed by an intense retaliatory attack, Pakistan reestablished its deterrence credibility. Second, given the critical role Chinese platforms and weapons systems played in having Pakistan quickly gain the upper hand militarily, these must not be underestimated in a future conflict. Third, given that India and Pakistan hit targets deep inside each other’s territory across the international border—rather than limiting these to the other’s Kashmir area, as was always the case previously other than in an all-out war—means that we can expect future bilateral military confrontations (below the nuclear threshold) to be as equally intense and across the international border. Fourth, with President Trump wanting “to fix” Kashmir, Pakistan managed to have Kashmir put back on the international agenda—an outcome utterly anathema to India’s aim of keeping it strictly a bilateral issue. Fifth, Kashmir-focused non-state actors will feel encouraged by the outcomes of this confrontation, quite possibly leading to an increase in terrorist activity. Sixth, China will also feel emboldened towards a humbled India, tempting it to perhaps prod in the volatile Ladakh region of Indian-administered Kashmir. Last, but certainly not least, India’s underwhelming military performance will most likely have US Defense Department officials question the long-term effectiveness of India as a counterweight to China.

In the short-term, the ceasefire should hold. However, it will come under intense strain if the two parties do not resolve quickly the most pressing immediate issue between the two countries: ending India’s suspension of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The IWT, which was never previously suspended even during previous wars, regulates the Indus water flowing downstream to Pakistan. It is literally the life line for millions of Pakistanis. Pakistan officials have made it clear that any disruption to the flow of water would be considered an “act of war”. Accordingly, failure to resolve the IWT issue quickly, may well lead to another military confrontation.

Dr Claude Rakisits is a Canberra-based geo-strategic analyst who has been following South Asian issues for over 40 years.