The New Order casts a long shadow over Prabowo presidency

The inauguration of retired general Prabowo Subianto on Sunday marked the achievement of a decades-long personal ambition to become Indonesia’s president. He had earlier won a convincing victory in the February 2024 election, thanks to a very well-organised campaign, but also due in no small part to the resources provided by then incumbent President Joko Widodo (Jokowi).  It didn’t seem to matter that they had been engaged in prior years in two bitterly fought presidential contests, back when Jokowi was being presented as a reformer while Prabowo was seen as a tough military man who would bring back order to the perceived chaos of democratic politics.

While armies of social media ‘buzzers’ and influencers have subsequently created a brand new image for Prabowo, as a cuddly elder statemen, there can be little doubt that he now intends to rule with a firm hand.  That has not prevented him from emulating Jokowi’s successful ‘big tent politics’ strategy, bringing in an array of individuals from different political parties and social organisations, while simultaneously being more insistent than his predecessor that everyone plays by his rule book. So far, most have been on board, perhaps underlining how unashamedly transactional the business of coalition building is in Indonesian politics, where few would want to be left out of the corridors of power. Not for Prabowo is the indiscipline of decentralised authority – it is his way or the highway.

A week before his inauguration, he met over a hundred people to fill his extra-large cabinet and other executive body positions.  Merging with the usual suspects from the political, bureaucratic (and business) worlds were former student and human rights activists who had once fought against the authoritarian New Order, led for three decades by Suharto, Prabowo’s late former father-in-law.  Several of these activists had experienced abduction and torture by military units loyal to Prabowo when he was a leading New Order-era general or were otherwise imprisoned during the Suharto regime. There are some strange bedfellows indeed in Prabowo’s big tent coalition.

Have they joined Prabowo because the latter has had a change of heart and is now devoted to democracy and human rights? Both are mentioned, after all, in his cornerstone Asta Cita (Eight Goals or Aspirations) policy document.  To believe so would require a lot of wishful thinking if Prabowo’s past behaviour is a useful predictor of his future actions.

While having finally won the presidency by playing by the rules of Indonesia’s democratic game – albeit heavily skewed in his favour by Jokowi’s blatant interventions as well as formidable electoral machinery – there is little to suggest a fundamental change in the way that Prabowo views how power should be wielded.  His origins, after all, lie at the very heart of the New Order-created oligarchy, made up of politico-bureaucratic and big business alliances, which still dominate Indonesia’s institutions of governance in the democratic era, and whose ascendance had been buttressed by the coercive apparatus of the state.

Given such origins, and in spite of his own cosmopolitan family, he has bemoaned how Western ‘cultural products’ like direct presidential elections are accepted by the Indonesian public. These allegedly contradict some sort of eternal authentic Indonesian culture that he likes to imagine.

But what will Prabowo do with the power of the presidency, now that he has finally got it? The first matter would be to gradually free himself from Jokowi’s still outstretched tentacles.  This might seem odd given that the Prabowo-Jokowi tactical alliance had been cemented by Prabowo’s acceptance of Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as running mate, in spite of the legal shenanigans required to make this possible. Yet, it is now firmly in Prabowo’s interest, no matter how much of Jokowi’s policies he continues, to use power to shore up his own patronage networks, as all Indonesian presidents have done since Suharto with varying levels of success.

Many of the individuals tapped by Prabowo for top positions in government had served in Jokowi’s cabinets and quite a few had been adversaries at one time or another.  This move is skilfully being presented as signifying an intent at political reconciliation. The inclusion of aides and associates of Jokowi, who continues to enjoy a very high level of popularity, also has the advantage of allaying fears about sudden policy disruptions.

Yet there will be the inevitable cabinet reshuffles in future. These will serve to further Prabowo’s own power base at the expense of Jokowi’s. Gibran, the former president’s 37-year-old son could then find himself no more than an isolated prop, barring unforeseen serious health problems for the 73-year-old new president.

Prabowo will likely begin his term by pushing for the signature policies of his electoral campaign, including the idea of providing free lunches and milk to schoolchildren across the sprawling Indonesian archipelago through what would require a costly and military-like command operation.  He has also talked up his intention of fighting corruption by raising the salaries of civilian and military employees of state. Such policies will help to bolster Prabowo’s claims of being pro-people, in spite of his background among Jakarta’s most cloistered elite families.

In truth, any anti-corruption campaign would be undermined by the fact that the Corruption Eradication Commission has already been defanged by Jokowi. This alone would assist any Prabowo effort to build up a much more centralised network of patronage than his predecessor ever had, since it would require unfettered access to state institutions and their resources.

Fears that Prabowo’s stated aim to attain 8% annual GDP growth is partly based on freeing up businesses involved in extractive industries from environmental protocols are not without merit. Not coincidentally he and his businessman brother, Hashim, have significant holdings in such industries.

Prabowo ultimately benefits from the fact he will operate in a political environment that has become more authoritarian-like, ushered in by Jokowi in his quest to nurture a political dynasty. Tragically Jokowi was once considered by many analysts as the great hope of Indonesian reformasi. Far fewer could reasonably have such illusions about his successor.

Professor Vedi Hadiz is the Director of the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne.

Image:  January 12th, 2024 - Indonesian presidential candidate (Capres) Prabowo Subianto was respectful when meeting with his supporters in the city of Palembang. / shutterstock.com