The harsh realities Of Myanmar’s current situation

The fourth anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February prompted the publication of numerous op-eds and online commentaries assessing the situation in the country and weighing up the chances of the junta’s survival for another year. There had already been a slew of premature predictions of an opposition victory, but the latest articles tended to be more measured in tone and cautious in their judgements. 

These articles appear to have attracted the attention of the Myanmar-watching public and helped to dampen down unrealistic expectations. However, there were a few notable pieces that do not seem to have been given the attention they deserve. This was most likely due to their pessimism. In considering the continuing tragedy of Myanmar’s civil war, however, and the country’s uncertain future, they warrant closer examination.

One article was by the independent Australian researcher David Scott Mathieson, who published an article in the Asia Times that dissected a “2024 Military Progress Report” issued by the shadow National Unity Government (NUG). Mathieson argued convincingly that the NUG’s claim of successive military victories, and political gains, was based on a selective, carefully worded and not altogether honest reading of developments over the past year.

Mathieson pointed out, for example, that most of the opposition movement’s military victories last year were achieved by ethnic armed organisations, none of which were under the command of the NUG or even, in some cases, owed it their allegiance. He also questioned the basis of the oft-repeated claim that the opposition movement “controls” (whatever that means) 44% of Myanmar’s townships, while the junta “controls” only 32%. 

Other statistics cited by the NUG were equally shaky. For example, the NUG claimed that more than 14,000 junta soldiers were killed in 2024 and some 7,300 were injured. It also claimed that 14,760 junta personnel had “defected” to the opposition. As Mathieson explained, these numbers were not supported by any hard evidence and could easily be challenged, on several grounds. Some appeared to be deliberately misleading.

Mathieson also warned against the “conflation of revolutionary actors into a unified front”, when the reality was a large number of disparate ethnic, political and military groups, often with differing agendas, that were only loosely allied against the junta. The same point was made in another important article, published in The Irrawaddy by its Executive Editor, Kyaw Zwa Moe, on 21 February.

Kyaw Zwa Moe’s timely article attempted to dispel what he called “some key illusions about Myanmar”. These were that any elections staged by the junta would lead to a democracy; that a meaningful dialogue with the junta was possible; and that opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi would be released from prison soon. The target of his article seemed to be foreign governments and international organisations that seemed reluctant to face the hard facts.

To take his points in turn:

The junta’s plans to hold elections later this year or next year have been welcomed by China, India and Thailand. The aim seems to be to bury the results of the 2020 elections (which resulted in a landslide for Aung San Suu Kyi’s party) and create a new parliament that will appoint the junta’s chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to the position of president. This ostensibly civilian government could then claim popular endorsement, and thus a degree of legitimacy, while the armed forces continued to exercise real power behind the scenes.

As Kyaw Zwa Moe pointed out, the entire process would be a complete sham, even if polls could be carried out in those parts of the country under the junta’s nominal control. 

Another illusion was “the possibility of a genuine dialogue with the junta”. 

In January this year, the European Union and the governments of the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Timor-Leste issued a joint statement supporting “genuine, constructive and inclusive dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Myanmar and a return to the path of inclusive democracy”. The sentiment might be heartfelt, but there is no realistic expectation that this will be achieved, at least not any time soon.

Ever since the coup in 1962 that first brought the armed forces to power in Myanmar, the military leadership has demonstrated a consistent, single-minded pursuit of dominance in all spheres of national life. At times, it has shown a surprising degree of flexibility, as illustrated by the election of Aung San Suu Kyi’s quasi-democratic government in 2015. However, the goal of effective control over the entire country has never changed. This was underlined by the February 2021 coup.

The third of Kyaw Zwa Moe’s listed illusions is that Aung San Suu Kyi will be released soon. As he has pointed out, there are no signs that the opposition leader, who will turn 80 this year, will be allowed to enjoy the freedom to rally the opposition movement in Myanmar or seek the support of the international community for a more democratic government. She is likely to remain incarcerated for as long as the junta survives.

There is one other abiding illusion that Kyaw Zwa Moe did not mention in his article, but which is implicit in everything he said. That is the belief held by many activists, human rights campaigners and others that the international community can, and will, exert sufficient pressure on the military regime to make it change its fundamental approach to the exercise of power in Myanmar. As history repeatedly has shown, this is most unlikely.

There have been major political, economic and social upheavals in Myanmar in 1962, 1974, 1988, 2007 and 2021. There were crises of other kinds in 2008 and 2017. Some of these episodes, such as the 1962 military coup, slipped by almost unnoticed by the international community. Others, notably the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” and the 2017 Rohingya massacres, attracted much greater attention and widespread condemnation.

However, at no time has the international community made any moves directly to intervene in Myanmar’s internal affairs. It has been content to criticize the behavior of the regime, pass resolutions in forums like the UN and to levy sanctions of various kinds. Despite the fears of the armed forces leadership, and the pleas of various activist groups, serious thought has never been given to the provision of lethal aid to the opposition movement, let alone direct military action, such as an invasion. No foreign country wants to go to war in Myanmar.

All this is now well known to the junta, whose members are convinced that they are safe for as long as they remain behind Myanmar’s borders. They thus feel free to act with impunity, regardless of public opinion, humanitarian law or threats from the international community. In this position, they are actively supported by China and Russia, and assisted by the self-interest, disunity and inaction of Myanmar’s regional neighbours. 

Such are the harsh realities of the current situation in Myanmar, as it faces its fifth year under the junta’s brutal and uncompromising rule.

Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. His latest book is “Myanmar: The Making of an Intelligence State” (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, forthcoming).