ASEAN’s Myanmar problem

In April 2021, ASEAN leaders held a special meeting to consider the military coup in Myanmar and agreed on five points of consensus intended to produce a peaceful solution to the violence through constructive dialogue and allow for the provision of humanitarian assistance through ASEAN mechanisms.

Since then, violence has only escalated and there has been no dialogue among the parties and very limited humanitarian assistance. Myanmar’s exiled National Unity Government (NUG) and commentators want the Five Point Consensus reviewed and reframed, most notably by expanded engagement by ASEAN with non-junta actors.

Analysts argue ASEAN is weak and compromised by some of its members who are themselves military regimes or have flawed democracies. They regard ASEAN’s perceived tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and consensus-based decision making as sources of weakness preventing a more robust response to Myanmar’s crisis.

This criticism is odd as there is no other member state issue that has so exercised ASEAN. Indeed, ASEAN has a tradition of speaking out about Myanmar’s internal affairs while remaining silent following flawed elections, state sponsored violence, judicial interference and military coups in other member nations.

ASEAN’s public criticism of Myanmar goes back to 2003 when its foreign ministers expressed concern about the slow pace of democratisation and called for national reconciliation. At the 2005 ASEAN Summit, Myanmar was urged to release political prisoners and expedite democratic reforms and was pressed to forego its turn to take up ASEAN’s rotating chair in 2006. And the 2021 Leaders’ meeting was the first ever ASEAN meeting at leaders’ level to address concern over developments within a member state.

The suspension of leader- and foreign minister-level participation by Myanmar at ASEAN meetings is similarly unprecedented and has been sustained notwithstanding ASEAN internal differences on how to deal with Myanmar. In 2023, leaders decided to let the Philippines take Myanmar’s turn at the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026 with the rotation thereafter to continue in alphabetical order, effectively pushing Myanmar’s next chairmanship out to 2036.

While the Five Point Consensus has failed to achieve its objectives (other than a modest amount of humanitarian assistance), it has nevertheless had some utility. The Myanmar junta’s failure to adhere to the Consensus encouraged Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia to speak out more strongly and triggered ASEAN’s more robust posture, including the exclusion of political representatives from leader and ministerial meetings. The Consensus has become the undertaking that is used to hold the junta to account leading to censure, suspension from high level meetings and cancellation of Myanmar’s 2026 ASEAN Chairmanship.

The inability of ASEAN to achieve an end to the violence in Myanmar is not explained by simplified narratives about ASEAN’s principles of non-interference or consensus decision making. Constructive dialogue between the parties to the conflict hasn’t happened because none of the parties want it. The military junta label those resisting the coup as terrorists and have vowed to annihilate them. For its part, the exiled NUG argues that durable peace will never be achieved by enabling, engaging and cooperating with the military whose permanent removal is their ultimate goal. Ethnic resistance organisations are fighting not for the status quo ante but for a new, federal democratic union to be conceived. And with recent significant hard-won battlefield victories the mood does not favour pausing to negotiate a compromise.

Calls for Myanmar’s suspension from ASEAN reveal that some members support a more robust response from the grouping, but what are the likely consequences? While it would unshackle those member states and enable them to impose unilateral measures, it would also damage ASEAN unity and have the contradictory outcome of weakening ASEAN’s (albeit limited) leverage over the rogue regime. Preserving ASEAN and the cherished notion of ASEAN centrality are likely to continue to trump other considerations in the minds of the region’s policy makers.

That said, ASEAN’s hand needs to be strengthened. The rotational nature of the ASEAN Special Envoy is a structural weakness only partially ameliorated by the creation of a troika involving the current, previous and incoming ASEAN Chairs. While this will provide a greater level of continuity in ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar (with both the junta and the NUG), the relationship between the troika and the Special Envoy has not been spelled out.

Other proposals to strengthen ASEAN’s hand include appointing a senior and respected person as Special Envoy (rather than the Foreign Minister or a senior official of whichever member’s turn it is to be Chair of the Association), to lengthen the term of the Special Envoy and to strengthen the position by providing support through a dedicated, professionally staffed secretariat. These steps, including greater engagement with non-junta actors, can take place without revisiting the Five Point Consensus.

Indeed, efforts to revise the Consensus should be avoided as this would support the junta’s position that it is no longer relevant or appropriate and the junta certainly would not agree to strengthening or widening the Consensus. Differences within ASEAN would also come to the fore to the advantage of the junta. The best strategy is to keep the Consensus while strengthening ASEAN’s hand as proposed.

Having regard to the differences within ASEAN on how to proceed, it is remarkable that it has taken and sustained the steps it has against the military regime. This is recognised by the United Nations and most of the world who remain staunchly supportive of ASEAN ownership of the Myanmar problem.

Nicholas Coppel, President of the Australia Myanmar Institute and former Australian Ambassador to Myanmar. With Associate Professor Lennon Chang, he is the author of “Myanmar’s Digital Coup: How the World Responded” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).