ASEAN’s unity under the microscope

The spotlight is again on ASEAN’s ability to maintain its unity and centrality amidst growing contentious regional and international issues. The 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and related Meetings took place in Vientiane from 25 to 27 July 2024. It involved over 15 ministerial gatherings with major powers including the US, China, Japan, the EU and Russia. This marks a significant moment for Laos as ASEAN Chair for the third time. Unlike its chairmanship in 2004 and 2016, this year proves to be more challenging with rising tensions in Myanmar and the South China Sea, as well as other global crises.

Traditionally more inclined towards economic and socio-cultural priorities, Laos has had to grapple with balancing contentious geopolitical issues that have become increasingly polarised. These issues have amplified the difficulties of bridging ASEAN member states’ diverse interests and national positions.

The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey highlights the region’s growing concern about ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in addressing fluid political and economic developments, risking ASEAN’s irrelevance in the new world order. Furthermore, more than half of the regional respondents surveyed felt that ASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited. This sentiment is becoming more pronounced in discussions on critical issues such as the South China Sea, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as the situation in Myanmar.

The long-drawn drafting of the Joint Communique (JC) of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (which was finalised two days after the meeting) has underscored the contentions surrounding regional issues, especially the South China Sea. This time, differences between the Philippines and several member states are even more stark amid tensions between China and the Philippines. The latter has accused the China Coast Guard of launching a “brutal assault” with bladed weapons, causing a Philippines Navy serviceman to lose his right thumb. The Philippines’ attempts to include a reference to this incident in the Joint Communiqué (JC) faced resistance from other member states, in particular Cambodia and this year’s Chair. This could potentially push the Philippines further from ASEAN due to the perceived lack of support from the bloc.

The emergence of the SQUAD—a new minilateral comprising the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines—as well as other trilaterals between the Philippines and major powers, reflect a perceived failure of ASEAN to stand up to China’s assertiveness effectively. Although ASEAN adopted the Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an Effective and Substantive Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea last year, with a target to finalise negotiations within three years, internal divisions within ASEAN could undermine these efforts. Such divisions may grant China a strategic advantage in Southeast Asia’s vital sea lanes. ASEAN’s ability to safeguard its maritime interests will depend on the claimant states’ (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam) willingness to resolve disputes collectively among themselves.  While the COC is still in progress, the formalisation of the ASEAN Coast Guard Forum will be a significant step towards enhancing ASEAN’s role in regional maritime security and maintaining its centrality in addressing these critical issues.

"The Philippines’ attempts to include a reference to this incident in the Joint Communiqué (JC) faced resistance from other member states, in particular Cambodia and this year’s Chair. This could potentially push the Philippines further from ASEAN due to the perceived lack of support from the bloc."

Similarly, the conflict in Gaza has further polarised ASEAN members, particularly between Muslim-majority countries and those maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. This divide illustrates how domestic politics and religious sentiments can complicate consensus-building within ASEAN, making negotiations in a politically charged environment especially challenging. However, the detailed discussion of the Middle East situation in the Joint Communique—one of the longest paragraphs dedicated in the document—demonstrates that despite diverse views, ASEAN can find common ground when its members are willing to respect each other’s differing perspectives.

While the situation in Ukraine garners less attention in the region due to the geographical distance, the reluctance to explicitly condemn the aggressor in ASEAN discussions suggests a delicate balancing act influenced by ties with Russia. This is evidenced by the region’s poor response to the Ukraine peace summit in June. As such, the unspoken elements of ASEAN’s deliberations often carry as much weight as the published content, especially when bridging diverse interests proves difficult.

The deteriorating situation in Myanmar continues to dominate discussions with no viable solution in sight. At the invitation of the Lao Chair, Myanmar continued to send its “non-political representative” to the meetings despite still showing no support for the full implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). Informal consultations, akin to an ASEAN Troika mechanism that was proposed by Indonesia last year, finally convened between the past, current and incoming Chairs. The JC called for the participation of “other interested ASEAN Member states”, in effect expanding the idea of a troika but it remains to be seen if the call for expanded participation will be answered. What is clear though is that an institutionalised mechanism of consultations will ensure sustained engagement with stakeholders and greater continuity from chair to chair.

The challenge of facilitating inclusive dialogues in Myanmar, without undermining ASEAN’s non-interference principle, underscores the limitations of ASEAN’s approach to resolving the complex crisis. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has remained intransigent by appointing himself acting President recently. The junta’s loss of control in certain areas to anti-junta forces means that the ASEAN Humanitarian Centre (AHA) has been unable to reach areas outside of junta-controlled areas. More importantly, there are fissures in ASEAN concerning Myanmar. Some members want to bring “Myanmar back to the fold” sooner, while others are digging in their heels, and are convinced that the junta remains uncommitted to the peace plan.

True to its theme of “Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience”, Laos made some strides in ASEAN’s community building and regional integration, notably through new connectivity initiatives like the Thailand-Laos train service and the ASEAN Express linking Malaysia, Thailand, Laos and China. However, the ongoing challenges of internal division and external pressures highlight the need for a more unified approach, other than delivering the feel-good factors.

The meetings in Vientiane present ASEAN with the opportunity to reinforce its resilience and relevance as the region’s strategic convenor. As more countries seek formal partnerships or accession to ASEAN’s instruments, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the bloc must remember that its centrality begins with internal cohesion. A divided ASEAN risks undermining its aspirations and potential as a driving force in regional and global affairs. Whether it be Laos or subsequent chairs, maintaining unity to enhance centrality will remain critical for ASEAN.

Joanne Lin is an Associate Senior Fellow with the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Sharon Seah is a Senior Fellow and concurrent Coordinator at the ASEAN Studies Centre and Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

This article originally appeared on the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute's Fulcrum on 30 July 2024.