Anatomy of A Train Highjacking

On 11 March, a Pakistani train, Jaffer Express, travelling from Quetta to Peshawar with 450 passengers onboard, was highjacked by Baloch militants as it passed through the rugged terrain of Balochistan, a sprawling, sparsely populated, province in the country’s southwest. The security forces conducted a successful military operation to secure the release of hostages. The siege continued for almost 30 hours resulting in the deaths of 21 civilians and four military personnel while all 33 attackers were killed. The separatist Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) accepted responsibility for this attack. While Pakistan is no stranger to terrorism, the coordinated nature of this attack, and its magnitude, makes this one of the most high-profile incidents of insurgent violence in recent years. 

The BLA was responsible for the deadliest terrorist attack of 2024 when the Quetta train station was bombed in November, killing 25 people. There has been a sharp increase in the number of attacks by Baloch separatists in recent years. The BLA, and other groups such as the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), were responsible for 504 attacks in 2024, a big jump from the 116 attacks recorded in 2023. The Jaffer Express train incident reflects a new confidence among Baloch separatists. In the days following this attack, there have been several other incidents of terrorism in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan. This surge in insurgent violence has led to calls from the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan for a “hard state” response. On 18 March, the National Security Committee of federal parliament met to develop a national consensus on countering the rise in violence. All the major political parties except the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) of former Prime Minister Imran Khan attended this meeting.

Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan in territorial terms (42 percent) and smallest in terms of population (4.5 percent). According to the 2023 census, its population is estimated at 15 million. It is home to 12 of the 20 most impoverished districts of Pakistan. Yet Balochistan is the site of lucrative natural resources such as gas and copper. Pakistan’s new major deep-sea port of Gwadar, labelled as the crown jewel in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is situated in Balochistan. In addition to natural resources, Balochistan derives its strategic significance from its borders with Iran and Afghanistan. 

The current wave of political violence in Balochistan is symptomatic of a long history of troubled relations between Islamabad and Quetta. Despite being rich in natural resources, Balochistan presents a picture of gross socio-economic underdevelopment. In Balochistan, the widespread view holds that the federal government is responsible for transferring natural resources outside the province to the detriment of the local population. 

There have been five waves of insurgency in Balochistan since 1947. The Baloch nationalists blame various security agencies for committing gross human rights violations, especially cases of missing persons, who are allegedly picked up by intelligence agencies. The federal government established a Commission on Enforced Disappearances in 2011 that remained largely inactive on this issue. These conditions present a fertile environment for growth of militancy in the province. 

Violence perpetrated by the Baloch separatists along with Islamic insurgents, especially the Taliban, who are engaged in armed rebellion elsewhere, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province), has led to serious deterioration in the security situation in Pakistan. According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2024 Pakistan was the second-most terrorism affected state in the world, jumping two spots from the previous year. Pakistan’s restive neighbor Afghanistan was number nine on this index. There was a 45 percent increase in terrorism-related fatalities in Pakistan in 2024 with a total of 1081 deaths. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was the actor responsible for most of these deaths.

For some, Balochistan was already at a ‘point of no return’ long before the recent upsurge in militancy in the province. The current round of insurgency started in early 2000s during the period of General Musharraf. The situation took a turn for the worse when former Chief Minister Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed in a mountain cave by Pakistan’s armed forces in August 2006. For almost two decades now, Balochistan has been caught between the military and the militants, with few efforts to address the broader issues of maladministration, poverty and excessive use of force. 

The growing militancy in Balochistan also is indicative of the decline of major ethnonationalist parties in the province. There are many shades of Baloch nationalism. First, the traditional Baloch nationalist parties, dominated by the tribal elders, i.e., sardars, operated within the framework of the constitution and electoral politics. Parties such as the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP) of Sardar Akhter Mengal and National Party (NP) of Dr. Abdul Malik operate in the electoral arena. Second, in recent decades, the nascent Baloch middle class has joined the nationalist movement changing the sociological profile of Baloch nationalism. A new platform for expression for Baloch grievances is the recently formed social movement, Baloch Yekjehti Committee (Baloch Unity Committee) led by a young woman Dr. Mahrang Baloch. It started out as a movement for recovery of Baloch missing persons and mobilised women and youth. It has emerged as the new face of Baloch nationalism. In the face of a security clampdown in Balochistan following the Jaffer Express incident, parties such as the BNP have come out strongly in support of Baloch nationalist mobilisation. Finally, there are the Baloch militant groups such as the BLA, which reject the constitution and is engaged in an armed struggle against the state in pursuit of a separate homeland.

The BLA is the most prominent actor among the Baloch rebels. It emerged in the 1990s under the leadership of Balach Marri, son of tribal chief Nawab Khair Baksh Marri. Balach was killed in a presumed NATO strike in Afghanistan in November 2007. The BLA seems to be thriving under the ‘new middle-class’ leadership. In 2010, the group launched its suicide squad known as Majeed Brigade, which was involved in the 2018 attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi and the 2022 attack on the China Center within the Karachi University by a female suicide bomber. The BLA has targetted Punjabis of mostly working-class backgrounds in acts of ethnic cleansing. The highjacking of the Jaffer Express by BLA insurgents presents a dangerous expansion in the group’s tactics. The group has benefitted from the wide-spread disillusionment of Baloch youth in the face of the alleged abuses and human rights violations committed by security institutions against the Baloch population. 

In recent years, the BLA has targeted Chinese nationals, causing embarrassment to Pakistan. It has carried out multiple attacks against Chinese nationals and CPEC-related infrastructure. What makes the Chinese so unwelcome to Baloch separatists? The BLA blames China for joining hands with the Pakistan Army in its suppression of the Baloch. These groups also harbour suspicion towards the Chinese for allegedly planning to exploit the province’s vast resources with zero gains for the local population.  The BLA has carried out several well-known incidents of terrorism against Chinese engineers and workers. 

The Jaffer Express incident has led to renewed calls for kinetic and non-kinetic measures to curb militancy in Balochistan. The official narrative in Pakistan emphasises the role of external actors, especially India and Afghanistan, in providing material, logistical and diplomatic support to Baloch rebels. The Shahbaz Sharif-led federal government has called for a revival of the National Action Plan (NAP), Pakistan’s premier counter-terrorism strategy. The Jaffer Express incident has re-ignited a public debate in Pakistan on the Baloch question. The civilian and military leadership have vowed to give a hard response to terrorists. In addition to the military option, the state needs to reach out to various stakeholders in Balochistan to find a long-term solution to the Baloch discontent. 

Asma Faiz is Associate Professor and Director of Political Science program at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Pakistan.