Japan–US relations from Trump to Biden: the challenges ahead

In the turmoil of the Trump years, US-Japan relations were strained over everything from the cost of maintaining US forces in Japan to North Korea and China. Prof. Purnendra Jain argues the early signs from the Biden administration are promising and leaving Japan a little more confident in the value of its core security alliance.

Japan and the United States have maintained a relatively solid alliance since they signed a security treaty following the end of the Pacific War. The security treaty has remained the lynchpin of their bilateral relationship. There have been moments of stress and strain in the past, but the relationship entered a particularly nerve-racking phase from the time Donald Trump entered the White House in January 2017 until a new administration under Joe Biden was sworn in on 20 January this year.

With Biden in office, the bilateral relationship is likely to return to a degree of predictability and consistency with greater consultation on matters affecting bilateral relations and their views on global issues. Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga was the first Asian leader to speak to Biden soon after the new president took office. Early indications suggest they have established a good personal rapport and have agreed to address each other by their first names: Joe and Yoshi. But there are critical domestic, regional and global issues facing both the US and Japan that will test the political acumen of the two leaders and that will have to be overcome if they are to forge a meaningful partnership.

Trump and Abe

Like many of America’s allies and partners, Japan suffered four years of uncertainty under the erratic foreign policy of Donald Trump. Credit goes to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for managing to engage Trump by cultivating a personal relationship with him and avoiding the worst consequences of the Trump interregnum for Japan. Under Abe, Japan withstood pressure to shoulder a greater share of the costs of maintaining US forces in Japan, the threat of new tariffs on Japanese exports to the US, and demands to buy more arms.

Abe could not dissuade Trump from jettisoning global institutions such as the World Health Organisation, the Paris Accord on climate change or the Trans Pacific Partnership, all of which damaged the reputation of the US and instilled anxiety in the minds of allies and partners. However, The Trump administration did latch on to Abe’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and the Quadrliateral Security Dialogue framework, or the Quad, signalling the Trump administration’s intentions to remain engaged with the region and push back against China.

Former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe was able to forge a personal relationship with former US President Donald Trump. Image credit: Trump White House Archives, Flickr.

Of all US allies, Japan has been the most dependent on its chief alliance partner and security provider because of the difficult strategic situation it faced on its borders during both the Cold War and post-Cold war periods. During the Cold War, Japan perceived a threat from the Soviet Union, now Russia. Japan continues to have territorial disputes with Russia. A peace treaty still eludes the pair 75 years after the end of the Pacific War. While Russia is significantly weakened today, and Japan does not regard Russia a serious military threat, Japan’s security remains vulnerable because of the North Korean regime and its nuclear and missile programs, and because of uncertainty over the strategic designs of the People’s Republic of China, with which Japan has developed deep economic links over the past four decades.

Japan’s defence is essentially underwritten by the US by virtue of their post-War security treaty. Although today Japan’s Self Defence Force is well equipped, Japan has neither an offensive capacity nor a nuclear capability because of its long history of nuclear aversion and preference to remain a ‘pacifist state’, as required through a constitutional provision that prohibits Japan from maintaining war potential and the use or threat of force as means of settling international disputes. It is here that US extended deterrence, which includes not just military deterrence but also nuclear deterrence, becomes so crucial for Japan. In exchange for this security insurance, Japan bears a heavy financial and political responsibility of hosting US forces on its soil, the largest outside of the US.

Trump’s erratic dealings with North Korea and China greatly unsettled Japan. Without consulting or even informing the Japanese government, Trump decided to hold meetings with Kim Jung-un after Trump had threatened Kim that he would be ‘met with fire and fury’ and declared him as ‘rocket man on suicide mission’. In their meetings, Trump did not raise Japan’s concerns over nuclear and missile developments or abduction of Japanese nationals by the North Korean regime, giving Tokyo the impression that Trump was unconcerned about Japan’s security.

On China, too, Trump was inconsistent: going soft and hard in a bipolar fashion. Towards the end of his term, and especially after the pandemic breakout which he called the ‘Chinese virus’, Trump and his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo adopted an increasingly confrontational tone on China, which widened the gap with Japan over the best way to manage the China challenge. We can only wonder how Trump would have treated China had he won a second term!

Suga and Biden

Abe’s sudden resignation last August brought his lieutenant and right-hand man Suga to the leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and of government, a few months prior to Biden taking office. It means both leaders are new to their jobs, yet both are seasoned politicians. While Biden is well versed in foreign policy matters, Suga, the former chief cabinet secretary, is a novice in the field, as his political career has revolved around domestic policy and managing party and government.

Both leaders are focused on challenging domestic issues: Biden’s main focus will be on economic recovery, healing deep racial and societal divisions, and dealing with the highly contagious pandemic, which has left more than 500,000 Americans dead. Coming from the same party as Abe and being a close associate of Abe, Suga’s domestic agenda will be similar to that of his predecessor.  We can expect continuity in policies on the economy, constitutional reform, the pandemic, and the fate of the postponed Olympics due mid-this year.

But both Suga and Biden will need to work on key foreign policy issues that affect their bilateral relations as well as those that impact on regional and global matters.

Challenges and Prospects

There are three challenging bilateral matters pertaining to Japan’s security on which Japan expects the Biden administration to be consistent and reasonable for Tokyo to feel reassured of the US commitment to the alliance. The first relates to North Korea. Going by a statement of Biden’s Press Secretary Jen Psaki it is clear there will be a more measured stance on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and there will be an internal review as well as a consultative process involving Japan and South Korea, which is good news for Tokyo.

The second is China policy. It is likely that the new administration will maintain the Trump administration’s tough stance without being as confrontational. This matches Japan’s policy of simultaneous engagement and hedging. However, Japan will not want Washington to pursue a policy of ‘strategic patience’ with China, a term the Obama administration used for North Korea, which proved to be a disaster. On a positive note for Tokyo, Biden reassured Suga that the defence of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, administered by Japan and claimed by China, is covered under the US-Japan security treaty.

The third matter concerns Japan’s financial contribution to the maintenance and support of close to 55,000 US troops at 78 locations in Japan. The current five-year host nation agreement, which outlines costs that Tokyo must bear, expires at the end of this month. The Trump administration wanted to shift a significantly higher share of the cost onto Japan, and negotiations stalled. New negotiations will start soon, but in the meantime the two sides have agreed on a one-year renewal costing Japan 200 billion yen ($A 2.4 billion), slightly higher than previous years.

Then-Vice President Joe Biden addresses US forces stationed in Yokota, Japan - August 24, 2011. Image credit: US Indo-Pacific Command, Flickr.

Beyond these three bilateral matters, just like the Trump administration, the new administration in Washington has expressed its commitment to a Japan-led Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, and to the strengthening of the Quad. Japan also will work closely with the Biden administration on climate change – Suga has committed to make Japan carbon neutral by 2050. Yet how Japan will achieve this target is highly debatable because of its increasing reliance on coal-fired power plants and the obstacles to returning nuclear energy’s share of electricity supply to pre-Fukushima levels.

All these bilateral and regional policy challenges notwithstanding, the Biden administration will allow Japan to feel a little more confident in the alliance and that Tokyo and Washington are at least on the same page on critical security issues like North Korea and the defence of Japan’s territories. Still, it is not clear how the personal relationship between Biden and Suga might develop. Suga’s popularity has sunk to a critical level and he faces a leadership contest and a general election this year. No one in Japan or around the world would like to see Japan return to the days of revolving door prime ministers, as happened between 2006 and 2012 before Abe returned to the helm and became the longest-serving prime minister in Japan’s parliamentary history.

Purnendra Jain is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Banner image: Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga delivers his first press conference of 2021, Tokyo, Japan - January 4, 2021. Image credit: @JPN_PMO, Twitter.