Why President Lee Jae-myung’s pragmatic diplomacy could move South Korea towards China

South Korea’s 3 June presidential election has resulted in the Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung’s electoral victory. This snap election was triggered by the then President Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed martial law declaration, his impeachment in December 2024, and the South Korean Constitutional Court’s unanimous 8-0 decision to uphold the impeachment in April 2025. Once again, the presidency switches from the conservative People’s Power Party to the liberal Democratic Party. 

President Lee’s campaign promise to pursue “a pragmatic and national-interest-based diplomacy towards the United States, China, Russia, and Japan” characterises his government’s foreign policy orientation. On the face of it, this campaign promise appears to state the obvious because no self-respecting government would pursue foreign policies that undermined its own national interests. It also appears to be an electioneering gesture to appeal to middle-of-the-road voters.

However, Lee’s foreign policy orientation articulated in his campaign promise is not merely a truism or a veneer but signals a fundamental departure from his predecessor. President Lee’s “pragmatic” foreign policy, reminiscent of North Korea’s equidistant diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, would likely put South Korea in a neutral position amid US-China rivalry by swinging the pendulum from Yoon’s strong embrace of the United States more towards China. 

Under Lee’s Democratic Party predecessor, Moon Jae-in (2017-2022), South Korea’s relationship with the United States, as well as with Japan, hit a low because Moon accommodated China and appeased North Korea too much, at odds with the United States and Japan. The ousted Yoon (2022-2025) performed an about-face on China and North Korea and mended relationships with the United States and Japan. Lee’s presidency is going to change South Korea’s international relations again. Indeed, in the first motion to impeach Yoon in December 2024, Lee’s Democratic Party accused Yoon of “antagonising North Korea, China, and Russia and insisting on a bizarre pro-Japan diplomacy.”

Lee’s foreign policy orientation may reflect the influence of the so-called National Liberation faction that has emerged as a power broker inside the Democratic Party. This influence is also felt in his comment as the Democratic Party presidential forerunner in 2021 that “US troops who entered the Korean Peninsula right after its national liberation were an occupying force.” The National Liberation faction consists of former Marxist student movement activists of the 1980s and early 1990s, who viewed the division of Korea and American imperialism as the central contradiction of Korean society and strove to overcome it. The faction, once a minority, has become mainstream within the Democratic Party since Lee built a coalition with National Liberation faction members and sought dominance over the party in his bid for the presidency in 2022. 

Besides Korean unification and US troop withdrawal from South Korea (“Yankee, go home!”), the National Liberation faction has long been fascinated with North Korea’s equidistant diplomacy during the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s as an ideal model for Korea’s national self-determination in international relations. As long as the National Liberation faction influences the Lee Jae-myung government’s decision-making, being pragmatic in foreign policy would be equal to being neutral and equidistant amid the intense US-China rivalry, which, in turn, would mean rolling back the Yoon-era US-South Korea relationship and getting closer to China.

Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy may come to be seen as a pro-China foreign policy in disguise. Lee’s partiality, if not servility, towards China is a public secret. Back in August-September 2024, Lee mounted a 24-day hunger strike to protest Japan’s discharge, with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s approval, of Fukushima wastewater into the Pacific Ocean, which earned him popularity among Chinese internet users. In contrast, Lee and his Democratic Party have remained silent on China’s disposal, into South Korea’s West Sea, of far more nuclear-contaminated water than the Japanese counterpart.

Lee’s much-maligned “Xièxie” (“Thank you” in Chinese) comment is another case in point. On the day after beginning his presidential campaign in April 2025, he asserted “Why bother with China? Just say Xièxie [to China], Xièxie to Taiwan, and it will be okay. Why would we interfere with cross-Taiwan Strait relations? Whatever would happen to Taiwan, isn’t it none of our business?” While it is true that Taiwan is not South Korea’s formal ally to be helped, Lee’s comment obscures the heightened possibility that cross-Strait tensions could embroil not only the United States but also its security allies, including Japan and South Korea, in a militarised dispute with China. 

Lee’s election as the President of South Korea ushers in a new chapter in the country’s history. Domestically, some hope that his government will restore South Korea’s democratic credentials tarnished by the ousted Yoon’s disastrous martial law and impeachment saga, while others fear that he will become the Hugo Chávez of South Korea and implode the country’s fledgling democracy.

Internationally, Lee’s interpretation of a pragmatic, noncommittal, and national-interest-based diplomacy signals a crucial departure from his predecessor. It does so by blurring South Korea’s traditional friend-foe distinction in international relations. Yet, given that the US-China rivalry under the era of Trump 2.0 is intensifying and increasingly becoming a zero-sum game, the Lee government’s foreign policy will likely face stiff challenges. It remains to be seen whether his government will “get along with everyone” without choosing a side or satisfy no one and get slapped in the face by both sides.  

Dongwook Kim is Lecturer in International Relations and Convenor of the International Relations Program in the Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations.