Timor-Leste and ASEAN: Rising above a difficult history

Timor-Leste has fulfilled the longstanding goal of full membership of ASEAN. Michael Leach assesses Timor-Leste’s difficult diplomatic journey and the economic and geopolitical consequences of joining ASEAN.

27 October 2025

Insights

Diplomacy

Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste ASEAN signing ceremony

Celebrated in Dili under the slogan “Together We Rise,” Timor-Leste’s accession as the 11th member of ASEAN this week marks a historic moment in the country’s foreign policy, and regional identity. Since the restoration of independence in 2002, ASEAN membership has been Dili’s overriding foreign policy goal, unifying political parties and key political figures.

While civil society groups express reservations about the readiness of Timor-Leste’s economy, the overall sentiment is one of enthusiasm, optimism and pride —especially among youth hoping for economic revitalisation in the wake of recent “Gen Z” protests over government waste and a stagnant job market.

Strategically, ASEAN membership affirms Timor-Leste’s Southeast Asian identity. Although this may now seem inevitable, the country had actively considered aligning with Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) nations in the leadup to independence in 2002. The decision to align with ASEAN—despite a chequered history of relations—reflects a deliberate geopolitical orientation, shaped by complex regional dynamics.

Accession journey

Timor-Leste’s path to ASEAN has been long and arduous. It obtained observer status in 2002, while becoming a special observer to the PIF the same year. However, Dili’s commitment to ASEAN was soon evident—it joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2005, signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2007, and formally applied for membership in 2011.

Disappointment followed, as some ASEAN states delayed accession, questioning Timor-Leste’s readiness. In 2022, ASEAN agreed ‘in principle’ to accession, subject to Timor-Leste achieving a range of milestones.  As President Ramos-Horta said in 2022: "It seems as if to reach ASEAN, you have to fulfill all the criteria to enter heaven. And then the next step is ASEAN." Timor-Leste’s vocal criticism of Myanmar’s regime in 2023, more recently moderated, ultimately proved no obstacle, even as it suggested Timor-Leste would bring its more open and democratic culture to ASEAN.

At an economic level, Timor-Leste hopes access to ASEAN’s 680 million people and $3.8 trillion economy will bring foreign direct investment and job opportunities to Timor-Leste, and desperately needed diversification from its current dependence on oil and gas revenues, which also makes government the main generator of jobs. The national poverty rate is about 40%, although data has not been updated since 2014.  Lower tariffs on imports and easier investments from ASEAN offer genuine hope of change.

But with some 66% of Timorese households engaged in subsistence agriculture, supplemented by government transfers and remittances, the transition to ASEAN free trade norms will have to be carefully managed. Whether Timor-Leste can develop productive sectors and export industries while freeing up trade with larger ASEAN nations will be a key policy challenge, with the principle of “national treatment” of foreign firms a risk to these processes.

As rising political figure Fidelis Magalhaes argues, a phased approach to integration into the ASEAN Free Trade Area, similar to those negotiated by Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar would allow “time to strengthen local production capabilities, improve know-how, and prepare exporters to compete regionally”. Timor-Leste already carries a significant merchandise trade deficit. In 2024, it imported $954 million worth of goods, while non-oil exports totalled only $22 million.

ASEAN membership carries significance beyond economics. Timor Leste’s media guide to accession envisages benefits in increased diplomatic influence, and enhanced security cooperation. In many ways, ASEAN accession is the ultimate recognition of Timor-Leste’s statehood from a region that had - at an official level – largely ignored its plight from 1975-1999.

A difficult history

It is worth remembering there was nothing inevitable about this journey to ASEAN accession. As a young independence leader in 1974-5, Ramos-Horta envisaged an independent Portuguese Timor joining the ASEAN community. Yet bound by principles of non-interference and consensus, ASEAN nations offered little support following Indonesia’s invasion and occupation from 1975-99.

Singapore’s abstention from a 1976 UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion - opposed by other ASEAN states - led to Indonesian threats of airspace closure. Thereafter, ASEAN states largely avoided diplomatic engagement with the issue until 1999. Even the ASEAN Regional Forum, established in 1994 to promote dialogue and preventive diplomacy, ignored East Timor’s plight. Ramos-Horta was barred from entering several ASEAN countries in the mid-1990s.

ASEAN’s stance began to cost it diplomatically. In 1992, in the wake of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, Portugal vetoed a major cooperation agreement between the European Community and ASEAN, citing unacceptable human rights violations in East Timor. In the end, ASEAN played no meaningful role in the resolution of the East Timor question until late 1999, when Thailand, as ASEAN Chair, mobilised support for the Australian-led INTERFET mission.

Given this chequered history, and the need to counter Indonesia’s integrationist arguments, Timor-Leste’s independence movement of the 1990s highlighted cultural links with Pacific nations, and historical links with Portuguese-language nations.  As late as 1999, the East Timorese leadership declared Timor-Leste had “more in common culturally and historically with the South Pacific than with Indonesia and the rest of South-East Asia”.

After independence, the greater political and geostrategic benefits of ASEAN membership were quickly moved to the centre of Timor-Leste’s foreign policy priorities. Above all, good relations with its former occupier Indonesia became an enormous strategic priority. Today, Timor-Leste’s dual identity—as a “bridge state” between Southeast Asia and the Pacific—is now celebrated as a “feature enhancing ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific connectivity”. Timor-Leste's media guide to accession refers diplomatically to the period of “Indonesian presence”, as it looks forward, rather than back.

Geopolitical significance

Timor-Leste seeks to balance relations with its two large neighbours Indonesia and Australia, to prevent the overwhelming influence of either. This has seen it engage in a range of multilateral forums, and adopt a “friends to all” policy, leavened by pragmatic quiescence to the security concerns of its major neighbours. Relations with Portugal - and with other Lusophone countries – have helped offset reliance on Jakarta and Canberra and other regional powers.

ASEAN accession likely represents a strategic evolution in this approach, rather than a repudiation of it. Behind the economic debates over accession, the security guarantees implicit in a non-interference understanding with its former occupier likely drive Timor-Leste’s strategic thinking. Indonesia has championed Timor-Leste’s accession, and it is likely that Timor-Leste’s membership of the regional bloc will buttress its diplomacy with Australia.

While Australia has been supportive of Timor-Leste’s entry into ASEAN, this has been interpreted as largely a means for limiting China’s influence and encouraging ASEAN to take responsibility if the security situation were to deteriorate in Timor-Leste, as it did during the 2006 political-military crisis. The risks from Canberra’s perspective may include Timor-Leste coming under greater influence from Jakarta in regional decision making—an assessment that may have been a factor for other ASEAN states in Timor-Leste’s relatively slow accession process. Such fears are likely exaggerated, given Dili’s pattern of using a range of relationships to minimise the dominance of any single player.

What Timor-Leste may bring to ASEAN, as Southeast Asia’s most democratic country, is a more interesting topic for reflection. Certainly, Timor-Leste has considerable experience in post-conflict peacebuilding. Timor-Leste’s affiliations to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries also offer diplomatic reach to every continent. The recent announcement that Portuguese will be taught in Indonesian universities reflects evolving global dynamics and soft diplomacy.  

ASEAN accession is a landmark achievement for Timor-Leste, symbolising both regional integration and a strategic recognition of sovereignty. Timor-Leste's accession coincides with considerable criticism of ASEAN effectiveness and backsliding over democracy. Having itself experienced long years of ASEAN neglect, it will be instructive to see whether Timor-Leste’s more outspoken commitment to human rights impacts upon ASEAN’s willingness to deal constructively with regional conflicts.

Michael Leach is Professor in Comparative Politics at Swinburne University of Technology.

Image: ASEAN Secretariat / Kusuma Pandu Wijaya

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