(Re)writing history: The contest over Indonesia’s past

On 17 August, Indonesia marks the 80^th anniversary of its independence. On that day, the Indonesian government, led by President Prabowo Subianto, plans to launch a new official account of Indonesian history. The project, which enlists more than 100 historians from various universities, is led by the Minister for Culture, Fadli Zon. The 10-volumes will chronicle Indonesian history from the time of Homo erectus, through Dutch colonisation, to Prabowo’s election as president in 2024. 

Fadli Zon has argued that the new history books will include recent historical findings, such as cave paintings on the island of Sulawesi, which are at least 51,000 years old and considered the oldest-known storytelling example by Homo sapiens. In addition, commonly held beliefs about Indonesia’s colonial history will be updated with nuance: for instance, it will be clarified that not all parts of Indonesia were under Dutch rule for 350 years. Fadli has emphasised that the new account will have an Indonesia-centric narrative, and aims to “reinvent the Indonesian identity”.

These might be laudable ambitions if they adhere to the truth. But the project has drawn strong criticism from Indonesian scholars and activists because they fear the real purpose is to censor some of the darker episodes of Indonesian history, especially those that reflect badly on Prabowo.

Marzuki Darusman, a leading human rights activist who served as Attorney General between 1999 and 2001, has said that the project is a dangerous attempt to “engineer the past” and argued that the government’s aim to establish a single perspective on history allows for authoritarian control. In a similar vein, leading historian Asvi Warman Adam stated that selective writing of history allows for manipulation to benefit the ruling regime, and labelled the project as “propaganda”. Moreover, feminist historian Ita F. Nadia has pointed out that the new history marginalises women, illustrated by the fact that key female historical figures and events, including the 1928 Women’s Congress, which is a key marker of female political organisation and articulation of rights, has been omitted from the draft text.  

Other omissions are the 1955 Bandung Conference, marking the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in which Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, played a pivotal role. Furthermore, the government’s version has left out critical events in Indonesia’s contemporary history. The twelve gross human rights violations of the New Order era that were recognised in 2023 by President Jokowi, have received scant attention. Nor does the draft address the 1997 financial crisis, the anti-Suharto protests that followed, or the fall of the New Order regime. In response to questions on the selection of historical events, Fadli Zon commented that “we certainly cannot write history in its entirety and in detail, so the 10 volumes are only highlights”.

The failure to reference the anti-Chinese violence of May 1998 and the sexual violence then perpetrated against Chinese Indonesian women is particularly concerning, as it further illustrates the ongoing marginalisation of Chinese Indonesians and women in Indonesian history. Fadli Zon has dismissed the sexual violence as “rumours”, adding that there “was never any proof. It’s just a story”. 

The exclusion of key historical events is convenient for Prabowo Subianto, who in 1997 and 1998 ordered the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists and was subsequently discharged from the military for his role in these abductions. Although Prabowo has never been formally charged with these crimes, his human rights record has been a concern for him and his supporters. The new history project advances the efforts of the President’s allies to cleanse his past: Fadli Zon is widely known as a Prabowo loyalist. The timing of the revision also aligns with a shift in demographics—most young voters, who account for 56 per cent of Indonesia’s electorate, and were largely responsible for Prabowo’s 2024 election success, have very little or no memory of the Suharto regime. 

The (re)writing of history for political purposes has been a recurring phenomenon. From the early 1950s, official histories have been used for nation-building purposes, while during the New Order history writing and the education system were systematically used to promote the state ideology and enforce militarist and anti-communist values. Although after the fall of the New Order regime more attention was devoted to the production of local histories and marginalised historical subjects, powerful political actors – such as the military – pushed back against new narratives on the most sensitive historical episodes, including human rights violations under the New Order regime. 

The production of a new official history raises concerns about education in Indonesia, as this revised narrative is expected to form the basis for history textbooks across all educational levels. Although in recent decades Indonesia made substantial progress in education, including elevating years of schooling, enrolment ratios and literacy rates, concerns have been raised about students’ achievement levels, as well as specific lack of knowledge of democratic values. 

The underlying causes of this problem are political: attempts to reform the education system have been hampered by elite actors whose main interest has been to expand the scope of education to create a large labour market, rather than to improve the quality of learning. The debate surrounding Indonesia’s new official history highlights the power of political elites to control historical narratives for their own interests, which will do little to improve the quality of education, let alone foster a critical understanding of the nation’s past.

Ken M.P. Setiawan is Senior Lecturer in Indonesian Studies, Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne