One region, many narratives, and the way forward

The Indo-Pacific region, which stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, is often described in terms of shifting coalitions and great power rivalries. But beneath the surface of these visible dynamics lies another, quieter contest over the narratives that define what the region is, how it should be organised, and who gets to shape its future.

These narratives are more than slogans. They influence how states perceive threats, justify partnerships, and signal intentions. In a region marked by strategic uncertainty, the stories actors tell about order, identity, and cooperation matter as much as the material instruments of power.

At the heart of today’s contest are three broad narrative frameworks. The first, widely adopted by countries such as Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, is the idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). First articulated by then prime minister Abe Shinzo in 2007 and revived in response to growing maritime tensions, FOIP emphasises freedom of navigation, adherence to international law, and the promotion of openness and transparency in regional engagement. Over time, it has become the conceptual foundation for initiatives like the Quad and AUKUS.

Despite shared principles, interpretations of FOIP vary. Japan continues to prioritise development cooperation, connectivity, and maritime capacity building, often engaging Southeast Asia and Africa. The US, especially under the Biden administration, has leaned more toward the strategic-security dimension, embedding FOIP in its broader competition with China. Nonetheless, both Washington and Tokyo envision a regional order that is rules-based, open to all, and respectful of sovereignty.

Alongside this vision, China has advanced its own narrative - the “Community of Shared Future for Mankind.” This storyline, introduced by President Xi Jinping, presents China as a responsible power, seeking mutual development, peaceful coexistence, and respect for political and cultural diversity. Unlike the Western-led FOIP, China’s approach emphasises sovereignty, non-interference, and shared prosperity, especially among countries in the Global South.

Rather than position itself as a mere ideological alternative, China’s narrative reframes the conversation. It suggests that development and peace can coexist without rigid alignment, and that a flexible, inclusive model of cooperation, backed by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the Global Development Initiative, can offer more practical benefits to regional actors. At the same time, it critiques what it sees as selective rule enforcement by others and presents China’s model as more respectful of regional diversity.

In between these two major visions stands ASEAN, which in 2019 released its own “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP). ASEAN’s approach avoids binary alignments. It is rooted in long-standing principles of openness, inclusivity, and centrality, emphasising dialogue, functional cooperation, and the use of ASEAN-led platforms like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Rather than promote a single vision of order, AOIP aims to create space for practical collaboration in areas such as maritime security, sustainable development, and infrastructure connectivity.

Importantly, AOIP is not a comprehensive blueprint for the region’s future. It is intentionally modest: focused less on setting normative direction and more on sustaining inclusive engagement amid growing competition. In doing so, it presents a “process-oriented” vision that privileges coexistence over convergence, and conversation over confrontation.

Beyond these three major strands, a number of middle powers have developed their own narrative frameworks. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative foregrounds maritime security, economic resilience, and disaster response. Australia, while aligned with US-led security efforts, also actively supports inclusive institutions like the EAS and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). South Korea’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasised shared values and cooperation while still hedging its position vis-à-vis China. These narratives are more pragmatic than ideological. They allow states to assert agency, adapt to changing conditions, and maintain manoeuvring  space in an increasingly complex environment.

What emerges is not a unified regional script, but a dynamic narrative ecosystem. Competing and overlapping storylines coexist, interact, and evolve. Sometimes they converge around shared goals, such as infrastructure investment or climate resilience. But often, they diverge sharply. A naval patrol, for example, may be described as a stabilising measure by one actor and as a provocation by another. The same infrastructure project may be welcomed as connectivity enhancement or rejected as strategic encroachment, depending on the interpretive lens.

This divergence matters. Narrative fragmentation can lead to misperception, mistrust, and institutional deadlock. When states operate with fundamentally different understandings of concepts like “order,” “freedom,” or “development,” the potential for misaligned expectations increases, particularly in sensitive areas such as the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. Even cooperation on global challenges like pandemic response, AI governance, or supply chain resilience can be slowed by conceptual disagreement rather than material opposition.

It also creates challenges for regional institutions. As major power narratives harden, smaller states and non-aligned actors may find themselves sidelined. Forums like the EAS or ARF, once central to shaping inclusive regional dialogue, risk being overshadowed by issue-specific coalitions or minilateral groupings. Even ASEAN’s AOIP, with its focus on balance and openness, has struggled to gain traction beyond Southeast Asia’s institutional space.

But this growing diversity of narratives is not inherently destabilising. It can, if managed wisely, become a source of flexibility and creativity. What the region needs is not a single, dominant storyline, but a set of mechanisms to manage narrative pluralism. This means investing not only in coordination of action, but in coordination of meaning: developing habits of interpretation, translation, and mutual understanding.

ASEAN is well-positioned to play this role. Precisely because it does not push a maximalist vision, it can serve as a convener of ideas and a manager of difference. Platforms such as the ASEAN Future Forum, the East Asia Summit, or Track 1.5 dialogues offer space where strategic narratives can be aired, debated, and better understood. This is not about erasing disagreement. It is about creating the conditions under which disagreement can coexist with cooperation.

To that end, the region needs strategic narrative stewardship: the conscious cultivation of a discursive environment where different visions do not inevitably lead to division. This requires clarifying terms, acknowledging differences without hardening them, and building platforms that allow for interaction across narrative lines. In a region as diverse and dynamic as the Indo-Pacific, such efforts are not luxuries, they are essential infrastructure for long-term stability.

In a time of structural change and heightened uncertainty, narrative agility may be one of ASEAN’s most valuable assets. By providing space for conversation without coercion, and fostering understanding without forcing convergence, ASEAN can help ensure that its home region remains open, not just in trade or security terms but in its capacity to accommodate multiple paths forward.

Dr. Ngô Di Lân is a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.