One nation or two: The roots of India-Pakistan conflict

The seminal conflict between India and Pakistan is the debate prior to partition in 1947 over whether the post-colonial settlement should occur on the principle of one nation or two. It echoes today in the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir, which repeatedly descends into the sort of bloodshed we saw on 22 April in Pahalgam when 26 Indian tourists were shot dead.

But contrary to popular narratives, it was not the two-nation theory but rather the manner in which the one-nation theory was pursued that led to the partition of India—and later, the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and the formation of Bangladesh. 

The one-nation theory advanced by the Indian National Congress was rooted in the belief that all regions comprising present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh formed a single historic nation—much like the unified national identities of Germany or France in Europe. In contrast, the two-nation theory, as articulated by the Muslim League, asserted that Hindus and Muslims constituted two distinct nations with separate religious, cultural, and historical identities. 

Many Indians still feel the two-nation theory divided ‘Mother India’. This is why when Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, extolled the two-nation theory in a public speech on 16 April, it sparked an uproar in India. And just a few days later, after the Pahalgam attack, those remarks were immediately linked in Indian media to the shooting of Indian Hindus, and Pahalgam was blamed on the Pakistan state.

The debate over the one-nation versus two-nation theory, which unfolded in the seven years leading up to the partition of India, was not solely about the demand for a separate Muslim state. For much of the period from 1857 to 1947—now commonly referred to in Pakistan as the ‘Pakistan Movement’—the underlying contest was about the future constitutional structure of India. At stake was a fundamental question: Should post-colonial India emerge as a centralised, unified nation governed by a majoritarian framework, or as a decentralised, multi-national federation that recognises and accommodates its deep cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity? 

Moreover, this academic debate in India did not begin with Muhammad Ali Jinnah or his All-India Muslim League. It was Rabindranath Tagore, the Bengali writer and philosopher, who first articulated a powerful critique of Indian Nationalism. In his seminal 1917 work Nationalism in India, Tagore not only challenged the one-nation vision espoused by the Indian National Congress and Mahatma Gandhi but also questioned the very concepts of “nation” and “national self-determination” as promoted in the West. As he wrote: “I am not against one nation in particular, but against the general idea of all nations.”

Indeed, the one-nation theory must be understood within the broader historical context of the global nation-state system and the wave of decolonisation that unfolded across the world in the mid-20th century. Rather than framing the question narrowly as whether Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations based on religion, culture, or history, it is more productive to view the debate as part of a larger struggle over the nature of post-colonial statehood. Across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, newly independent nations were grappling with the challenge of unifying diverse populations under the modern nation-state model—an inherently Western construct often ill-suited to plural societies. In this light, the conflict in India was not just about communal identities but about competing visions for political order in a post-imperial world.

Initially, the Muslim League and Jinnah also supported the one-nation thesis, seeking primarily constitutional safeguards for Muslims within a federated India. This position was reflected in agreements such as the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and Jinnah’s Fourteen Points, which aimed to protect Muslim interests within a united India. However, tensions escalated when the Indian National Congress withdrew from the commitments made under the Lucknow Pact and, with the Nehru Report of 1928, advocated for a centralised, majoritarian system. This shift deepened divisions and set the stage for the eventual demand for a separate Muslim state.

Even in March 1940, when Jinnah articulated the two-nation theory clearly and emphatically, the Muslim League did not explicitly demand a single, separate nation-state in the Lahore Resolution—later known as the Pakistan Resolution. Instead, the League called for the Muslim-majority areas in the Northwest (West Pakistan) and the East (East Bengal) to be “grouped together to constitute independent states,” with each constituent unit enjoying autonomy and sovereignty. The demand, therefore, was framed as a call for autonomous and sovereign units rather than a unified nation-state. 

Hence, Pakistan did not emerge simply because Hindus and Muslims were viewed as separate nations. Instead, it was born out of Congress's refusal to recognise the complex, multi-ethnic and multi-religious fabric of the Indian subcontinent. By prioritising a unitary and overly centralised federal model under the guise of national unity and majoritarian democracy, the Congress failed to address the federal question—how to accommodate India's profound internal diversity. This failure ultimately made a negotiated, pluralistic union impossible, paving the way for the creation of Pakistan.

The League championed federalism and maximum provincial autonomy—an agenda that resonated strongly in regions such as Bengal, Sindh, and Punjab. Thus, Pakistan was founded with the implicit promise of a decentralised federal framework that would respect regional identities and autonomy.

Ironically, while Pakistan emerged in the name of the two-nation theory, the post-colonial Pakistani leadership adopted its own centralised, assimilationist model of governance. In the name of national unity, the state pursued the same exclusivist and coercive one-nation theory it had once opposed, using Islam and Urdu as instruments of national identity. This denial of genuine federalism and cultural diversity ultimately sowed deep internal divisions, culminating in the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

In this sense, the one-nation theory not only contributed to the partition of India in 1947 but also played a decisive role in the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.

The key lesson for today is that there is little value in reopening old wounds. Even after partition, both India and Pakistan remain deeply diverse societies—multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural. This reality calls for greater inclusivity and tolerance toward religious and ethnic minorities in both states. 

However, current policy directions appear to move in the opposite direction. In India, the government is considering the controversial One Nation, One Election plan, while in Pakistan, the implementation of the Single National Curriculum reflects a similarly centralising and homogenising impulse. Both initiatives risk undermining the pluralistic foundations that are essential for democratic stability in such diverse nations.

Dr. Saeed Ahmed Rid is Assistant Professor, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.