New thinking required in Australia-Indonesia relations

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Jakarta on 14 May for his first foreign visit after his reelection. His visit follows a trend of successive Australian prime ministers making Indonesia one their first foreign stops, going back to Sir Robert Menzies who became the first sitting prime minister to visit Indonesia in 1959. The only exception was Harold Holt, who disappeared before his planned visit. 

That almost every Australian prime minister has visited the Republic of Indonesia since it won independence demonstrates the importance Australia attaches to its northern neighbor. But each time an Australian Prime Minister visits, pundits and experts herald the occasion as a chance to reset or deepen the relationship or to clear misperceptions between the two countries.

It is disconcerting that, despite all the visits, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia still falls short of expectations. An annual survey by the Singapore-based ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute,  which polls experts and opinion-makers in Southeast Asia, showed that at no time between 2020 and 2025 was Australia considered a top strategic partner for Indonesia. Ironically, the European Union, located half a world away, consistently held first place.

While there are criticisms of ISEAS's methods of sampling, other surveys mirror the findings. A 2021 Lowy Institute Poll found that while a small majority (55%) of Indonesians trust Australia, it was behind trust in Singapore (66%), Japan (65%), and the United Kingdom (59%), but on par with the United States (55%). The Australian rating is a sharp drop from the 2011 survey when trust in Australia was 75%. The same poll also stressed many Indonesians don't pay much attention to Australia's foreign policy. 

Still, some are attentive.  A survey of Indonesian public and elite perception of major power influence conducted by Indikator Politik, one of the most credible polling organisations in Indonesia, found that in 2023 and 2024 only 4% of the public and 4.9% of the elite believed Australia was Indonesia's closest ally. 

On the other side, a 2024 Lowy Institute poll of Australian views of major powers and world leaders showed that only 15% of Australians believed that Indonesia was Australia's best friend in Asia, far behind Japan (42%) and slightly below Singapore (16%). 

In other words, despite the visits from successive Australian Prime Ministers and Indonesia’s geographic proximity to Australia, the elite and public of both countries have never consider each other as their top strategic partner or best friend. 

There are several reasons for this. First, there is still a question of the degree to which each country regards the other as important. Indonesia always has the perception of Australia as the little brother of the US or even its deputy sheriff in Southeast Asia. Similarly, in practice, Australia does not consider Indonesia that important, evidenced by the decline in the number of Australian universities teaching Indonesian language and culture.

Second, despite the closeness, Indonesia is not among Australia's top trading partners and, similarly, Australia is not among the top ten Indonesian trading partners. This has been an issue of concern for as far back as 1986. The problem is that both Australia and Indonesia's top exports are commodities that are produced by both countries in abundance, notably iron ore, coal, and natural gas. 

Third, Australia and Indonesia have different foreign policy goals. In Australia, Indonesia is seen as the lynchpin of defence. Whoever wants to invade Australia must pass through Indonesia. In addition, considering Australian concerns over the potential threat posed by China, its best defence option is regarded by the major political parties is to ally with the United States as the dominant power in the Pacific.

In contrast, from Indonesia's perspective, it does not want any great power to have too much influence in Southeast Asia, which it sees as its backyard. It regards with concern the growing rivalry between China and the United States, and the attempt by each to drag Southeast Asian countries to their side. While it is willing to build stronger military cooperation with both Australia and the United States, it does not want to be forced to pick sides. This sentiment is reinforced by the burgeoning economic relationship between China and Indonesia. China is making much needed investment that supports Indonesia's key infrastructure and industrial priorities, such as high speed rail and capital intensive nickel smelters. China is also involved in President Prabowo Subianto's pet programs, notably the controversial free nutritious meal program. As Donald K. Emmerson once suggested, "Why not prolong the happy combination of American ships for deterrence and Chinese markets for profit?"

This does not mean that Australia should not try to invest in its relationship with Indonesia. There is too much at stake for both countries. The relationship still has a huge room to grow. For Indonesia, a stronger relationship with Australia provides another option to growing economic reliance on China. Similarly, for Australia, the uncertainties under the Trump Administration shows that Canberra can no longer rely on its old thinking. Rather, Australia needs new foreign policy thinking that will have to include Indonesia’s perspective in its calculation.

Yohanes Sulaiman is Associate Professor in International Relations at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani (UNJANI), Cimahi, Indonesia.