Myanmar, elections and realpolitik

Over the past five years, the civil war in Myanmar has become known as the “forgotten crisis”. The embattled pro-democracy forces have found it increasingly difficult to make themselves heard. However, since junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that he was going to hold national elections in four phases between December 2025 and January 2026, there has been a flood of op-eds and articles about Myanmar in the news media and online.

The authors of these works have ranged from expatriates and activists through to scholars and officials. Almost without exception, they have condemned the advertised elections as a complete sham, a transparently self-serving exercise that lacks any characteristics that could possibly justify the junta’s claim that it will represent a legitimate expression of the wishes of Myanmar’s people.

Despite the Trump Administration’s astonishing statement last month that Myanmar plans to hold “free and fair” elections, opposition elements have been prevented from participating, the electoral rolls are inaccurate and incomplete, and the actual voting process is deeply flawed. Only those areas under military control (estimates vary, but it is thought to be around 21% of the country) will be included in the poll.

The “constitutional requirements” approvingly cited by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were put in place by a military leadership that is determined to continue its domination of Myanmar. It is absurd to list a range of cosmetic measures taken by the junta to perpetuate its rule and then claim that there have been “substantial steps toward political stability and national reconciliation”. Nothing is further from the truth.

As Human Rights Watch has noted, extensive reporting contradicts almost every assertion made by the DHS in its November statement. Since the 2021 coup, gross human rights violations have become routine. Up to 6,500 civilians have been killed, 3.5 million people are now displaced, and more than a third of the population lives below the poverty line.

Even before the first vote is cast, the outcome of the elections is already decided.

Given that all these facts are well known, even to some members of the Trump Administration (the State Department’s website warns against travel to Myanmar, noting that violence is widespread and arbitrary arrests are common) one question springs to mind; why is the regime going to all the trouble and expense of holding elections. No-one, either within Myanmar or outside it, is fooled by the rhetoric.

This is a question that has been asked before. Ever since General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, successive military regimes have held elections, ostensibly to give the people of Myanmar a voice. Few polls, however, have envisaged the armed forces giving up real power. One rare exception was in 1990, but that resulted in a landslide for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), so was ignored by the ruling military council.

Confident in its control of the levers of power, a later military government permitted relatively free and fair elections in 2015, resulting in a decisive victory for the NLD. It is thought that another landslide in favour of the NLD in 2020, and the prospect of more far-reaching reforms, spooked the generals, who feared the country was slipping from their grasp. This was most likely a major factor behind the coup of February 2021.

To return to the key question, the attraction of elections to Myanmar’s military leadership is probably the same as that felt by dictatorships elsewhere. No matter how patently corrupt such exercises are, the international community demands at least the appearance of popular support. Authoritarian regimes conducting such elections seem to feel that they can stand up in public and claim legitimacy, even when such claims are demonstrably false.

More to the point, many governments and international organisations seem to be happy to accept such theatrical gestures at face value. They cite them either to justify inaction on the world stage, or as a fig leaf to cover the naked brutality of regimes with which they wish to develop relations. The Trump Administration’s latest outrage, declaring Myanmar safe for activists and exiles to return, is a good example of such wilful blindness.

Russia, China, India and some members of ASEAN have already indicated that they will accept the validity of Myanmar’s sham elections. They will doubtless hail the resulting parliament and work with the junta to further their own political, security and economic interests. Self-interest may even persuade some Western democracies to accept such posturing, rather than call it out for what it is.

If all this sounds deeply cynical, that’s because it is. Sadly, it has become the norm in contemporary international relations for high principles and ethical standards to be sacrificed on the altar of realpolitik. Many observers would say that it has always been so. Certainly, Myanmar-watchers can point to countless well-meaning gestures and supportive speeches made over the years, but very little in terms of practical assistance. 

In any case, the international community has always been divided over responses to Myanmar’s complex problems. The only thing it can agree on is not to become directly involved. Despite the impassioned protests of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, and the tourism of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, the UN has demonstrated that it too is unable significantly to influence the course of events.

All this is understood by the generals who make up Myanmar’s newly branded National Defence and Security Council. They know how weak the international system is and they have seen how reluctant other countries are to take decisive action. The junta is convinced that, with a little help from its friends in Russia, China and elsewhere, it can withstand the slings and arrows of outraged critics, while consolidating its rule.

The latest round of elections in Myanmar is another sign of this confidence and sense of impunity.

Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. His latest book is “Myanmar: The Making of an Intelligence State” (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, forthcoming).