Towards a new era in Australia–ROK Relations

Australia and the Republic of Korea are often described as natural economic partners. That characterisation, while accurate, is no longer sufficient. What is emerging is something more consequential: a strategic partnership shaped by shared vulnerabilities, converging interests, and a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific order.

Both countries face a common structural dilemma. As long-standing US allies, their security frameworks remain anchored in Washington. At the same time, China remains their largest trading partner, deeply embedded in their economic systems. This dual dependence has always required careful balancing. Today, however, it has become a source of growing strategic unease.

Recent years have sharpened this reality. Supply chain disruptions, the increasing use of economic coercion, and persistent uncertainty about the future trajectory of US engagement in the region have exposed the fragility of existing arrangements. For Seoul and Canberra, the question is no longer whether diversification and resilience are desirable, but how quickly and effectively they can be achieved. 

In this context, closer Australia–ROK cooperation is not simply logical—it is necessary. The two countries already possess the essential ingredients of a strong partnership: aligned strategic outlooks, complementary economies, and established institutional frameworks. The challenge lies in translating these assets into sustained and practical collaboration.

There is a solid foundation to build upon. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, reinforced by regular high-level exchanges and the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ “2+2” dialogue, reflects a clear political commitment on both sides. Economically, the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement has facilitated steady growth in bilateral trade across energy, minerals, manufacturing, and services.

Yet the significance of this relationship is evolving. Trade is no longer just about efficiency; it is increasingly about security. Australia’s role as a major supplier of liquefied natural gas and critical minerals such as lithium and nickel directly supports Korea’s advanced industries, including batteries and semiconductors. These linkages are not incidental—they are central to both countries’ economic resilience.

The 2024 Green Economy Partnership Arrangement points in the right direction, but much more can be done. Cooperation in critical minerals, for instance, remains fragmented and largely transactional. A more strategic approach—centered on joint investment in mining, processing, and refining, supported by long-term supply agreements—would strengthen supply chain security while enabling Australia to move up the value chain. 

Clean energy offers similarly tangible opportunities. Australian hydrogen and ammonia projects could supply Korean industry, while Korean firms contribute engineering, technology, and shipbuilding expertise. Aligning regulatory frameworks, including carbon pricing mechanisms and certification standards, would help unlock these projects at scale.

Defence cooperation, too, is entering a more substantive phase. The establishment of Korean defence production facilities in Australia and Canberra’s procurement of Korean platforms signal growing trust. However, the relationship remains largely focused on acquisition. To realise its full potential, defence cooperation should expand into joint development, maintenance, training, and integrated supply chains.

The technological domain presents another underdeveloped frontier. Both countries possess advanced capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and next-generation telecommunications. Deeper collaboration—spanning research, standard-setting, and industrial strategy—would not only enhance national competitiveness but also contribute to broader regional stability.

Cybersecurity is an equally pressing concern. As digital threats become more sophisticated, cooperation in information-sharing, joint exercises, and public–private coordination will be essential. Beyond capability-building, there is also an opportunity for Australia and Korea to shape emerging norms in areas such as AI governance and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. As middle powers with advanced economies, they are well positioned to play a constructive role in setting standards rather than merely responding to them.

Despite these opportunities, the partnership remains underutilised. Institutional mechanisms, while well established, are not yet sufficiently geared toward implementation. Expanding working-level coordination—particularly in economic security, technology governance, and regional resilience—would help bridge the gap between strategic intent and practical outcomes.

Regulatory alignment is another critical area. Differences in standards, certification processes, and investment rules can delay or deter even high-priority projects. Addressing these barriers will require sustained effort, but the payoff in terms of efficiency and investor confidence would be significant.

Equally important are the societal foundations of the relationship. Educational exchanges, research collaboration, and cultural ties have all grown in recent years, supported in part by the increasing visibility of Korean culture in Australia. These connections are not peripheral; they are essential to building long-term trust and ensuring that the partnership is supported not only by governments, but by broader society. 

At the regional level, there is also scope for more coordinated action. Whether in APEC, the G20, the WTO, or smaller groupings such as the CPTPP, Quad, and AUKUS Pillar II, closer alignment between Seoul and Canberra would amplify their influence. In an era where middle-power cooperation is increasingly important, acting in concert can shape outcomes more effectively than acting alone. 

Looking ahead, several practical steps could help advance this agenda. Updating KAFTA to reflect the realities of digital trade and economic security would provide a stronger institutional backbone. Establishing a dedicated partnership on critical minerals and clean energy would bring greater strategic focus. Creating a joint platform for AI and digital innovation could align research priorities and investment. Expanding people-to-people exchanges would reinforce societal support. And strengthening regional coordination would enhance both countries’ ability to navigate a more contested Indo-Pacific.

Ultimately, the Australia–ROK relationship is at an inflection point. It has moved beyond its origins as a trade partnership, but it has not yet fully realised its potential as a strategic one. In a region defined by uncertainty and competition, this is a gap that both countries can ill afford.

If Seoul and Canberra can move beyond dialogue toward delivery—embedding cooperation in institutions, industries, and societies—their partnership can become one of the most resilient and forward-looking among Indo-Pacific middle powers. In doing so, they will not only advance their national interests, but also contribute to a more stable and inclusive regional order.

Oh Seok Hyun is a former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea, and Chair of the Advisory Board of the Plaza Project.

This article is based on a presentation to an Asialink-Plaza Project Chatham House webinar “On Track2: Australia–ROK Strategic Interdependence” on 2 June.