Sino-American stability without trust

At the recent summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, China’s primary objective was to prevent tensions from escalating further. From that perspective, it was largely successful.

The most important outcome was a joint commitment to build a “constructive China–US relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity.” The challenge now is to agree on what that means. The Trump administration interpreted the phrase as a possible opening for trilateral arms-control talks involving the United States, Russia, and China. But China appears far less enthusiastic about that prospect.

What both sides seem to agree on is that regular leader-level communication is the only dependable safeguard against accidental escalation. Trump and Xi have committed to meet again in November at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen and at the G20 summit in Miami in December. Four summits in a single calendar year—including three in four months—would set a record in the history of US-China relations.

At the same time, the two-month extension of the trade truce—far shorter than many had anticipated—underscored the mutual distrust that has plagued the Sino-American relationship since Trump’s first term. The two-month window is effectively a compliance-observation period, during which both sides will “review, evaluate, and consider” their next steps—an arrangement designed to postpone confrontation, not to resolve its underlying causes. Neither government is prepared to make significant concessions when confidence in the other side’s intentions remains so low.

The US and China also agreed to extend preferential tariff treatment on approximately $30 billion worth of “non-sensitive” goods in each direction. China will purchase ten million tons of US coal in 2027–28, and the two countries will establish a bilateral agricultural working group. These measures point toward a model of managed trade, which implies reduced expectations more than diplomatic success.

The investment track was even less successful. Speculation that Chinese entrepreneurs would accompany Xi to the White House state dinner, and that major investment announcements would follow, proved unfounded. Investment has stalled largely because of legal and political obstacles on the US side, including heightened scrutiny of Chinese capital amid growing concerns about national security.

The most significant new institutional mechanism to emerge from the summit was a bilateral dialogue on AI, led by Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Both governments have publicly endorsed the safe development of frontier AI, but the terminology in their readouts revealed an important divide. The Trump administration used its preferred term, “super intelligence,” while the Chinese side stuck with the more conventional “artificial intelligence.” The seemingly minor difference reflects deeper disagreements about definitions, incident classification, safety thresholds, and risk-management frameworks.

Of course, competition between the US and China—particularly in advanced semiconductors and frontier-model development—remains intense. What the new channel provides is not cooperation in the full sense, but a floor beneath the relationship: a mechanism for reducing misunderstanding in a field where technical errors or miscalculations could be catastrophic.

The Taiwan question produced the summit’s sharpest diplomatic exchange. In its post-summit briefing, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on the US to “adhere to the correct position of opposing ‘Taiwan independence.’” By contrast, US Ambassador to China David Perdue said only that America’s policy on Taiwan had not changed after Xi’s visit, and that the US does not support independence. In China’s diplomatic lexicon, “does not support” falls short of the explicit opposition Chinese officials have repeatedly demanded.

The issue will remain politically volatile in the US, especially as midterm elections approach. Republican candidates face pressure to project toughness toward China. The administration’s temporary pause on new arms packages for Taiwan has already drawn criticism from China hawks in the GOP and will likely be revisited repeatedly in the coming months.

One area of unexpected alignment was Iran. Trump and Xi agreed that Iran must not develop nuclear weapons and that no state or institution should impose transit fees on international waterways. The fact that China placed this outcome third on its official eight-point readout underscores the country’s growing stake in Middle East stability. Moreover, an opportunity to support regional de-escalation aligns with China’s broader diplomatic effort to present itself as a constructive force in global affairs.

All this points to Sino-American relations being in a holding pattern. The two-month trade extension, the AI dialogue, and even the carefully chosen language on Taiwan are temporary arrangements pending a clearer picture of US domestic politics. Current polling suggests that Democrats could retake one or both chambers of Congress in November’s midterm elections, which would substantially narrow Trump’s room for manoeuvre, while bipartisan support for tougher legislation targeting Chinese technology, finance, and investment shows no sign of weakening.

Both China and the US are exploring the possibility of managed competition. As Xi put it, the two sides should strive for a relationship where “cooperation is the mainstay, competition is kept within proper limits, differences are managed, and peace can be expected.” But this is aspirational. For now, the defining features of US-China relations are stability without trust and deceleration without resolution. The hardest issues—from semiconductors to structural imbalances—have been deferred, not resolved.

As the relationship continues to oscillate between crisis and accommodation, the immediate task is not to create the illusion of harmony, but to prevent managed rivallry from devolving into outright confrontation.

Minghao Zhao, a senior fellow at the Charhar Institute in China, is Professor and Deputy Director at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies.

Image: “P20260925MR-0334” by The White House, United States Government Work