Quad passes its most critical test: survivability

The recently held Quad ministerial meeting is yet another sign that history does repeat itself; the Quad was revived in 2017, after its first iteration in 2007, when senior officials from Australia, India, Japan and the US met in Manila, in the Philippines. Back then, there were still questions about whether the group would be able to survive. Nine years later, another Quad meeting took place in the same city, overcoming the same concerns and demonstrating its resilience in the face of all difficulties.

The meeting of the Quad Foreign Ministers took place on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 22 July; it was the second such meeting this year, after the one that took place in New Delhi in May. The July meeting reaffirmed “regional stability, a free and open Indo-Pacific, and unwavering support for ASEAN unity and centrality”.

In this context, it appeared counterintuitive that the Trump administration should decide at the G7 meeting in Évian in mid-June to change the name of USINDOPACOM back to USPACOM. Although this was seen as indicating a downgrading of the Indo-Pacific framework and a diminished role for India in US policy, the Indo-Pacific concept is not solely focused on India as it is grounded in common challenges and collective responses with India acting as only one of the participants. Assertions at the time that "the Quad is dead" or "the Quad is irrelevant" were not convincing and are no more so now.

Even though the Trump administration has introduced considerable changes to US foreign policy, this does not mean that the Quad’s importance is decreasing. For example, the United States' recent activities—including its involvement in the Middle East, its stance on the Greenland claims, its inconsistent approach towards China, and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's call for increased middle power involvement, and the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey trilateral defence agreement—show that US’ allies and partners are becoming more uncertain about how much they can rely on Washington.

For now, America's allies appear to be farther from Washington than its enemies. Although the Quad continues to exist, the United States is seen as the weakest element within it; the other three members still having considerable initiative. For instance, Japan played a key role in keeping the Quad going during 2007–08, and over the past ten years all four members have demonstrated a commitment to preserving the group.

It is just as inaccurate to say that the United States is pulling back from the Quad or the Indo-Pacific. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has consistently taken part and stressed the importance of the group. In Manila, he said: "The Quad remains a priority, and we will meet again later this year."

Even as many uncertainties remain, the Quad is resilient and relevant. Nevertheless, the leadership summit has turned into more of an obstruction than a facilitator. The Quad’s effectiveness lies in its multi-level operations, despite the critical focus on leaders' meetings and the tendency to overlook the important work carried out at the ministerial level and by working groups.

The recent meeting in Manila shows that engagement is continuing. Moreover, the Quad foreign ministers have now met twice within a few months, indicating steady progress—particularly relevant given growing tensions in the South China Sea. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the respective maritime claims of the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. It is significant that the major liberal democracies, including the Quad members, are once again expressing their support for the Philippines in the face of China's aggressive stances and its refusal to recognise the arbital ruling, which favoured the Philippines.

One of the Quad’s, not-always-stated, key objectives is to promote regional stability, especially in the maritime domain. The members’ joint efforts and exercises reflect this commitment. Escalation in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea would have serious consequences for all Quad members. The partial US retreat is prompting closer cooperation among countries to address regional challenges until Washington fully re-engages. While a vacuum may exist, it does not necessarily mean ineffectiveness.

The Quad is here to stay. So long as the growth of Chinese power is viewed as a risk, its relevance will last, and it is very unlikely that this will change anytime soon. At the same time, the four countries need to improve their coordination and should keep in mind the reasons the group was set up and then resurrected.

With its Manila ministerial meeting, the Quad has passed the test of survivability and resilience in an uncertain regional strategic dynamic exacerbated by Trump’s flippant and incoherent policies. That said, if the Quad is to mature, it might have to take on a more explicit role in maritime security, and for that it will be necessary to have greater consistency, institutional depth, and strategic clarity.

Dr Rahul Mishra is a Senior Research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand, and Associate Professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He is the Series Editor of the Palgrave Series in Indo-Pacific Studies Palgrave Macmillan, London, UK.

Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan