Pakistan: the unexpected peace facilitator

On 11 April, Pakistan managed to bring together American and Iranian officials in the same room in Islamabad’s most secure hotel. This alone was an amazing diplomatic success, given that the two countries hadn’t had high-level face-to-face meetings since the 1979 Iranian revolution almost 50 years ago. How was this possible?

In many ways, Pakistan was an obvious choice as convenor. Islamabad has good relations with Washington today—which wasn’t always the case, and a workable one with Iran, with which it shares a 900 km-long border.

Pakistan’s strategic relationship with the US dates to the early 1950s, when it was part of America’s anti-Soviet network across the world. But expectations between the two countries differed. Pakistan joined the US alliance system expecting the US to side with it in its confrontation with India. To the dismay of Pakistan, during the brief 1962 India-China border war, the US assisted India militarily, and during the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars the US provided Islamabad minimal support.

Bilateral relations improved in the 1980s, when Pakistan became a frontline state hosting the US-supported Afghan Mujahedeen groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. During America’s and the Western allies’ 20-year presence in Afghanistan (2001-2021), Pakistan was a critical logistical hub for providing non-lethal materiel to the Coalition forces. However, relations between the US and Pakistan were also ambiguous, as Pakistan was providing safe havens for the Taliban and their fellow ideological travellers who were fighting the Americans and Australians. Still, the US made Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) in 2004.

Following the US withdrawal from Kabul in August 2021, its bilateral relations with the Pakistan fell to an all-time low.  Relations have significantly recovered in Trump’s second term, despite Islamabad’s deepening and long-standing strategic relationship with China.

Pakistan’s relations with Iran have also been mixed over the years. Under the Shah, as both countries were allies of the US, relations were on balance amicable, and as the undisputed ‘policeman’ of the region, Iran was concerned with regional stability and the maintenance of the status quo. Iran didn’t look favourably at Pakistan’s deepening relations with Saudi Arabia and Riyadh’s attempt to displace Iran as the dominant player in the Gulf. The Shah was also concerned about the increasing ethnic unrest in Balochistan and how this could spill over into Iran’s own restive Baloch region. Iranian air force aircraft assisted in the suppression of the unrest on Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto’s watch.  Everything changed with the Iranian Revolution. The Ayatollahs wanted to export their version of Islam, and with up to 20 percent of its population Shiite, Pakistan has always had to factor in that religious element in its dealings with Iran.  As for Balochistan, that remains a thorny issue between the two countries, especially because Tehran provides safe havens on its territory for Pakistan-based Baloch rebels.

But the decisive factor in having Pakistan facilitate the talks is President Trump’s personal relationship with Pakistan’s top military man, Field Marshal Asim Munir, the man who effectively runs Pakistan. As is well known, President Trump respects leaders who appear tough and decisive. Accordingly, he was impressed with Munir’s leadership during Pakistan’s successful four-day military clash with India in May 2025. So much so that he invited him a month later to a two-hour private lunch at the White House, an unprecedented invitation to a non-head of state military man. This personal rapport between the Pakistani field marshal and the American president paid off, because according to various sources, it was Munir, working with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shebhaz Sharif, who was instrumental in convincing the Americans and the Iranians to meet face-to-face in Islamabad. This led to the two countries agreeing to a fragile two-week ceasefire on 8 April.

Getting an agreement between the US and Iran at their first meeting in almost 50 years was always a fantasy. Nevertheless, the meeting had two positive outcomes for Islamabad. First, it established Pakistan’s bona fides as a neutral and credible mediator. This was confirmed with the two parties’ warm thanks to Prime Minister Sharif and Field Marshal Munir for hosting the talks, as well as by several foreign leaders. Second, the talks significantly improved Pakistan’s international image as l’enfant terrible of South Asia. And this is quite an achievement given the complexities of inter-state relations in that neighbourhood for the last 50 years.

But whether Pakistan will be asked to moderate a follow-up Iran-US meeting is a moot point given Islamabad’s decision to send 13,000 troops and fighter and support aircraft to Saudi Arabia on the day of the talks following a recent Iranian attack at a key Saudi petrochemical complex. This will not have gone unnoticed in Tehran. But Islamabad had little choice having signed with Saudi Arabia the “Joint Strategic Defence Agreement” in Riyadh in September 2025, pledging that any attack on either nation would be treated as an act of aggression against both. To renege on its obligations would have been tantamount to economic suicide given its heavy reliance on Saudi largesse to try to keep the country’s economy afloat and the millions of dollars of remittances Pakistani expatriates living in Saudi Arabia send back to Pakistan annually.

Still, like in 1971, when Pakistan facilitated the first secret meeting between a high-level American official (Henry Kissenger) and Chinese officials in Beijing, Islamabad will always be remembered for having been a critical player in having Iran and the US finally meet after almost 50 years of silence. We can only hope that the door Pakistan will have slightly opened is not slammed shut once again.

Dr Claude Rakisits is the President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (ACT Branch). He has been following South Asian issues for over 40 years.