A new visit, an old playbook: understanding the Cheng–Xi meeting

After a decade‑long hiatus, the recent meeting between Taiwan’s Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) Chair, Cheng Li‑wun, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has been widely publicised as a potential step toward renewed cross‑Strait engagement. Yet in historical and political context, it resembles a return to a familiar script. The choreography, messaging, and policy “deliverables” echo two decades of KMT–CCP engagement that consistently advances Beijing’s preferred narratives. Rather than a genuine new direction for Taiwan-China relations, the Cheng–Xi meeting reaffirms a long‑standing United Front approach designed to advance the CCP agenda.

The CCP has long used party‑to‑party “diplomacy” to advance its political objectives. Through CCP–KMT channels, a pattern that has been established since former Vice President and KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s visit in 2005, Beijing has been able to bypass Taiwan’s democratic institutions and successive Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) governments while dictating the parameters of the cross‑Strait relationship. Cheng’s trip fits squarely within this tradition. The widely covered visit allows Beijing to cultivate influence and promote its preferred narratives inside Taiwan, presenting itself as open to dialogue even as it sidesteps the Taiwanese government. By elevating the party channel again, Beijing signals that the KMT is its preferred interlocutor, setting up a parallel track that works around Taiwan’s elected government. For the KMT, the visit reinforces its long‑standing claim that it alone can keep channels open, lower the temperature, and avoid open conflict with China.

Immediately after the visit, Beijing announced  ten policy measures as new initiatives but that closely mirror earlier packages offering preferential treatment for Taiwanese businesses, youth exchanges, and expanded market access. The language may shift, yet the aim is consistent: to draw Taiwan more tightly into the PRC’s economic and social orbit and build long‑term leverage. This reflects a familiar carrot‑and‑stick pattern in which Beijing heightens cross‑Strait pressure and then promotes its own incentives as the path to relief.

This approach complements the PRC’s broader “grey zone” toolkit—illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive (ICAD) tactics aimed at shaping Taiwan’s political environment and constraining its strategic choices. Seen through this lens, the Cheng–Xi meeting is not an isolated gesture but a component of a long‑running strategy to normalise political-economic integration on terms favourable to Beijing.

Within Taiwan, the visit has renewed scrutiny of the KMT’s role as a loyal opposition, a concept that becomes more complicated when the head of the main opposition party not only engages directly with Beijing but echoes CCP positions and narratives, often contrary to the position of the government and mainstream opinion. This divergence allows the PRC to amplify political divides and strain Taiwan’s contentious political landscape.

Cheng’s itinerary draws on a familiar symbolic repertoire: Nanjing invokes the KMT and CCP’s shared nationalist roots, Shanghai showcases economic success, and Beijing provides the political finale. This sequence evokes a cultural narrative rooted in the KMT’s Chinese nationalist tradition and aligns with the great power imagery Beijing seeks to project.

For Cheng, the political calculus is unmistakably personal. Elected KMT chair with a relatively modest mandate, she has every incentive to use high‑profile cross‑Strait engagement to expand her stature within the party she now leads. Her own political trajectory, beginning with early involvement in pro‑independence activism and roles within the DPP, makes this transformation even more striking. By stepping onto a political stage that few Taiwan politicians can access, she not only reinforces the KMT’s claim to be the party capable of sustained dialogue with Beijing but also recasts her own political identity in a way that projects relevance, authority, and diplomatic reach.

Beyond Taiwanese-Sino relations, the meeting also serve as China’s strategy to shape the regional environment, allowing Beijing to influence perceptions not only within Taiwan but also in Washington and other capitals prior to the scheduled Trump–Xi summit expected later in May. The timing is notable coinciding with contentious Legislative Yuan debates in Taiwan over a special defence budget. Beijing’s outreach is calibrated to influence these discussions directly by reinforcing narratives that question the scale or urgency of defence spending. The political deadlock prompted public statements from members of the US Congress, including bipartisan calls urging Taiwanese lawmakers to advance the package.

A particularly unusual element of Cheng’s visit was the involvement of the taxpayer-funded Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). The KMT’s pending subsidy request to cover the costs of the trip has already triggered partisan debate, heightened ironically by the fact that the TFD, blacklisted by the PRC for “secessionist” work, is prohibited under its own charter from funding unification/independence‑related activities. That Beijing can sanction the TFD while indirectly benefiting from a trip facilitated through the organisation shows how the PRC exploits Taiwan’s polarised democratic political environment. The episode highlights the asymmetrical relationship in which Beijing selectively condemns or tolerates Taiwanese institutions depending on its strategic needs. Ultimately, the highly anticipated Trump–Xi meeting due to take place in just a few weeks, and the results of Taiwan’s local elections in November, will shed more light on what the Cheng-Xi meeting has actually delivered for the KMT and the CCP. 

Roger Lee Huang is a senior lecturer in the School of International Studies at Macquarie University.