Myanmar’s intelligence chiefs: backing into the limelight

On 30 March, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Myanmar’s Defence Services. Four days later, he was elected president of the country by a token parliament. The C-in-C’s flag passed to General Ye Win Oo, for the past five years head of the country’s powerful military intelligence service, the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA).

Ye Win Oo’s promotion was clearly due to his past loyalty to Min Aung Hlaing, and to his expected willingness to let the new president maintain control over the armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw). However, his elevation can also be seen as evidence of the return of Myanmar’s military intelligence organisation to prominence in national affairs.

This is significant, as the armed forces’ intelligence capabilities have always been a major factor in the ability of the generals to control both political and military developments in the country.

Ever since General Ne Win’s military coup in 1962, the country’s intelligence services have been critical to the Tatmadaw’s control over the civilian population and the conduct of its long-running counter-insurgency campaigns against various ethnic armed organisations. Colloquially known as the MI, the military intelligence organisation has dominated the field, although at times the police force’s Special Branch has exercised considerable power.

These two services have been supported by several smaller agencies and public service departments. The most important has been the Bureau of Special Investigation, which has usually focused on economic crimes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also exercised certain intelligence functions, exercised mainly through Myanmar’s diplomatic missions. 

Under the direction of General Khin Nyunt, who was appointed Chief of Intelligence (CI) in 1983, Myanmar’s intelligence agencies developed into an enormous, powerful and multi-faceted apparatus that dominated national affairs. After 1994, an offshoot of the MI known as the Office of Strategic Studies became so influential that it was often described as “a state within the state” and viewed as a potential challenge to the military regime.

Concerns about the extent of Khin Nyunt’s power became so strong that, in 2004, the general was arrested and the entire military intelligence organisation dismantled. More than 3,000 officers were imprisoned, sacked or redeployed. Most civil intelligence responsibilities passed to Special Branch, while operational intelligence functions devolved to the then 12 regional military commanders.

The nation-wide Saffron Revolution in 2007, however, brought home to the generals that, lacking any popular mandate, they needed a powerful and well-coordinated intelligence apparatus to monitor the mood of the civilian population and prevent any further outbreaks of civil unrest. The MI’s position was restored and it gradually regained power and influence under revised command arrangements. 

Looking back over the 78 years since Myanmar regained its independence from Britain, it is possible to identify five enduring features that have characterised the state’s intelligence apparatus — apart, that is, from its sheer size, reach and impunity.

1. Myanmar’s national intelligence apparatus has always been dominated by the armed forces, in one way or another. This contrasts with the British colonial period, when the civil police force was responsible for most intelligence collection and analysis.
2. Since 1948, all Myanmar’s intelligence agencies have been characterised by an uncompromising commitment to the preservation of the country’s unity, stability, and sovereignty, as they have been perceived by the government of the day. In pursuit of these goals, they developed a fearsome reputation.
3. The primary focus of the national intelligence effort has always been on domestic security, not external threats, although the latter have not been ignored. Myanmar has never had a discrete foreign intelligence service.
4. Due largely to Myanmar’s relative isolation and persistent economic problems, its security agencies have relied heavily on human rather than technical intelligence sources, although the balance between them has changed since the country’s electronic revolution began around the turn of the century.
5. In terms of intelligence management, there has always been a tension between the imperative to have a single person or organisation to guide and direct the vast national intelligence effort, and the wish to create multiple agencies under different managers, each performing specialised functions.

Over the years, this last problem has prompted some strong reactions, including far-reaching purges of key personnel. In 1983 and 2004, for example, Myanmar’s military intelligence agencies were sacrificed to the overriding need felt by fearful regime leaders to exercise total control over the state and its coercive apparatus. On both occasions, the resulting chaos led to notable intelligence failures.

In this context, it is noteworthy that, when Senior General Min Aung Hlaing staged his coup in January 2021, he drew heavily on current and former intelligence chiefs for support.

The then head of OCMSA, Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, was appointed a founding member of the junta’s new ruling body, the State Administration Council (SAC). Another founding member was Lieutenant General Mya Htun Oo, the Tatmadaw’s Joint Chief of Staff. He was later joined on the SAC by Lieutenant General Soe Htut, the Minister for Home Affairs. Both were former chiefs of OCMSA. 

In another sign of the trust placed in intelligence chiefs by the junta, and the central role of intelligence in contemporary Myanmar affairs, retired Lieutenant General Myint Swe, until his death in August 2025 the regime’s acting president, was also a former chief of OCMSA. The appointment of Lieutenant General Kyaw Ko Htike as the new head of OCMSA can also be cited as evidence of his perceived reliability and loyalty to Min Aung Hlaing.

It goes without saying that, since the 2021 coup, the national intelligence apparatus has played a major role in identifying opponents to military rule and taking measures against them. There has also been a greater reliance on human and technical sources of intelligence to monitor both the civilian population and security forces, as well as to conduct military operations against various armed opposition groups.

There does not appear to be any move to restore the CI’s position to the same level of prominence, independence and influence that it enjoyed under General Khin Nyunt. The importance of the intelligence function under a trusted Tatmadaw officer, however, has clearly been recognised, and accepted as a critical component of continuing military rule, whether this is exercised openly or, as is the case now, thinly disguised behind a sham parliament.

Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, in Brisbane, Australia. His latest book is “Myanmar: The Making of an Intelligence State” (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2026)