Japan’s ‘quasi alliance’ with Australia takes shape

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaich’s three-day visit to Canberra this week produced no breakthroughs or landmark agreements. But her meeting with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese still proved significant, reflecting the growing strategic urgency in the bilateral relationship.

The conditions for strategic alignment are manifest in several ways. 

First, the regional and global security environment has deteriorated sharply in recent years. The Russia–Ukraine war continues with no clear resolution in sight. War in the Middle East has disrupted global energy markets and supply chains across the Indo-Pacific. China’s military posture and irredentist territorial claims unsettle the region.

Second, Australia and Japan are celebrating the 50th anniversary of their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, underscoring how far bilateral relations have evolved since World War 2. This is highly symbolic and sends a diplomatic message to the communities of both nations.

Third, Tokyo and Canberra have reached a historically significant defence cooperation agreement under which Japan will supply three upgraded Mogami-class frigates to Australia, with later vessels to be jointly built in Australia under a co-production arrangement. This is one of Japan’s most ambitious defence-industrial partnerships in the postwar era. It signals a new level of bilateral strategic and political trust, underpinned by multi-dimensional relationships from trade and commerce to people-to-people exchanges.

This week the two leaders also signed a series of agreements covering economic and energy security and critical minerals and cyber cooperation. Together, the joint declarations reflect the widening scope of the strategic partnership beyond traditional diplomacy into areas increasingly central to national resilience and regional stability. 

While many of these collaborations build on work done during former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Australia in 2022, they renew the emphasis on defence cooperation, supply chain security, and critical raw materials. Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit gives this agenda particular significance. It demonstrates that Canberra remains strategically important to Tokyo under Japan’s new leadership and that the bilateral relationship continues to deepen and expand.

This deepening partnership did not emerge overnight; rather, it evolved over decades of careful cultivation, particularly in defence and security cooperation. A major turning point came with the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, a landmark agreement that was Japan’s first significant security partnership outside its alliance with the United States.

For much of the postwar period, while their commercial and economic ties grew rapidly, in the security field Australia and Japan operated primarily as the southern and northern anchors of the US-led alliance system in the Western Pacific. The 2007 declaration signalled a shift toward a more direct bilateral strategic relationship, even as both countries remained firmly embedded within the US alliance framework.

The inflection point arrived in 2022 with the revised Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, strengthening the relationship further, followed by the signing of the Australia–Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which entered into force in 2023. 

The RAA enables the deployment and operation of each country’s defence forces on the other’s territory and represents one of Japan’s most significant defence arrangements in the postwar era. With the agreement now in force, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces conduct regular visits, with some maintaining a longer-term presence in northern Australia, marking a significant change in bilateral military cooperation.

Building on this momentum, the two countries established the Framework for Strategic Defence Cooperation in 2025, which focuses on strengthening capability, deepening integration, and enhancing interoperability between Australia and Japan. This initiative underscores the continuing expansion of defence ties.

As a result of this increasingly close security relationship, Australia and Japan are often described as ‘quasi-allies’, as also noted by Prime Minister Takaichi in her statement to the press in Canberra. 

Indeed, the Australia–Japan ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ has been further elevated through Takaichi’s visit and the signing of the latest defence and economic security agreements. Looking ahead, the proposed Australia–Japan Leadership Dialogue, which would bring together political leaders, academics, and business groups, could help sustain both public and strategic attention on the importance of the bilateral relationship.

Amid strengthening bilateral ties, significant challenges and strategic tasks remain. Beyond the two critical tasks of managing relations with China and sustaining US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, Australia and Japan must also think more ambitiously about the region’s long-term trajectory.

 In the 1980s, the two countries demonstrated such vision through their leadership in establishing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which helped shape regional trade rules for decades and attracted broad membership. More recently, they again showed leadership by advancing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018, following the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the original pact.

A comparable medium-term vision is now needed, one that addresses an evolving security environment alongside growing economic uncertainty, including energy and fuel disruptions stemming from conflict in the Middle East. As Takaichi noted, the two countries have become “frontrunners in co-operation among like-minded countries”. Yet how this leadership will translate into concrete strategies for a more stable, resilient, and cooperative region remains unclear.

There were also notable gaps in the visit itself. No joint press conference was held at which the two prime ministers could take questions and articulate their shared agenda. Nor were there substantive engagements with business leaders or community organisations that might have broadened the visit’s impact and visibility. 

An address to the joint sitting of parliament, like that delivered by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2014, or more recently by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, could likewise have elevated both the profile and substance of the engagement.

For Takaichi, however, these are still early days as she consolidates her position as the first female prime minister in a male-dominated domestic political environment characterised by frequent leadership turnover. Only a few prime ministers have remained in office for more than two years, with Abe standing as a notable exception in Japan’s parliamentary history.

At present, the political landscape appears broadly favourable to her. Although her popularity has declined slightly, she continues to maintain relatively strong approval ratings six months into office. The opposition remains fragmented and weak, and there is no clear rival within the ruling coalition capable of mounting a serious challenge. Moreover, with no major election scheduled until the triennial upper house contest in mid-2028, Takaichi has a window of political stability.

That election will serve as a critical barometer of her leadership. A strong performance, particularly securing a two-thirds majority, would position her to advance her Liberal Democratic Party’s long-standing goal of constitutional revision, including formalising the status of the Self-Defence Forces, an objective also closely pursued by Shinzo Abe.

For Australia, and indeed the wider region, the key question will be how Takaichi navigates domestic politics and translates her political capital into a clear and consequential foreign policy direction.

Purnendra Jain is Emeritus Professor of Asian Studies at Adelaide University.

Image: @takaichi_sanae X.com