Beyond BTS: a mic drop moment for Australia–Korea relations

In the jukebox of Australia’s Northeast Asia relationships, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is the ‘outro’ – the deep cut only diehard fans know. Despite a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), Australia’s engagement with the ROK has remained sporadic and thin at leader level.

When BTS kicks off the Australian leg for their world tour in February 2027, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his wife Jodie could invite President Lee Jae Myung and First Lady Kim Hea Kyung on a double date—the Korean couple have been ardent advocates of the cultural marketing power of K-pop.

Better still, Albanese could make a bilateral visit to South Korea, ending a 12-year gap since the last standalone prime ministerial visit and consolidating his attendance at the 2025 APEC summit in Gyeongju.

While there are numerous geostrategic forces driving Australia and ROK together, a closer relationship is not inevitable. Realising its potential will require sustained effort to deepen mutual understanding, earn trust and expand areas of cooperation across government, business and civil society.

By making an obligatory appearance at APEC last November, Albanese became the first Australian Prime Minister to visit Korea since Tony Abbott went to sign the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) in April 2014. It’s not as if Korea hasn’t experienced significant change in its domestic politics and international relations since the signing of the CSP in 2021. Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s recent visit to Seoul is a reminder that summitry is no substitute for the signal sent by a bilateral visit.

There is much for both leaders to discuss. Australia and the ROK share deep economic relationships with China and strategic alliances with the United States critical for their security. Korea has the added complication of geographical proximity to China and the existential conflict with the DPRK. Korea also has a complex history with Japan—an increasingly important Australian ally—but regional and global instability is providing the context for a more cordial and substantive relationship between Seoul and Tokyo than has been possible in the past. This is positive for Australia, but the opportunity will only be maximised if the Korea relationship is given the same main stage billing.

Australia and the ROK have better options than joining the Middle Power chorus led by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. But they are missing the habit of collaboration that recognises their shared agency as Asian middle powers. Both have foreign policy settings that assert agency, albeit more strongly in some geographies and thematic ambits than others. But their institutional habits of cooperation remain underdeveloped. More regular dialogue between ministers and officials, deeper engagement between business and research communities, and stronger networks linking civil society are needed to translate shared interests into collective influence.

The breathless North Atlantic reception to Mark Carney’s Davos speech revealed just how little effort is invested in understanding Asia’s approach to multilateral (and minilateral) cooperation. For Asian middle powers, agency is not exercised through rhetorical leadership alone, but through consensus building and pragmatic coordination. Australia and the ROK would be better served by building their own patterns of cooperation—ones that others, including Canada, might eventually choose to join—rather than waiting to be convened.

For a partnership that’s meant to be strategic, Australia and the ROK still barely know each other where it counts. Economically, the two countries are a natural fit—Australia’s strength in resources and energy complements Korea’s advanced manufacturing and technological capabilities, creating highly integrated trade in LNG and critical minerals.

Yet the partnership remains overly defined by this familiar exchange. Australia is more than a quarry—in some technology fields ahead of Korea, a leading global player in areas such as quantum computing, medical research and education. Korea, likewise, is more than a market for gas and beef—it is one of the world’s most sophisticated consumer economies, with globally competitive firms and a culture of rapid technological adoption.

Building a more resilient partnership means moving beyond transactional trade to deeper economic integration. The work of building a deeper and more resilient bilateral partnership is not the task of ministers and government officials alone. It requires business relationships of greater consequence than Korea’s status as Australia’s 20th largest foreign investor would suggest.

Hanwha’s defence industrial investment in Geelong, where is it building the Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the Huntsman Self-Propelled Howitzer, offers a glimpse of what is possible. Joint defence industry research and development and supply to third parties should follow.

A leader-level commitment to exploring KAFTA 2.0, focusing on supply chain cooperation in areas of shared priority, would be another worthy short-term goal. And it should be buttressed by commitments to expand research collaboration, scale student and professional exchanges, and leverage the influence of Korean culture in Australia to help anchor the relationship in more than just commerce.

Structural drivers—in security and economics—are pushing Australia and the ROK closer together. But deeper, more resilient partnership requires both sides to develop stronger habits of cooperation informed by a contemporary understanding of each other. There is potential for this to be a ‘mic drop’ moment in the Australia-Korea relationship but only if both sides commit to — in the words of BTS — ‘Stay Gold’.

Rachel Thompson is the Chief Executive Officer of Asialink.

Asialink and the ROK’s Plaza Project convened a Chatham House dialogue “On Track2: Australia–ROK Strategic Interdependence” on 2 June.