Australia and the Republic of Korea: How to make a better strategic partnership

The US-led world order—the Pax Americana system—that has persisted since World War II appears to be at a tipping point, triggered by the Iran War and the US-China Summit in Beijing last month. The fact China, dealing from a position of strength, called for "strategic stability" at the summit, and the US appeared to accept this concept, suggests the US will now put more emphasis on managing relations with China than maintaining hegemonic superiority. If arms sale to Taiwan are halted due to pressure from China, the security commitments of the US to the region will lose all credibility. In other words, if Taiwan's security becomes a bargaining chip, it is highly likely that the security of other nations in this region will also become bargaining chips of great power politics. 

Under these circumstances, South Korea and Australia, which rely on the US for security and on China for trade, must redouble their efforts to mitigate the dilemma arising from this dual dependency.  While they currently engage in indirect security cooperation centered on their respective US alliances, they must strengthen the mechanism for more direct security cooperation. Furthermore, countries in the Indo-Pacific must be prepared to coordinate more and fill the power vacuum created by the weakening commitment of the United States. Amid predictions that we will enter the so-called G-Zero era, in which “no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage – or will – to drive a truly international agenda” and each country must pursue a self-help security policy, the failure of middle powers to unite will lead to the failure of their individual national security policies.

In this context, I would like to make several suggestions to strengthen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) between Korea and Australia. First, dialogue channels between the two countries must be revitalised and deliver more substantive results. The frequency of summit meetings should be shortened to at least once every three years—that is, possibly once during the terms of both heads of government. The 2+2 foreign and defence ministers’ meetings, held every two years, must also be conducted more substantively to produce tangible results. Consequently, strategic dialogues at the Assistant Secretary level should be held annually to review the progress of the outcomes from higher-level meetings.

Second, to give the CSP a more solid foundation, we should confirm the two countries possess sufficient potential to be strategic partners. Due to several factors, they have not fully recognised each other's potential as strategic partners. Therefore, it is imperative to narrow this perception gap. Korea tends to be passive in seeking diplomatic alternatives that could negatively impact relations with China and North Korea—it places a high priority on stable relations with both. Australia also appears unsure about fully expanding cooperation with Korea due to Korea's inconsistent foreign policy and a lack of awareness regarding Korea's status as a new manufacturing powerhouse. To address this perception deficit, it is necessary to promote substantive strategic dialogue not only between the governments but also between the private sectors. We need to understand each other better.

Third, substantive cooperation must be promoted in areas such as the existing and renewable energy sectors, the defence industry, supply chain reshaping, and rare earth production. It is necessary to promptly conclude a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) for military personnel, which is currently under discussion between the two governments, to facilitate the smooth entry and exit of troops and equipment during joint exercises. Furthermore, the governments should consider an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to enable mutual support of military supplies and equipment during joint exercises.

Beyond enhancing bilateral relations, the two countries should cooperate to stabilise the situation in the Indo-Pacific. As US allies, South Korea and Australia were enmeshed in the US-centric "Hub and Spoke Alliance System," resulting in mutual, indirect security cooperation. However, keeping in mind the possibility that American security resolve in the Western Pacific may be diluted in the future, joint efforts should be made to establish a "Lattice Structure of Cooperation"—a minilateral security cooperation framework centered on both countries. It is necessary to form security cooperation bodies with combinations of countries outside existing minilateral frameworks and test the level of cooperation. If a robust minilateral security cooperation framework emerges, Australia and South Korea should consider elevating this body to a quasi-military alliance. While some advocate the launch of an Asian version of NATO in the Western Pacific, this initiative is unlikely given the region's history. It is overly ambitious given the current international situation.

As middle powers with similar political systems and values, South Korea and Australia share a common interest in maintaining a liberal, rules-based international order. It is becoming clear that maintaining the current global order will be difficult, as great powers do not wish to be bound by such an order. However, there is a need for cooperation in maintaining liberal international solidarity among those countries wishing to join. It is desirable that the creation of a new order in the Indo-Pacific is led by the nations within this region. 

We are entering an era of great “rupture" as mentioned by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. As the order, and practices, we have been accustomed to fade, we must build a new order in the Indo-Pacific bringing a fresh and creative perspective. Today, both Australia and South Korea rely on the United States for security and on China for their economies, remaining trapped in a "dilemma of dual dependence". To escape this, it is necessary not only to forge a new security cooperation framework but also to establish a new supply chain system. While one can put all one’s eggs in one basket during periods of stable order, it is wise to put one’s eggs in multiple baskets during times of great rupture. Rather than rely on the power of others for their survival, nations must rely on their own power and the power of solidarity. If weaker nations continue to rely on a power distribution structure centered on great powers, they are highly likely to be reduced to mere objects of trade between great powers. To avoid this risk, it is time to further strengthen solidarity among middle powers.

Lee Baek Soon is the former ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Australia.

This article is based on a presentation to an Asialink-Plaza Project Chatham House webinar “On Track2: Australia–ROK Strategic Interdependence” on 2 June.