Inclusive economic development in Myanmar cannot be achieved amid ongoing militarisation

Myanmar’s political, economic and humanitarian crisis raises a fundamental question: Can it achieve meaningful, inclusive development when its competing rulers destroy the institutions that safeguard rights, political participation, and accountability?

Evidence since the military coup in 2021 suggests the answer is no. The military junta has used draconian laws to suppress dissidents and conduct airstrikes, while people in areas controlled by revolutionary armed groups also face restrictions on free expression due to security risks.

Democracy and human rights are not liberal ideals to be postponed until economic stability arrives or a common agreement is reached among political actors; they are the institutional foundations that make sustainable and inclusive development possible.

Myanmar’s modern political history shows how deeply repression has been embedded in state formation since independence in 1948, with the military’s prolonged involvement in politics justified by the Communist Party of Burma insurgency and the Karen National Union rebellion. After the 1962 military takeover, decades of authoritarian rule normalised censorship, arbitrary detention, forced labour, and violent persecution of ethnic minorities, while centralising power in ways that insulated the armed forces from public accountability.

The reform era from 2011 to 2021 opened limited political space through elections, partial media liberalisation, and greater civil society activity, but these changes remained constrained by the 2008 Constitution, which preserved the military’s institutional veto and broad coercive power.

The coup of 1 February 2021 therefore did not create authoritarianism; it restored and intensified a long-standing structure of military domination, abruptly reversing a decade of fragile democratic opening. The revolutionary actors fighting against the military junta are also not free from criticism for violating fundamental rights and for failing to be accountable in some cases.

Since the coup, civil and political rights have deteriorated on a massive scale. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported as of 1 August, 8,222 people had been killed by the junta and pro-military groups (28.3 percent died in custody and 13.3 percent of those killed were children), and that 31,619 people had been arrested by the military junta and its allied militia groups.  

As of 27 July, the UNHCR estimated there were approximately 3.8 million internally displaced people. Human Rights Watch reported torture, sexual violence, and other forms of ill-treatment are widespread in prisons, interrogation sites, and military bases. Journalists, lawyers, teachers, health workers, and activists have been detained under sweeping security and counterterrorism laws.

UN Special Rapporteur, Tom Andrews, found the military’s targeting of civilians, destruction of civilian structures, and obstruction of humanitarian access have become central features of post-coup governance. Human Rights Watch’s review of 2025 events further documents repeated airstrikes on villages, schools, hospitals, monasteries, and camps for displaced people, alongside the use of banned munitions and indiscriminate attacks across nearly the entire country.

When people cannot speak, assemble, report, or organise safely, they are also prevented from shaping political processes, economic policies, and participating in economic growth and development.

OHCHR has shown that the military uses legal, administrative, and coercive barriers to restrict aid delivery, control movement, obstruct imports, and limit access to food and healthcare in areas seen as resistant to military authority. The same report describes how the registration regime for organisations (CSOs and humanitarian workers), checkpoint extortion, banking restrictions, and telecommunications shutdowns impede both relief operations and civilian survival, especially in conflict zones. These are not merely governance failures; they are mechanisms of domination that transform access to essential goods into a political privilege.

Development in Myanmar cannot be understood through a narrow economic lens. UNDP reported that more than one-third of Myanmar’s population now requires humanitarian assistance and 16.7 million are facing acute food insecurity. Poverty has worsened dramatically, with an estimated 76 percent of the population living at or below subsistence levels.

The collapse of markets, disruption of livelihoods, and fragmentation of governance have further eroded household and community resilience, deepening humanitarian needs and undermining prospects for sustainable development. Irradwaady News rightly noted that the coup erased nearly a decade of progress made in the 2010s. Under the civilian-led democratic government, Myanmar’s GDP reached US$77.8 billion in 2020 but fell to US$64.28 billion by 2024 under military rule. Meanwhile, the exchange rate weakened from 1,350 kyats per US dollar in 2020 to around 4,500 in January 2025, further driving inflation. It has since strengthened to 2,100.

These outcomes show that repression does not create order from which development can later emerge; it erodes the social trust, institutional capacity, and human security on which development depends. While a militarised state may pursue resource extraction and infrastructure development for economic development, its policies prioritise centralised control and regime stability over openness and inclusion. Foreign exchange restrictions, import controls, financial intervention, and ongoing conflict have distorted markets, weakened investment, and disrupted livelihoods. As a result, development remains narrow and exclusionary, underscoring that sustainable growth requires political stability, accountable institutions, and the rule of law.

Democracy and human rights are not obstacles to development in Myanmar but its precondition. Any growth produced under conditions of military coercion or authoritarian governance is likely to remain fragile and unequal because it is detached from accountability, participation, and the rule of law.

Sustainable development in Myanmar will require more than economic recovery; it depends on ending impunity, restoring civic space, rebuilding democratic institutions, protecting fundamental freedoms, and constructing a federal democratic order in which all communities can participate as rights-bearing political equals. Only under those conditions can development become genuinely inclusive, just, and durable.

The author is a Myanmar political analyst with extensive knowledge of the country’s political history and current political dynamics and is using a pseudonym for personal security reasons.