How the ouster and jailing of Imran Khan enabled closer ties between Pakistan and the US

Former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s incarceration isn’t about to end any time soon; the Pakistani military will make sure of that, despite Khan’s continued high popularity at home. The jailing of a democratic leader should be cause for censure by the United States. Instead, President Donald Trump has embraced Khan’s jailers in a gambit that is reshaping US relationships on the subcontinent, in particular the all-important but prickly one with India.

Two years ago this month, Khan was jailed for three years for alleged misuse of his office to buy and sell gifts in state possession. He has not been seen in public since. In January, he was sentenced to an additional 14 years in a corruption case linked to a Pakistani businessman. As of December 2024, prosecutors had filed 186 cases against Khan. 

His jail conditions are harsh, particularly for a former high-level Pakistani politician. In jail, they usually live in relative comfort. Khan is reportedly held in solitary confinement in a small cell meant for terrorists in a Rawalpindi prison. And he has been denied visits from family members and political allies in breach of his legal rights.

Even though Khan was the military’s ‘man’ in the 2018 federal elections, his political downfall was almost inevitable when, as prime minister, he encroached on what the military considered its exclusive domain, including in the selection of some of the top generals. When the then opposition led by Muslim League head, Shehbaz Sharif, won a parliamentary vote of no confidence against Khan in April 2022, the military didn’t come to his aid. Khan repeatedly accused the opposition, supported by the military, of doing Washington’s bidding. 

The driving force behind the suppression of Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), is Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the man who to all intents and purposes runs the country. It was under his watch that riots took place in May 2023 in which thousands of demonstrators attacked military and government buildings, including the army headquarters in Rawalpindi and the residence of a senior commander in Lahore. Munir and his generals were determined such unprecedented violence against the armed forces would never recur.

Accordingly, a massive crackdown was launched against the PTI following the bloody riots. The subsequent elections in February 2024 were probably the most blatantly rigged in Pakistan’s history. And while PTI-linked independent legislators still won the most seats, Shehbaz Nawaz was installed as prime minister. The PTI was banned in July 2024. The overwhelming majority of high-level PTI officials and politicians were either forced to resign from politics or jailed.

With the ejection of Khan and his PTI from the political boardgame, and the instalment of a docile Muslim League-led government, it was easy to institutionalise Pakistan’s long-standing de facto ‘Hybrid Model’ of governance—a military regime in civilian clothing. This political division of labour has been publicly welcomed by the government as a successful and efficient model for Pakistan.          

The timing of Khan’s removal from the political scene and the arrival of Field Marshal Munir dovetailed with the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House. While Trump appeared to like Khan in his first term, two issues eventually dampened that enthusiasm: Khan’s consistent accusation that the State Department had pressed for his removal from power in 2022; and his welcome of the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 as “breaking the shackles of slavery”.     

In contrast, Pakistan’s military knew it still needed a solid working relationship with the US, despite Islamabad’s long-standing and close strategic relationship with China and the United States’ increasingly important military relationship with India.

Following Khan’s ouster, the military worked hard to rebuild the bilateral relationship with Washington. The critical turning point in the rejuvenation of the relationship was Pakistan’s decision to hand over to the Americans recently captured Mohammad Sharifullah, a commander of Islamic State in Khorasan Province and mastermind of the terrorist attack on Kabul airport during the evacuation of Western forces in August 2021 which killed 13 military personnel. This was widely appreciated in Washington. President Trump personally thanked the Pakistan government in his first State of the Union Address in March.  

Pakistan’s victory in a four-day military clash with India last May, sparked by a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, would have impressed Trump who doesn’t like ‘losers’. Indian leaders belatedly and begrudgingly acknowledged that they had done poorly in this short war against an opponent armed with Chinese-made weapons. However, oddly, and without any proof, the Indian Chief of the Air Force claimed this week that the Indians had actually shot down six Pakistani aircraft. 

President Trump claims—but this is hotly disputed by India—to have been instrumental in having the two countries agree to a ceasefire. Pakistan thanked Trump for his efforts by formally nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. 

In an unprecedented move, Trump invited Munir for a private two-hour lunch at the White House on 18 June. There, Munir thanked Trump for being “extremely influential in stopping” the recent Indo-Pakistan clash. And later, referring to Munir, Trump stated that the “General [is] a very impressive personality, a great man”. Less than two months later, Munir was again invited to Washington to have high-level discussions with American political and military leaders. 

These visits by the military strongman of Pakistan—India’s arch enemy, blamed for the April terrorist attack in Kashmir, sent a clear message to New Delhi. Notwithstanding America’s bipartisan-supported, strategic relationship with India, which has evolved over more than two decades, Trump is not happy with India. 

The American president is particularly irritated with India’s membership of the anti-Western BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, joined recently by other members of the Global South), with its continued purchase of Russian oil and military hardware, and with the many trade barriers it imposes on American imports. Accordingly, the US imposed on 5 August a 25% tariff barrier—one of the highest in Asia—on all Indian goods coming into the US. These tariffs will increase to 50% on 27 August to penalise India for its continued purchase of Russian oil. If these remain in place, it would impose an unsustainable strain on India’s economy which Trump refers to as a “dead economy”. 

In contrast, Washington signed a trade deal with Pakistan that only imposes a 19% tariff on imports (instead of the 29% originally threatened), and assists with the exploration of Pakistan’s “massive oil reserves”. In return, Pakistan will import one million barrels of oil from the US in October, with possibly more to follow. This is good news for an economy that recently hit rock bottom.

Much has changed in the six years since Trump warmly welcomed Imran Khan to the White House. Khan is now languishing in jail and the man who put him there is now Trump’s hero. As to how long this bromance between the President and the Field Marshal will last is anyone’s guess. As for relations between the US and India, these too are changing dramatically under Trump. These are going to be navigating choppy waters for the foreseeable future and will require much nurturing to recover. The planned Leaders’ Meeting of the security-oriented Quad grouping (Australia, India, Japan and the US), to be hosted by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for later in the year in New Delhi, will be a particularly difficult one to manage. That’s if it still goes ahead. 

Dr Claude Rakisits is a Canberra-based geo-strategic analyst who has been following South Asian issues for over 40 years. 

Image: Asianet-Pakistan / Shutterstock.com