The end of the Shinawatra Era Is written in policy, not in court

The Thai courts have dealt heavy blows to the Shinawatra dynasty in recent weeks. The Constitutional Court ousted Paetongtarn from the premiership, and the Supreme Court has just sentenced her father Thaksin to prison. Some political commentators see this as a chance for Pheu Thai to ‘rebrand’ after years of compromise. Others argue it instead signals the closing chapter of the Shinawatra era, which has influenced Thai politics for more than two decades.

What could truly end the Shinawatra era, however, is not court rulings against Paetongtarn or Thaksin, but the party’s loss of its economic edge. Historically, Thaksin’s first political vehicle, Thai Rak Thai, defined itself through ground-breaking policies that reshaped opportunity for rural Thais — the 30 Baht healthcare scheme, One Tambon One Product (OTOP), and the Village Fund. Its successor, Pheu Thai Party, pushed ambitious infrastructure projects such as high-speed rail, only to see them aborted by the Constitutional Court. These programmes, while sometimes criticised as populist, projected vision and hope and firmly reinforced the parties’ dominance at the ballot box. By comparison, the short-lived governments of Srettha Thavisin and Paetongtarn installed in 2023 left behind no legacy to rival their predecessors’ visionary projects.

Indeed, the recent Pheu Thai government has rolled out new economic policies, but none have made a real impact. A much-hyped digital wallet scheme was billed as a blockchain-based programme for all citizens; in practice, neither promise delivered. Paetongtarn once called it an ‘economic tornado’, yet it turned into just another short-term stimulus — cash in hand with little vision. The warm reception of the revived Kon La Khrueng (half-half) scheme underscores Pheu Thai’s lack of vision. The scheme was first launched under former prime minister and junta leader Prayut Chan-o-cha during the pandemic and was just reintroduced by Anutin Charnvirakul. Yet even this recycled measure seemed more appealing to the public than Pheu Thai’s trumpeted economic tornado.

There are at least two reasons why the Shinawatra party can no longer deliver sound economic policy. First, it lacks the bargaining power to push through game-changing policies. Unlike in Thaksin’s era, Pheu Thai does not control the House and must bow to coalition partners, making ambitious initiatives nearly impossible. For example, the controversial proposal for an ‘entertainment complex’, pitched as a new engine of growth, was swiftly blocked by Bhumjaithai. Second, and more importantly, the party has lost the motivation to do so. Since the May 2023 election, it has prioritised political manoeuvring over economic vision. Even the flagship digital wallet scheme was added late in the campaign, riddled with flaws and poorly prepared. The only programme that could be called innovative is the retirement lottery, which has been praised by the World Bank. Yet it is hardly new, having been floated during the 2019 election campaign. In fact, Pheu Thai has focused on its own survival under the 2017 constitution — striking bargains and compromising with rivals — while abandoning the economic base that once defined its brand.

These policy drifts come at the worst possible time. Since the 2006 coup, Thailand’s average annual growth has been under 3%, well below that of neighbours such as Vietnam and Indonesia. It droped five places in a respected competitiveness ranking last year. Inequality, meanwhile, has scarcely improved. And this is before counting the geoeconomic shocks still to come. The Shinawatra parties once met such challenges with audacious, if controversial, initiatives — for example, the so-called Thaksinomics. Thailand now needs not just quick stimulus but a structural economic transformation. The era that began with bold ideas ended in aimlessness.

What, then, should we expect from the new government under Anutin? The revival of Kon La Khrueng already signals Bhumjaithai’s preparation for the next general election. It would be no surprise if more band-aid schemes follow, especially as the party has agreed with the People’s Party to dissolve the House within four months. When that election will actually take place  is uncertain. What does seem certain is that with Thaksin in jail for a year, it is hard to see Pheu Thai campaigning on economic policy. By the time the election comes, it may have no breakthrough ideas left in its hat.

Can Thais hope for better economic policies from other parties, such as the People’s Party? Unfortunately, probably not. The party now appears focused on drafting a new constitution to create a fairer political game. Nor is there any guarantee it will even enter the cabinet, as the last election showed. If Thais are lucky, a new constitution might eventually pave the way to unlock economic stagnation. But the recent Constitutional Court ruling has only made that drafting process more complicated.

The 1997 Constitution opened the door to big economic change, seized by Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai. By favouring bigger parties and stronger prime ministers, it gave elected governments the stability needed to pursue ambitious policies. It was not flawless, coming at the expense of checks and balances. But the coups and subsequent constitutions have closed that door, limiting what any government can do through overtly undemocratic means. The Shinawatra parties, then, are not solely responsible for these policy drifts. But as they surrendered the economic edge, their once-dominant era is fading fast.

Itsakul Unahakate is a lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University

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