A bruised presidency in the Philippines

The Philippines currently finds itself in a familiar dynastic standoff between its President, Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. and Vice President, Sara Duterte. This pits two infamous clans – that of former dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. and that of the last incumbent of the presidential palace, Malacañang, Rodrigo Duterte – against each other in a high stakes political contest.

President Marcos and Vice President Duterte won landslide victories in the 2022 elections. Although they ran as a “UniTeam”, a feature of Philippines politics is that the president and vice president are elected separately. The pair since have become bitter rivals as has been typical in Philippine history since the Commonwealth period (1935-1946). 

Manuel Quezon became the Commonwealth president after fighting off a challenge from Sergio Osmeña Sr. (who reluctantly became vice president) and several post-independence presidents quarreled with their vice presidents, including Marcos Sr. and his vice president, Fernando Lopez (most of whose wealthy family was forced into exile after the declaration of martial law in 1972, with many of their assets seized and the vice president’s nephew jailed). 

After the kleptocratic Marcos regime was toppled by the “people power” uprising in 1986, the new president, Corazon “Cory” Aquino of the storied Aquino-Cojuangco clan and widow of slain opposition leader Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., was nearly felled by a coup backed by her vice president, Salvador Laurel, scion of another major clan (whose father had served as president of the Japanese-installed government during World War II with Ninoy Aquino’s father his vice president). 

Most subsequent presidents feuded with their vice presidents, in part because of separate mandates granted by the idiosyncratic system of separate elections. Rodrigo Duterte often harshly criticised vice president Leonor Maria “Leni” Robredo, who lost to Marcos Jr. in the 2022 presidential election.

Although severely disadvantaged in a hyperpresidentialist system, the Dutertes have proved remarkably resilient in the current Philippine ‘game of thrones-style’ conflict because of the mass appeal of a brand built around the murderous ‘penal populism’ embodied by the drug war. The second Marcos presidency has been badly bruised in its battle with the Duterte dynasty, despite Marcos’s massive patronage resources, dominance over the legislature and centralised police powers. Sara Duterte is now well-positioned to retake the presidency for her family in 2028.

The pro-Marcos forces had seemingly dealt two major blows to the Dutertes – the loyal lower house impeached Sara Duterte in early 2025 and her father was arrested in March and sent to The Hague for trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) based on an Interpol warrant carried out in a procedurally questionable manner in a highly politicised environment. Yet by the May midterm elections it was obvious the Marcos administration’s efforts to bring down the Duterte family had gone badly awry. 

While patronage politics usually enables a pro-administration Senate slate to win national elections easily – and, just to be certain, the pro-Marcos slate was carefully curated with celebrity politicians, backed by powerful clans - his Alyansa (alliance) ticket could only tie the pro-Duterte Senate coalition with five seats each after the defection of two Marcos-slate candidates. Two liberal candidates, previously thought marginalised, won Senate seats as well. 

The backdrop to pro-Marcos candidates’ poor performance was an abrupt fall in Marcos Jr.’s opinion poll ratings, down to 25% shortly before the polls, the lowest of any post-Marcos Sr. president at the midpoint of their time in office. Although his approval rating has recovered somewhat since, it still lags far behind Sara Duterte’s. 

With her vote in 2022 for vice president surpassing even Marcos’ landslide win for the presidency, recent polling showed she enjoyed a nearly two-to-one margin over Marcos after the arrest of her father led to widespread outrage in the country. Human rights activists and the families of drug war victims saw justice as finally being done, but many Filipinos sympathised with the Duterte family, with the former president portrayed as a martyr. Sara Duterte even invoked a parallel to the 1983 assassination of opposition leader Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. during the late Marcos Sr. regime (much to the anger of the Aquino family, who rejected the comparison).

Duterte received a further boost when the Supreme Court threw out her impeachment on technical grounds on July 25, pre-empting a Senate trial. On July 28, Marcos Jr. tried to reboot his presidency with a sober fourth State of the Nation address. Taking place amidst widespread flooding (the risk of typhoons in the country has doubled in recent years due to climate change), he blamed corrupt politicians for substandard flood control infrastructure. Despite falling inflation, Filipinos still feel the effects of post-COVID 19 price hikes, particularly on foodstuffs, blaming Marcos for failing to fulfill an unrealistic promise to keep the price of rice down to 20 pesos per kilo. 

After their return from political exile in 1991, the Marcoses built up a powerful political narrative about nostalgia for the supposed “golden age”, based on systematic historical revisionism of Marcos Sr.’s rule. This helped Marcos Jr. win the presidency. Yet in an effort at political redemption given his father’s authoritarianism, Marcos Jr. has sought to redefine his image, presenting himself as a “normal” chief executive who respects the rule of law, adheres to institutional processes and works to promote good governance. He downplayed the controversial “war on drugs” and shifted Philippine foreign policy from a pro-China orientation toward a more pro-US stance, particularly in defence of the country’s interests in the West Philippine Sea.

However, as the decline of the legacy of “people power” in the country indicated, appeals to democratic norms and procedural governance have limited discursive power when confronted by resurgent illiberal populism, fueled by grievance and intensified through the allure of decisive, punitive leadership.

Mark R. Thompson is chair professor of politics, City University of Hong Kong. His most recent book is The Philippines: From “People Power” to Democratic Backsliding, Cambridge University Press, 2023.

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