ASEAN's regroup requires deep reforms

If ASEAN's 58 years thus far have been about resilience and playing a central organising role in promoting regional security and stability, its next decade will determine whether the Southeast Asian bloc can adapt and remain relevant. After the crises in Myanmar and along the Thai-Cambodian border, ASEAN's credibility has never been more in doubt. To regain its effectiveness as Southeast Asia's one and only agency, ASEAN needs to move away from the ritualistic diplomacy of mundane meetings to far-reaching reforms that chart new ways of making things work.

One immediate change would be to reduce summit frequency. ASEAN leaders currently meet twice a year, but this has turned into an exercise in ceremony rather than substance. The bloc should revert to a single annual summit -- allowing more time for preparation, coordination, and follow-up. Camaraderie among ASEAN leaders should be promoted but bilaterally and minilaterally based on personal chemistry and mutual interests. These personal relationships can then complement and reinforce the broader group at the summit level.

What ASEAN needs now is not more communiqués, but more implementation. Fewer meetings could mean more focus -- and perhaps more progress. For instance, the Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar and the Thai-Cambodian ceasefire must be enforced, not just reaffirmed. ASEAN needs to ensure Myanmar's looming sham elections in December-January do not supersede the 5PC, whereas the Thai-Cambodian border requires actual ASEAN-wide peacekeepers, not just observers.

Moreover, the ASEAN Secretary-General (ASG) wields potential authority but little autonomy. The current five-year, alphabet-based rotation system allows every member state a turn, but often at the cost of competence and continuity. A better model would appoint the most qualified candidate through a regional search process. The term should be shortened to two or three years, renewable once, with measurable performance benchmarks. Compensation should reflect both responsibility and accountability, akin to a corporate or central bank executive.

Performance-based incentives could ensure dynamism and discourage complacency. ASEAN's past secretaries-general, such as Ong Keng Yong and Surin Pitsuwan, demonstrated what strong and smart leadership can achieve. The office needs to recapture that calibre. If the alphabet rotation cannot be scrapped, ASEAN might experiment with a one-year linkage between the ASG and the rotating chair country. This could synchronise national and regional agendas. The obvious risk would be a single member state's dominance, but this would only be for one year.

Because of the limited duration, this modality could force member states to think beyond themselves because their longer-term interests require working with others rather than being pursued narrowly for just a year. However it is done, revitalising the Secretariat is a top priority. Without capable leadership, ASEAN's machinery will continue to suffer from inertia and endless red tape.

Perhaps ASEAN's most crippling habit is consensus-based paralysis. When every member state holds veto power, the bloc becomes hostage to its weakest link. Cambodia's obstruction on the South China Sea issue in 2012 and Myanmar's defiance since 2021 illustrate the perils of unanimity. The solution lies in flexibility. ASEAN should adopt a "variable geometry" model -- or what might be called "ASEAN à la carte". Not every initiative needs all ten members to approve. Intra-regional coalitions of the willing should be free to advance on trade, digital economy, or defence cooperation, while leaving the door open for others to join later.

The precedent is clear. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) includes all ASEAN members, but the more demanding Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) includes only four -- Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. These early movers can lead the way for others like Indonesia and Thailand.

Similarly, the original ASEAN five founding members plus others ready to cooperate - ASEAN5+X - could regain traction and restore momentum. Without such flexibility, ASEAN risks being eclipsed by external minilaterals like the Quad, Aukus, or the emerging Squad of the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and the United States.

Structural reforms must go hand in hand with moral clarity. ASEAN cannot claim centrality while ignoring atrocities or conflicts within its own borders. Non-interference cannot be an excuse for inaction. If ASEAN cannot deal with the crisis induced by civil war in Myanmar, curb transnational crimes and scam centres, or prevent member states from waging war on each other, as is the case with Cambodia and Thailand, it forfeits its relevance.

To regain trust, ASEAN must be seen as a community of responsibility, not merely convenience. Enforcement mechanisms for peace and humanitarian commitments must be strengthened. Member states should be accountable to each other and to their people. Complacency is ASEAN's greatest danger. Without change, it will be bypassed by powers and partnerships that move faster and act bolder. The addition of Timor-Leste as the new and 11th member to the grouping will likely heighten these risks and challenges.

Deep structural reform is not just optional or rhetorical, but it is existential. Reducing summit frequency, revitalising the Secretariat, adopting flexible cooperation, and enforcing agreements are the starting points. These are just some preliminary suggestions, but the key is to start thinking and adapting ASEAN in the direction of reform and progress. Any real transformation of ASEAN must be rooted in the collective mindset of its member states and societies.

ASEAN governments must stop viewing the organisation as a stage for national posturing and individual member states' interests and start treating it as a shared project for regional stability and survival. For nearly sixty years, ASEAN has been a symbol of Southeast Asia's agency and staying power, a forum that turned a war-torn region into one of peace and prosperity. Whether it remains so depends on its willingness to adapt quickly and boldly. Reform may be uncomfortable, but irrelevance is worse. The choice is clear. ASEAN must reinvent itself or end up in the dustbin of history.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, PhD, is professor at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science and a senior fellow at its Institute of Security and International Studies in Bangkok.