The Crisis in the Rules-Based Order Poses an Opportunity for Australia in Southeast Asia

The ‘rules-based order’ that Australia has promoted time and again to its neighbours around the region is in tatters. With the Ukraine and Israel–Hamas wars, immense trade tariffs being levied without reference to the rules, the World Trade Organization crisis and US threats against the International Criminal Court, it is no surprise that a leading British foreign policy analyst suggests ‘dialling down’ ‘rules-based order’ rhetoric.

Yet there continues to be wide support for international rules and rulemaking, and this offers an opportunity for Australia, especially in its engagement with ASEAN.

Australia has a track record in international rulemaking and the Australian Labor government’s declared commitment to ‘constructive internationalism’ includes an emphasis on ‘rules and norms’ in governing inter-state relations.

Research from the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, an organisation with members from every quarter of the region, affirms the continuing regional commitment to rules. It notes that many practical or technical rules, including those related to international travel, are in no way controversial. There is also a consensus in support of the United Nations Charter, international law and continued work on rulemaking, especially in new areas of international activity such as artificial intelligence, health and the management of outer space.

The problem is the ‘rules-based order’, not the rules. It matters that no one can say exactly what the term ‘rules-based order’ covers and on what international authority many of its rules are based. Some of the states that speak most often about the ‘rules-based order’ also cast aside rules when it suits their national interest. Importantly, in China, Russia and many parts of the Global South there is suspicion that the ‘rules-based order’ is really a liberal order crafted after the Second World War, largely to suit the purposes of Western powers.

The ‘rules-based order’ has come to be identified with unipolarity, not the multipolarity of the world in which we live today. Support for the transition from an US-led world to a multipolar world is gaining traction, as evident in the speeches of Australia’s Foreign Minister.

In a multipolar era, rules deliberation in Asia and the Indo-Pacific will need to negotiate at least three clusters of principles. There will continue to be a liberal framework with the advocacy of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, democratic institutions, a free press and a vibrant civil society. Commitments to key principles such as human rights and human dignity or to alliance relationships will also continue.

A Chinese alternative to this framework, spelt out in an official white paper, ‘A Global Community of Shared Future’, stresses ‘multipolarity’, denies that ‘a rising power will inevitably seek hegemony’, and opposes ‘alliance-based confrontations’. Declaring respect for the ‘diversity of human civilizations’, the paper refers not to ‘human rights’ but to ‘the common values of humanity embedded in Chinese civilisation’, and it criticises the ‘narrow historical limitations of so-called universal values’.

A third type of strategic framework emerging in the Asian region is centred on ASEAN. Various formal statements, including the influential ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ of 2019, highlight ASEAN’s focus on building a resilient, regional community and stress the critical importance of ‘inclusivity’ and ‘consensus’ in this and other areas of foreign relations.

A long-held ASEAN principle insists on agency for smaller states. Southeast Asians are used to operating in hierarchies and prefer to make space for — and benefit from — a rising power, rather than forge alliances to oppose it. Their ‘friendly to all sides’ approach is driven by a quest for autonomy within a dynamic regional equilibrium.

A cursory glance suggests the move from unipolar rulemaking to plural, multi-polar rulemaking will be challenging. It may be easier in certain technical areas, but issues such as the territorial contest in the South China Sea, the Myanmar crisis, or the management of artificial intelligence are more difficult. The incompatibilities in the frameworks above — the United States, China and ASEAN — suggest that matters touching on human rights, democratic processes, power-balancing, alliance-forging or inclusive region-building are likely to require careful negotiation.

Here lies the opportunity for Australia.

One takeaway from the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific’s research is that rules that work in a regional context might also contribute to international deliberations, in particular at the United Nations. In the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN processes such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum could be critical. Though sometimes dismissed as ‘talk-shops’, patient consensus-making is invaluable in the area of the making of rules. ASEAN meetings are also ‘inclusive’, bringing together all the region’s major players. Minilateral groupings are often better at ‘getting things done’, but the exclusive membership and democratic ideology of the Quad, for instance, is not conducive to multipolar rules deliberation.

As for Australia, its involvement in international rulemaking goes back to the founding years of the United Nations, where it acted as broker between smaller nations and major powers. In a process in which liberal principles provide only one framework for rules deliberation, brokering talent will be vital. Australia’s long experience in ASEAN institutions, longer than that of the organisation’s other Dialogue Partners, will be another asset.

Given Australia’s current determination to reinvigorate ties with Southeast Asia, close collaboration in rules deliberation — a two-way learning endeavour — could deepen its engagement, as well as contribute to a stable regional order.

Anthony Milner AM is International Director at Asialink, Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne, Visiting Professor at the University of Malaya and Emeritus Professor at The Australian National University.

This article is also published by East Asia Forum.