Regional Experts on China’s ‘Grand Design’

1) Do you personally view China as offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

Referring to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the background is that China is a rising power with global influence in some ways, but not a comprehensive global power yet. In the future China will try to be a comprehensive global power but this will be quite difficult, and I would argue, almost impossible.

A diplomatic way for China to perform in international affairs is that it can be a regional leader, peacefully, especially in Asia, and especially in the eastern part of the continent, rather than the whole world.

2) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The opportunities nowadays are that China is the number two economy in the world, so China needs to further its economy. That means it cannot only focus on domestic markets but needs to go abroad further, in order to spend its money, build its capabilities and sell its competitive advantage. That’s why China pays attention to neighbouring diplomacy, which is China’s competitive advantage in economic aspects. This means it’s in the number one position.

And when it comes to the non-economic aspects, China also needs to shoulder its responsibility as a large power in Asia. So that’s why China puts neighbouring diplomacy in a priority position. In Chinese we call it zhong zhong zhi zhong (重中之重translation = something of the utmost importance and highest priority). Nowadays neighbouring diplomacy will be in the position of zhong zhong zhi zhong.

The risks of BRI are that China will go too far and put too much money into it. It seems to me that China should set limitations on BRI expenses, which should be lower than 5% of GDP or at most, no more than 10% of GDP. Nowadays it seems to me, we have some kind of a signal that we spend too much on the Belt. And now I think we need to pay much more attention. When we practise the BRI, China should let the host country propose the program and everything. Based on the proposal by the host country, China can find someone to cooperate with the host country.

3) Do you consider China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership to be reassuring?

This is related to the last two questions. I would argue that China should focus on regional institutional adjustment, rather than build up new ones one totally, because just like President Xi Jinping said, China is an additional power. It should try to do something additional to the current international institutions rather than make new ones, which is totally different to the behaviour of the Cold War period.

As for international leadership, when it comes to some concrete issues, maybe yes. But generally speaking, it’s very hard for China to perform international leadership.

4) What do you see as the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - concerns both in the Chinese community, and in the wider world?

Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions? The first concern for China is economy rather than strategy or socio-cultural, because that is where China’s competitive advantage is. As for the strategic and socio-cultural results, it will depend on how China will implement the BRI. Will the so-called ‘grand design’ add something new to the established regional and global institutions? That, I would say is possible. But will it build up brand new rules for regional and global institutions? I would say no.

1) Do you personally view China as offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

What, for the moment, is coming across as Chinese offering of new international leadership, be it making a high profile presentation at Davos or hosting a summit on the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), is in actuality, a tacit official acknowledgement of the obvious in the eyes of the general public, educated or not. China’s own development has arrived at a stage whereby the country needs to be able to access all the markets around the world as fully as possible. Or, its society risks sliding backwards in its level of prosperity. There is a modern day precedent to what’s going on with China today. Back in 1977, Japan’s Prime Minister Fukuda spoke of developing a ‘heart-to-heart’ relationship with countries across Southeast Asia. The so-called ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ basically says Japan was going to get along with everyone and anyone willing, just to keep its growth momentum going. Today you have sentiment out of China, expressed as five-connectivity （五通）to be the essence of its BRI. Indeed, China today is about where Japan was then.

2) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The BRI is an invitation on the table. Other countries can partake and try to see if China’s ‘learning-by-doing’ approach – as opposed to the military alliance-based preference championed by the United States – works for their societies as well. In its very essence, the BRI amounts to the same sort of salient message Nixon’s trip to China sent out: let’s try to turn a market of low demand (for imports) around down the road. Now, the opening to China in the early 1970s certainly did not stop at China itself. Many other countries stood to benefit from the same opening. Some performed better than others did. In the future, the same is likely to be true of countries that subscribe to the BRI vision.

3) Do you consider China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership to be reassuring?
I find it truly hard to characterize Chinese efforts thus far – shall we say since the winter of 2016 (when United States election results becoming clearer) – as assuming regional and international leadership. Some rhetoric out of China does say that. But, it does not really pass the test of reality check. It is just erroneous and misleading to continue claiming that Asian countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, must choose between the United States (for leadership in security) and China (for economic prosperity). That sort of binary choice, neat as it sounds, amounts to a cheer-leading of confrontation between Beijing and Washington. Mr. Trump got it right when he spoke to the U.S. Congress as the 45th president and declared that he represented America but not the world! This sentiment resonates with that of China when Chinese leaders talk about non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs.

4) What do you see as the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - concerns both in the Chinese community, and in the wider world? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

The greatest risk I see is for a society to somehow blame China for each and every major failure in itself whereas the evidence is not really there. Chinese policymakers and project operators must guard against over promising. Instead, they should constantly remind audiences home and abroad that China is but one of the many players and actors in the BRI endeavor. Institutions, regional or international ones, need to learn to adapt or risk being left weakened or even irrelevant. When a major country actor uses ‘rule-based institution’ as a justification for non-participation, so be it.

1) Do you personally view China as offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

I prefer to use the word of “partnership” to describe China’s new initiative. Leadership is not a suitable word. The reasons for other country to use this word as I think are reflecting the objectivities of China. China is a big power and it is willing to behave like a big power. As well, China’s behaviors and initiative on the international forum will be more influential than many of other countries.

2) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The more opportunities is always following with more risks. And, like one coins have two sides, even an opportunity can be viewed as a risk from different perspectives. BRI will provide economic dynamics as well as more chances for regional integration and interdependence among countries. Naturally, more interactive will bring trust as well as suspect for countries at the same time. Interdependence will bring more chance for peace as well as worries for the relative advantages. As there are almost small and poor countries along the BR roads, the worries of them for falling into the control of big country is also risks for prompting future cooperation.

3) Do you consider China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership to be reassuring?

As China has such big amount of economic volume, its influence will look like some kind of leadership. No matter it is willing or unwilling, China has to take some responsibility to lead. The precondition for performing such leadership is there much be a clear blueprint or aim to be reassuring all countries under China's leadership.

4) What do you see as the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - concerns both in the Chinese community, and in the wider world? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

The major concern during the implementation of BRI is the possibility of misunderstanding between China and other countries. How China’s initiatives or activities be interpreted and understood is related to how China explains and behave under the different circumstances, even China has the same good will to all countries. It is no fast track to shift the rules away from established institutions. The changes should be gradual and under the consensus of all countries concerned, as well as reflect the new realities of the world and for a better future.

1) Do you personally view China as offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

Yes, the BRI/AIIB are such example.

2) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

Opportunities - China and partner countries achieve win-win: China sells its cement and iron/steel wrapped in infrastructure to sustain its own growth, while partner countries get loan and technology etc. The risks are if the partners could repay. Various factors such as geopolitical instability, terrorism, fluctuation of energy price etc. could bring lots of uncertainty and risks.

3) Do you consider China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership to be reassuring?

To certain extent. First China offers RBI for its own interests, to transfer its overcapacity of production.  Second, it indeed serves interests of many who need such products of infrastructure. But when China's foreign currency reserve decreases rapidly, from $4t last year to $3t this year, China will more limit its investment abroad, especially in volatile region. So China is not always willing to take risk in offering regional and international leadership.

4) What do you see as the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - concerns both in the Chinese community, and in the wider world? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

As mentioned above, when geostrategic risk emerges, the public will voice their concerns over the BRI.  Cases of Sri Lanka, Greece, Zimbabwe and Venezuela indicate the unpredictability of the risk of such initiative.  The AIIB will definitely have concerns to invest in the DPRK.  For any AIIB investment, it will not act much differently from ADB/WB, to assure that member states are willing to cooperate in an assured way. For China's unilateral investment, China certainly could do whatever it want to do, such as investing $62b or more in Pakistan, but it still need to make sure that it has to care about how to get its investment returned, as this is not an aid, but commercial business. .

1) Do you personally view China as offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

I don't think China is "offering" global leadership as part of a grand design. China does not have a design or plan for the world. China has a plan for itself, that is to say to realize the China Dream which is stability and prosperity for the country. On the other hand China is fully aware of the fact that the world is a global village, and free trade and globalization are the answer to today's problems the world is facing. China is opposed to isolationism and protectionism and believes there is a shared destiny of humanity in general and is willing to make its own contribution to it.

2) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The BRI is a perfect reflection of the ideal of globalization and the concept of shared destiny for all human kind. The Belt and Road does not mean one belt and one road for China. Actually the BRI means many roads, highways, ports, airports, a multiplicity of infrastructure facilities which benefit countries and regions in the world. The BRI initiative is an economic endeavor of massive scale. We need to collaborate with various countries to ensure the financing, technology, and management to run in a scientific and rational way. The BRI is not only cross border but also cross cultural. Attention must be paid to cultural differences which could hamper the progress.

3) Do you consider China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership to be reassuring?

China does not attempt to ascend to a hegemonic status neither in the region nor in the world. Hegemony brings no benefit to China. China is willing to play an active role, sometimes a major role in issues like climate change, free trade, anti terrorism, nuclear armament control, etc. China is also willing to collaborate with countries like the United States and Australia to fight for peace, stability and prosperity.

4) What do you see as the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - concerns both in the Chinese community, and in the wider world? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

The most important task is to achieve understanding and support of the countries and regions involved in the BRI initiative. In the implementation, environmental protection, sustainability, cultural communication and understanding, etc are issues to be studied and emphasized. Once again, I want to reiterate that China does not seek to challenge any country or any institution for regional or global leadership. It is not China's aim and not in China's interest to attempt hegemony. On the other hand, China is willing to make significant contribution to the regional and international development, and play a major role in the progress towards peace, stability, sustainability, and free trade.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

For Malaysia, the top business circles are broadly hopeful on China’s expanding international economic role – adding on to a big trade relationship with FDI and construction contracts and large loans, including those related to the Belt & Road initiative. Three years ago, I was already hearing from (local ethnic Chinese) business of China investments in Malaysia to diminish the role of Singapore as a trade centre, but at the time Singapore-based think tankers were highly skeptical of this. Starting in 2013 there was a bounce up in large China deals for Malaysia, and this accelerated from 2015 with the (international scandal-ridden) 1MDB asset sales opportunities for power plants and Bandar Malaysia land. There has been great China interest in taking over control of several sea ports (Kuantan, Melaka) and air ports (a mooted KLIA ecommerce logistics hub) and anticipation of high speed rail and other rail, road and pipeline infrastructure. These economic designs sets up Malaysia with a central role in China’s Southeast Asia economic and infrastructure pivot strategy. China contractors are also making inroads in garnering construction deals and China FDI includes placement of several (including some dirty) industries in Malaysia including aluminium and steel making, solar panel manufacture and plastics recycling as well as white goods and more. Even in the socio-political sphere, China’s presence in Malaysia has taken on a new turn, led by an activist Ambassador with engagements with Malaysian ethnic Chinese clans associations and schools and apparent rebukes of political concerns about Bumiputera jobs and participation expressed by ex-PM Mahathir.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

The new China leadership in Malaysia is marks quite a shift in the country’s evolution. In socio-politics this was marked by the China Ambassador’s public stance against an ultra-right Bumiputera demonstration that seemed to threaten the peace in Petaling Street, part of KL’s old China town. China’s political economic expansion and a tilt of control of the South China Seas (versus waning US interests) seems well accepted in high politics and big business. Indeed, even US corporates are reportedly keen to be suppliers into the Belt & Road and other projects. There are great opportunities and challenges in the China initiatives for the region. The new leadership role seems inevitable and its unabashed carrot and stick approach is notable. As an independent political economist I see the need to reorient. There are work opportunities, but I am uncertain if these will be mostly retained within the China business ecosystem expanding overseas too. I am tapping into Beijing-linked networks to assess this.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

Amidst economic opportunities the challenges include: i) questions of economic crowding out (technology mismatch with lower technology of domestic businesses) ii) transparency on the apparent lack of uniform BRI approach and carrot-and-sticks I.e. different approaches depending on host country preference contrast the deal-by-deal approach in Malaysia (this broker driven approach may have implications including malcoordination, such as that displayed by the 3 May 2017 Bandar Malaysia deal debacle) and Indonesia seeking a five year master plan. iii) Specifically for the Malaysia and Indonesia contexts, there are worries about how business competition and ethnic concerns will be handled by China, with nascent host concerns from nationalistic interests and religious-ethnic cleavages. iv) What are the overall cost - benefits? Consider the host country FDI-trade gains amidst heightened business competition and changes in fishery and hydrocarbon resource control. China-host share of economic multipliers from infrastructure (especially as these are mostly via soft loans).

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

It seems reassuring in so far as the China is open for trade and promises economic boosts in anemic times whilst the US turns inward; and BRI encourages even US companies to seek participation. But the China leadership may need to display a nuanced and deft touch in the political economic sphere in host countries (see below on concerns); but this has to be driven out of the China political closing phase for nearly a decade now.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country?

Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions? For Malaysia (and Indonesia) the aforementioned socio-cultural issues are enmeshed with the political economy. Race and religion are big concerns that are popularly played in high politics. How does China, as a new power in the host countries, interact and influence hits? What are the main channels of China influence - business-to-business and business associations, political parties (does China deploy its Communist Party  to deal with all political parties of all ethnicities) or state institutions? What about national versus sub-national units; notable for Malaysia is the state of Johor’s  push for large-scale China developer projects that supersede an earlier Malaysia-Singapore GLC/SOE masterplan to create a dormitory zone for Singapore. Role of China consulates (and ambassadors) versus State Council bodies. How will China engage with political opposition and civil society in host countries?

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Malaysia attempts to be a leader in China integration efforts, is evidenced by the value of big deals and its pro-China accommodation even for strategic assets like ports and power supply. This sets it ahead in the ASEAN 5 context where others show more recent pivots or measured responses to China. The Najib administration’s open door now seems to be replicated by other neighbours faced with China’s carrot-and-stick approach. The region seems to go for accommodation in the South China Seas and has agreed to a sharing of fishery and hydrocarbon resources e.g. Malaysia accommodates China patrols very close to the coast of Sarawak in the Greater Sarawak Basin an important oil and gas zone.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

OBOR is a grand design - a grand geo- political strategy by China to gain its acceptance as a new World power , by cleverly emphasising a drive for a win-win economic development through  massive infra-structure development , connectivity ,  trade and enhancing economic cooperation , connecting Asia and Europe . In its grand design, China is offering itself as one of the main world leaders as China and Russia promote the emergence of a multi-hub and multi-partnership structure in international relations and counter balance the United States and the West. China will use the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ( SCO ) as one of the Hubs , with Russia as a partner , and linking the SCO to ASEAN and the ASEAN Dialogue and multi-partnership structure , the ASEAN plus 3 and RCEP , while also linking the Russian led EuroAsian Union . ASEAN will be the first crucial Hub for China's OBOR Maritime Silk Route, and Central Asia and SCO as the first crucial Hub for OBOR's Overland Silk Road. In this grand design, China is also be offering its model of State Capitalism, State driven development model and the important role of State Owned Enterprises. China's authoritarianism could also be a model or encouragement to certain countries.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

Clearly, all this is designed and led by President Xi Jinping. He has staked his personal leadership and prestige with the success of this grand design. Whether the grand design will survive beyond Xi Jinping remains to be seen.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?
What is needed is better clarity, transparency and good governance in the planning, feasibility studies and implementation of OBOR (BRI). Opportunities are plenty and there are plenty of risks if there are no proper planning, feasibility studies and without transparent mechanism to ensure proper and cost effective implementation. How are the partner countries in OBOR (BRI) going to finance their projects - will they have to borrow heavily from China and run bigger and risky budget deficits? It is said that for China to maintain its growth rate of 4.5 % per annum, it needs to run a budget deficit of some USD 4 trillion. How will the participating countries benefit in terms of the use of local resources, manpower, technical knowhow, technology transfer, financing etc.? There are many unanswered questions. The devil is in the detail.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Malaysia would not see China assuming regional and international leadership as a threat, and China's rise should not lead to a clash in power politics. What is needed is a constructive approach to China's rise as a regional and world power. International relations will be always be marked by a combination of competition and cooperation. An emerging multi hub and multi partnership structure in international relations will tend to emphasize more on the collaborative and cooperative aspects of relations including among the big powers.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country?

Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions? In handling the rise of China and the emerging multi hub and multi partnership structure in international relations, ASEAN as a Regional Organisation and Community will be increasingly important for member countries like Malaysia. The success of ASEAN Community is crucial to retaining ASEAN centrality in the Regional architecture and handling the power shifts, the rise of China and US's position, whose rivalry will be felt the most in South East Asia, East Asia and the Pacific. It will be a mistake for Malaysia or any other ASEAN member to think that it can benefit more by handling China on its own without ASEAN Regional platform.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

ASEAN is the first crucial Hub in OBOR Maritime Silk Road and it would appear Malaysia because of its important geo-strategic location has been identified by China as probably the most important Hub among the ASEAN countries. China and its Companies are reported involved not only in the expansion and modernization of the Kuantan Port but also in Malacca, Penang, Carey Island and Bagan Dato. China Nuclear Power Corporation bought Edra Global Energy from 1MDB for RM 9.83 billion cash. Chinese Companies are involved in a number of property developments. There is a lot of enthusiasm about the sudden upsurge in Chinese investments especially within the Government and MCA - yet there are those in Malaysia who are concerned over the lack of clarity, transparency and governance in these projects, as well as concerns that these massive projects will be opened to more abuse and corruption in the country especially among those in power. Clearly, there is a need for in depth studies of all the projects before decisions are made and  must cover feasibility and environmental impact studies, issues affecting National Interests especially those involving strategic interests , land ownership, no hidden State or Government Guarantees and conditions on loans, benefits to local economy, use of local manpower, transfer of technology and an independent watchdog to monitor projects and prevent corruption and financial leakages and wastage.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

Just in specific areas mainly in economic field so far. The BRI and other investment potentials are the headlines.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

At this juncture, I would say yes. But China’s leadership role will evolve overtime, must like other major powers. China is here to stay and its profiles would depend how well the middle kingdom carries itself among smaller nations.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

At the moment, China is the most viable source of funding for much needed infrastructure in the region.  Risk could be, as always, growing dependence on China’s assistance and goodwill.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Only in certain issues that impact on its interest and international profiles. Within the region, the peace process in Myanmar, the South China Sea dispute, the Uyghur secessionist movement. Beyond the region, China engages with the UN, especially the UN sponsored various peace-keeping operation.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country?

Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions? In the case of mainland Southeast Asia, it would link the over half a billion people in Southern China to Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore. With rapid movement of workers, businessmen and travellers, demographic changes would inevitably happen and subsequently shift and change societal landscape. Whether China would be able to re-establish new rules or practices would depend how well China has taken into consideration local environments — hopes and fears.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Thailand will continue to engage China as a comprehensive strategic partner. China has been a good friend of Thailand, especially in the past three years, when the military administration took over. However, the US under the Trump leadership has changed its priority and is now more willing to engage Thailand as a traditional ally—something the previous administration refused to do due to the widely reported human rights violations and undemocratic practices.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

I am now based in Singapore, working at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the ISEAS—Yusof Ishak Institute.  But I will answer as a Thai. Indeed, in Thailand, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has created a great deal of excitement, especially in the Thai mass media, academia, and business circle. It is increasingly seen as a positive new “grand design” not only for China, but also for Southeast Asia and East Asia.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

Yes, I do. At least China has offering concrete ideas. This is much better than the tensions in disputed areas in the South China Sea.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

Opportunities are obvious: Chinese investments can help fund the much-needed infrastructure construction in many poorer ASEAN countries. But the risks or pitfalls are also easy to see: China and Chinese investments will go to projects that serve Chinese interests more. Often, China is more interested in strategic interest than in commercial gains. The Malacca Gateway is one such case in point. Poorer developing countries may have to readjust their own infrastructure development plans to attract Chinese support and investments. Laos, for example, has ventured into building a railway from Kunming to Vientiane. China is funding the construction in the hope of linking this new railway with the Thai rail network at Nong Khai across the Mekong River. What will Laos get in the end? A redundant railway with few Lao passengers. But the Chinese can transport its goods to and from Thailand (Thai’s deep-seat port at Laem Chabang, and later at Dawei via Kanchanaburi).

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Yes, it is at least a positive development with potential win-win outcome – provided that the countries receiving Chinese investments can maintain control over subsequent operations/services. Such leadership in infrastructure development is something the U.S. cannot do, and has no capability of trying to do.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country?

Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions? One major concern is the growing economic dependence on China. This in turn empowers China even more; Beijing now has a very potent economic weapon, such as tourism, which can be used very effectively and immediately to punish any Asian governments. On the political side, growing economic relations with China tends to encourage governments in Asia to overlook democratic values, human rights, and regionalism. One obvious adverse consequence in ASEAN is the decreasing interest of ASEAN member governments in unity, in defending the centrality of ASEAN, and in pursuing common ASEAN interest.  Conversely, more of them are trying to gain favours from China.  Cambodia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam are the cases in point. If China succeeds in pushing and implementing its BRI “grand design”, certainly Beijing will be in the stronger position to change rules and norms for Asia, or at least for East Asia.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Thailand is trying not to miss the BRI boat.  However, the Thai Prime Minister was not invited to the recent BRI Summit.  Perhaps Beijing is still unhappy with the reluctance of Bangkok. The Thai government remains uncertain about its policy (or lack of policy) concerning the China’s rail project in Laos, and China’s interest in investing in rail projects in Thailand. But the existing military regime is rather short of ideas.  Its primary concern is its day-to-day reason for existence. After three years in absolute political power, it has failed miserably in realizing any significant reforms. Thailand has the geographical location as its strategic asset. But how to capitalize on this invaluable advantage remains a big question.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

We, the southern neighbours of China in Southeast Asia, have been experiencing since 2012, if not earlier, a rising China which professes to be peaceful and denies any expansionism and imperial designs (as with earlier Western powers),  practices benevolence towards others (as prescribed in the Confucian classic on The Doctrine of the Mean, that “for guests coming from afar, we should welcome them and reward those talented as well as help those in trouble…”), and establishing order and stability among all-under-heaven, Tianxia.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

China has been no more be benevolent than any other rising power in its desire to civilize the other societies it comes into contact with; nor has it been less violent in waging “just wars” to impose order and stability among all-under-heaven.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The opportunities and risks the BRI offers are more China’s than recipient countries of the BRI.  For China, the imperative is to export its excess capital and industrial capacity to sustain its economic growth, as Lenin analysed in his 1917 tract Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. The risks for China is to manage its investments overseas for positive returns for both China and the recipient countries.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Yes, China’s willingness to assume regional and international leadership is reassuring to the extent that its deeds and action matches its words.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

Much depends upon how China works out its overseas investment structures and foreign aid system. Many of us have grown accustom to the OECD aid norms and now have to make sense of China’s emerging decision making processes for investments on its BRI and foreign aid.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Singapore will have to respond to China’s BRI/’grand design” just as Singapore had no choice but to adjust to Britain’s post-World War II decline and decolonization and respond to the rise of American visions of modernizing societies in the 1960’s through the 1980’s.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

No. Most people even among the ruling elite in the Philippines are not aware of China’s broad foreign policy thrusts and tend to focus on very specific developments affecting bilateral relations. Public reaction to recent incidents (militarization of reclaimed islands, residual fishing issues in Scarborough Shoal, presence in Benham Rise) demonstrate that deep strategic mistrust still prevails despite the shift in China policy under Duterte, China’s offer of huge investments/ODA, and its more restrained behavior of late with respect to territorial disputes. In other words, China is either not really seen as sincere in its offer of becoming a provider of public goods, or contributing to regional peace and stability. If China were offering its leadership, there will be groups in the Philippines who will try to resist.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

Yes and no. In terms of the rhetoric and whatever intentions may be gleaned therefrom, there is an attempt to project BRI, AIIB as part of “grand strategy”, “grand design”, and a bid by China to sit at the rule-making table. But deeper analysis shows that even Chinese analysts believe that China is not ready to lead by itself, but to lead alongside others. There is recognition among them that China does not enjoy much soft power, and that there is a trust deficit in its relations with many countries.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

Opportunities abound for developing countries that need financial support for infrastructure and connectivity programs. Potentially, they can economically connect not only with China but also with other neighboring or far-off countries. If China is successful in breathing new life into globalization and interdependence through BRI (amidst US retreat), then this may partly translate into a more benign and cooperative China even in the security arena. The major risks are developing dependency ties on the Chinese economy, and tempting political interference by China in the host country’s internal affairs. At the level of the international system, because of its bilateral implementation and lack of a multilateral governance mechanism, there is also a risk of China rising to hegemonic status.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

No, for reasons mentioned already.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

On the economic side, China is more likely to copy and adjust existing rules than make new ones. On the strategic side, China may use trade and infrastructure links (ports, pipelines) to achieve for itself what US enjoys through its bilateral alliance system.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Yes, generally to welcome the initiative but with eyes wide open about possible pitfalls. There will be conscious attempts to learn from past mistakes in dealing with Chinese and other foreign-supported projects.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?
Yes, it is offering a new international leadership and a new grand design.  Because it is convinced that the U.S. leadership under President Trump has left the international order with lacuna and gaps that China tries to bill in with her “grand design”.  Most probably not to replace the old order of the U.S. leadership, but just filling in the gaps that came about because of the U.S. unwillingness to fulfil its leadership as we have known since Wold War II.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

I do personally feel that as we all, including with China, have to try to fill in the gaps or improve the damages that might have happened under President Trump. So, I do agree that China’s increasing role should be encouraged.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) give opportunities to keep the economy (and trade) open, and that cooperation should be the way to do that.  It should not only be an economic cooperation, but also to improving people to people relationship, and open ourselves for increasing cultural and civilization dialogues and cooperation. The risk is, if the cooperation is only a one-way street, dependent only on China and where China is going to dominate as has happened since World War II with the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank under the U.S. donation even until now, then BRI can never take off.

4) Is China’s seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

It is more re-assuring for China to take a formal way of leadership and not doing that in irregular non-legal and non-constitutional ways, which certainly will be counterproductive and rejected by others very soon. What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI – as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new ‘grand design’, for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

It is not expected to replace all the old rules and institutions with new ones. Yes, there are going to be some changes if necessary since they were established by the Western countries, but many of them are good and have been accepted and implemented by the emerging countries including China.

5) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Yes, I do expect Indonesia will give significant response to China’s BRI.  We (CSIS) are doing a joint research with China (DRC) how to complement the 21st century Maritime Silk Road of China with the Indonesia’s Maritime Policy (Global Maritime Fulcrum).

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

BRI is not a new grand design, but it is the second part of China global economic strategy which previously was proposed as the maritime silk road. BRI is a comprehensive framework of China investment project on infrastructure based on its calculation of population growth in line with the basic needs of food, energy, housing, etc.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

China is willing to win the global competition from the US by promoting the system of Market Socialism.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

When BRI (previously OBOR) was launched, China was expecting response from many countries, including from Indonesia. This means that there is an opportunity for any country to agree or disagree with the Chinese proposal.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

China is making power projection and economic calculation to its domestic needs, but China needs to consider the interests of middle powers and regional integration that have also influence to its proposals.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

After the BRF last month in Beijing, public awareness in Indonesia remains relatively limited. Economically, Indonesia can cooperate with China under the BRI framework, but investment needs to pay more attention on political sensitivity, such as anti-Chinese sentiment which potentially disrupts foreign direct investment/FDI from China, and culturally, Indonesia and China do not understand to one another.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

President Joko Widodo attended the BRF. It was clear that Indonesia sees positive or relevant points of BRI in relation with Indonesia's master plan to build infrastructure in the whole of the country, especially in the maritime sectors (sea and deep sea ports, railway/high speed train, etc.).

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

No.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

No. China is clearly taking a leadership but it is not reassuring as China is an emerging power.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

Increased international trade. Increased debt for recipient countries and non-performing loans and default for China.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

No.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

I don’t think there is a new grand design. However, China’s weight will change the rule of the game. The major concerns are governance failures in BRI countries. 6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'? Japan is selling its infrastructure and investing in the region to pursue its own geo-political and business strategy.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

We think that China is at least trying.  However, lack of political/technical capacity and its sometimes coercive attitude are limiting its ability to become a respected leader.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

Yes.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

The Belt and Road Initiative can create a great opportunity for growth and economic cooperation in the region.  If China uses it as a political tool, it might end up dividing the region instead of integrating it.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Not yet. If China stops taking expansionist attitude in the region, its regional and international leadership would be very much welcomed.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

China’s increasing influence might mean marginalization of Japan. It will depend heavily on how China uses the Belt and Road Initiative, for the good of the region or for the parochial interest of the nation.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

The Asian Development Bank continues to be the most sophisticated aid organization in the region. The ADB will still be there, offering partnership to the AIIB.  At the same time, the United States and Japan are hedging against the possibility of China using the Belt and Road Initiative for regional hegemony, by strengthening security partnership in the region.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

The opinion among the Indian intelligentsia is sharply divided on China’s role in offering leadership to Asia. Some welcome it as a “grand design” and feel left out of BRI, while others see it as a “grand fear” and justify the boycott. India fought and badly lost a war with China in 1962 and that has shaped the thinking of at least two generations. In sum, Indians have deep mistrust of China even as they are acutely aware of the equally deep disdain that the Chinese nurse for them, Indians were caught unaware by BRI, although it was four years in the making. There was little evidence of Indian concern when Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted President Xi Jinping in 2014. The warmth of that visited gradually ebbed as they have met thrice since and relationship has become complicated. This is despite the fact that the border, large parts of which are disputed for long, remains calm. The issues at stake are more multilateral than bilateral, but impact bilateral ties deeply. BRI comes in as yet another challenge to India since its government formally boycotted the project’s opening and warned others of the ‘dangers’, including huge debts and political manipulations by China in the long run. China has declared the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPC) as its “flagship” project and this is precisely the point of India’s discord and distrust. India cannot give up its sovereignty claim over the Gilgit-Baltistan territory that it thinks Pakistan illegally occupied and equally illegally ceded it to China in 1963.  This has effectively prevented India from joining or even welcoming BRI. China says it is not involving sovereignty issues in BRI. But, while advocating that India and Pakistan discuss the dispute bilaterally and settle it, it does not say what would happen of the territory that it acquired from Pakistan. India is loath to making China a third party to the Kashmir dispute. India’s attempts at collaborating with the regional neighbours has not worked much because it does not have the funds to spend that China has. It finds all its neighbours, even if aware of the risks involved, some of them like Sri Lanka already heavily indebted, joining BRI since none wants to stay out of the big game. India has defaulted on projects it acquired, some of them in competition with China, in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Its attempt at countering BRI, in small measure though, by helping develop Iran’s Chabahar port and a rail link through Iran to Afghanistan has been slow. A dispute with Pakistan over the arrest, trial and conviction of an Indian national that Pakistan accuses is an Indian spy has also contributed to the project going to slow. The man was doing business art Chabahar and was kidnapped by the Afghan Taliban, India says, who sold him to Pakistan’s ISI. In going after India on this issue, Pakistan has even jeopardized its ties with Iran. The bigger setback to Chabahar has come from the US that does not lift sanctions on Iran. Obama did not do it and with Trump, ready to renege the US-Iran deal, and even taking a partisan stand supporting Saudi Arabia and against Iran, the project may go into a limbo for long. India feels let down by the US and may find little support from Trump.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

I personally think the Chinese overwhelming presence in South Asia leaves little scope for India to be conciliatory. Those strategists who advocate India’s warm ties with China are largely stuck on bilateral disputes and issues and have yet to formulate a view on China’s advent, first on the sea around India (“String of Pearls”, which had fewer takers in India earlier) and now by road through the CPEC. Pakistan facilitating this land route to the Indian Ocean cements Sino-Pak relations in all possible forms – geopolitically, geo-economically and politically. In any future conflict with Pakistan, India will have to factor China’s physical presence and support, particularly on the Arabian Sea, with Chinese presence at Gwadar. The CPEC will create a new class of billionaires among the Pakistani elite in the next few years. But there are protests about widening regional inequality, especially in Balochistan (that Pakistan conveniently blames on India). Even the non-Balochs fear the return of “Chinese East India Company.” Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, an Indian Muslim leader who had opposed India’s Partition by the British in 1947, had said in an interview to Chattan, an Urdu magazine, that an India-obsessed Pakistan will always look for outside crutches to stay ‘equal’ to India. This is what Pakistan did, joining the Western military blocks in the 1950s and wooing China after the latter fought a war with India in the 1960s. I personally think Azad’s prophesy has come true with BRI.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?
BRI undoubtedly offers opportunities, being the most ambitious project in human history covering some 68 countries. A road, port and rail network facilitates large infrastructure, jobs, trade and hopefully, more funds for health and education of millions of those in the BRI member-nations who need it. Ideally, India ought to join in, with caution. Its opposition, mainly due to sovereignty issues and mistrust of China, is also viewed in geopolitical terms as caused by its strategic proximity to the US. Opposing BRI places India in closer and tighter American embrace. How India retains its strategic autonomy is the biggest challenge the present and the future governments face. BRI does not take note of the threat from terrorism although it is articulated as coming from the IS, by China, Russia, Iran and the West in general. China continues to play down the Pakistani role in training the Chinese Uighours. Both China and the US, deeply distrustful though, officially applaud Pakistan’s efforts to curb militancy and export of terrorism. The two are mentioned together here because the American lawmakers unhappy at Pakistan’s performance, continue to support it so that it does not get close to China. But there is little the Americans can do to prevent Pakistan from doing so. Terrorism is a unique issue – neither close collaboration (India), nor playing both sides (Pakistan’s handling of the issue with the US and China), nor switching sides (the Philippines, from the US to China) can buy insurance from it.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

The Chinese promises, coupled with funds on offer, do seem attractive. But do they mean more jobs and more prosperity? The Chinese model is always one of putting its own personnel, its own funds and material wherever it undertakes projects abroad. Even the marketing is done by the Chinese shops. Finally, these need not be turn-key projects, as China retains physical presence and in some cases, even control. Pakistan could not maintain Gwadar that the Chinese designed, funded and built. It got the Chinese companies to run it as well. Here lies the dangers to a huge number of economies who can be dovetailed into the Chinese economy in the long run, while debts remain to be paid by their governments, which raises prospects of political manipulation by the benefactor cum lender.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

The points have been made above.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

BRI poses the challenge to India to counter and to co-exist. It lacks funds. It has an uneven record of completing projects abroad. While Chinese firms, be they government of semi-private, work under the overall political control, no such control exists in India. In many of the 68 nations who have joined BRI, China is feared as much as it is welcome. But India is not in position to counter BRI. And American or Western support can be only of limited help. At the end of the day, every country has its national interests to serve and everyone wants to have a piece of the cake the BRI has on offer. In sum, BRI requires rebooting much that has been in process in India, as elsewhere.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

China is seen as an important global and regional player with significant and economic, military and strategic salience. It looks upon itself as a geo – gravitational state in the heart of continental Asia with great strategic influence along its continental periphery. Its attempts at establishing an alternative economic system through instruments like the AIIB, restructuring of IMF etc, are seen as part of ambitions to define the norms of new global order with Chinese perspectives. However large sections of population in India see China as predatory and greedy power covetous of other countries territories, non-adherence to international law and resorting to unfair business practices, restricting free speech etc.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

In Indian view the Chines political system is seen as oppressive, violative of human rights, though Indian people maintain favourable impression of Chinese people and culture. All most all Chinese initiatives are seen in tandem with the projection of Chinese influence and military power. Chinese are also seen as the leading exponent of orchestrated manipulations of rules and norms designed to cause political and economic pain to countries responsible for “upsetting the feeling of Chinese people, core interests and major concerns”. In recent years Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines have all faced the brunt of Chinese reappraisals staged through state controlled social media. Over the last four months India has been at the receiving end of 50 articles in Global Times and some 26 interventions by Chinese spokesmen all aimed at intimidation and coercion. As a result countries are willing to compromise their liberal values and free market principles for access to attractive Chinese markets. In short China today is too big to fault, notwithstanding its revanchist dream of rejuvenation and territorial expansion.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

BRI is a grand branding exercise by China, and an altruistic regional development initiative. It is unilaterally conceived, national initiative designed to align the economic and strategic landscape from East Asia to Eurasia, to China’s singular advantage. It also reflects China’s revisionist, pursuit of preferential, non-competitive and exclusionary arrangements that propel its ambitions to create economic dependencies and gain political influence. By combining Chinese capital investments and surplus infrastructural capacity, OBOR will create supply chains comprising companies, markets, raw materials and people that extend to all corners of continental Eurasia and maritime Asia, with the exception of Northeast Asia. This vast catchment area encompasses some 4.2 billion people and has an estimated trade potential of around $2.1 trillion. OBOR also aims at creating a massive China-centric trade zone where, even if there are no China dominated free trade areas, adjoining nations are subservient to Chinese investments, China’s desire to capture markets and of course its attempts to bolster strategic interests. Importantly there is no formal or multilateral institutional structure called OBOR or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and there is a complete lack of transparency about OBOR decision making.  So, how does the OBOR model work?  Essentially, it is propelled by a number of bilateral agreements developed between China and enlisted countries signing on to OBOR under which Chinese companies gain preferential access to low/medium cost economies that need capital to upgrade their infrastructure.  These investment decisions are taken at the political level, generally as outcomes of high level visits by China’s leaders.  Investment decisions emanate from collusive political understandings with national elites, flowing from which projects are awarded to major Chinese companies without any competitive bidding. Little surprise, then, that all Chinese decisions on OBOR investment, project development and coordination are centralised under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Not in India.

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

In Indian thinking, OBOR is clearly linked to China’s core security objectives that include enhancing its strategic periphery through the consolidation of relations with immediate neighbours, from Europe to Southeast Asia. The different strands of OBOR corridors help China in the consolidation of its military power by creating arteries for force projection.  This is even more relevant for the Maritime Silk Road or MSR, which is being utilised to build maritime leverages through port development infrastructure and overseas naval bases like Gwadar and Djibouti.  In fact, MSR is China’s new and more potent “string of pearls”. A Chinese consortium led by the CITIC Group is currently pressing the Myanmar government to grant it a commanding stake in the strategically important Kyaukphyu deep water port in the Bay of Bengal, the entry point for new oil and gas pipelines to China. From Indian perspective on regional transit and connectivity, India’s historic access routes to its natural hinterland in Central Asia and West Asia have been disrupted by Pakistan since 1947.  CPEC, apart from violating India’s territorial sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir, is designed to further entrench India’s strategic, security and economic disadvantages in the region.  It delivers strategic depth for China in Pakistan on the one hand, access denial and strategic encirclement for India on the other.  We are not aware of any Chinese effort to press their all-weather ally Pakistan to grant India normal trade and transit rights across Pakistani territory.  In fact, the true colours of CPEC are revealed by the Global Times: the warning to India that in future, China will have a direct interest in developments in Kashmir. To India's east, the BCIM corridor makes even less economic sense, as it would provide one sided advantages to China in terms of market access to Bangladesh, Myanmar and India as well as strategic access to the Bay of Bengal. The corridor would also pass through India's security-sensitive and strategically vulnerable North East, where China still fans insurgencies and lays territorial claim to large parts of Arunachal Pradesh. India is hardly alone in its concerns about BCIM; Myanmar too is wary about such instruments of Chinese domination.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

From the overall Indian perspective, the following factors guide its response:

(a) This initiative is all about China leveraging its surplus capacity to expand its sphere of influence and strategic space as a geo-gravitational state. India can at present neither match Chinese investments nor does it possess surplus capacities like China.

(b) With an obstructionist Pakistan to India's west and a disputed boundary with China to its north and east, how will joining OBOR help India? Even if China was to provide certain assurances on connectivity, will any such guarantees work, given Pakistan’s deep-seated hostility towards India? Very unlikely, to say the least.

(c) India is a developing economy and has relatively limited resources to deploy on projects beyond its immediate strategic periphery; it cannot match finance rich China. Thus, if India is to leverage connectivity projects, advancing bilateral and regional mechanisms serve far greater purpose than OBOR. Even discourse in Chinese academic circles has begun to appreciate these Indian concerns.

(d) The simple logic of comparative transportation costs highlights that larger economic gains lie in sea transportation vis-a-vis rail or road. India's interests are best served by its direct access to the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, rather than by alternate routes being developed under OBOR to its west and east.

(e) As India considers the possible terms of engagement or even the rationale of joining OBOR, we must recognise that OBOR investment arrangements are mainly designed for countries that do not have adequate economic capacities and need access to funding beyond the multilateral financial institutions in order to bypass their stringent conditions or political roadblocks.  As some Central European, Sri Lankan and Cambodian experiences highlight, rules based funding from established institutions is far more beneficial in the long term than funding based on political expediency.

(f) India’s own outreach to its strategic neighbourhood has to be structured through consensus driven multilateral, and not unilateral, frameworks.  India should act accordingly and intensify its efforts to promote BBIN and BIMSTEC regionalism to eventually forge a Bay of Bengal Economic and Security Community, as well as its “Act East” initiatives with South East Asia and ASEAN.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

YES and YES. Based on trade and mutual benefit.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

Yes.

- China has been around for 2000 years influencing Southeast Asia destiny one way or another-"wax & wane".
- China offers a new different narrative (only 4 years), less threatening than leadership imposed by the US since 1945 for example.
- The last decade Cambodia benefits from Chinese aid, FDI that allow her to develop infrastructures and boost economic growth.
- China does not interfere with internal affairs of Cambodia. -ADB, WB funding and loans and bilateral aid as well are not sufficient to meet the demand of infrastructures/energy of a fast paced developing country like Cambodia. Hence Cambodia along with 50+ others countries join AIIB as founding members.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

- Loans and aids for infrastructure development.
- Boosting regional trade.
- Risks of negative impact of rapid economic development on livelihood and environment like anywhere else (NOT specific to BRI though).
- Anyway it's too early to measure the impact of China BRI… barely 4 years.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

- Yes in some ways: to expand her influence and to balance Washington consensus which is in decline.
- Risk of falling into Thucydides trap.
- Insecure established power (USA) and assertive rising power (China): as a result arm race that benefit only the military industrial complex of countries that sell weapons.
- A new world order is looming at the horizon. The caricature: Trump boasting arm sale in the Middle East and embracing protectionism, while Xi projects image of a great global leader and peaceful development. Two different stories of global leadership ambition.
- If given a choice, small states will "sit on the fence". But do they have a choice?

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

For Cambodia:
- More than 2000 years of history of China-Cambodia relations. Millions of Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. Cultural links are part of everyday life. -Strategic risks for a small state: crushed between two giants fighting each other (Regime change induced by Kissinger-Nixon in Cambodia in 1970-Khmer rouge regime-cold war).
- Strategic concern: Choosing China is essential for Cambodia to survive the pressure for her two ambitious neighbors (Thailand and Vietnam).
- China does not interfere with internal affairs of other countries, while the US does using the narrative of human rights.
- Shift away from dominant Washington consensus in regional and global institutions... certainly. Developing countries have now more options for development funding beyond World Bank, IMF and ADB. They can shop at other banks: AIIB, SRF.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Yes.

- The Royal Government of Cambodia, like 65 other countries, had embraced BRI
- Opportunity to get funding to develop infrastructures that are much needed for economic growth and to get out of poverty.
- Opportunity to access a huge regional/global market to increase trade.

- As such one observed increasing exchanges between China and Cambodia: G2G, Think Tanks, Academia, political parties, NGOs etc.

1) Is China seen in your country to be offering new international leadership - a new 'grand design'?

Context is key and can be as important as perspective in cognitive processes. As former US Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter, and his deputy, Robert Work, acknowledged in late-2016, the world is experiencing a period bearing characteristics of transition. Work was more explicit in noting that 2014, when China embarked on a large-scale island-building enterprise in the South China Sea, marked the end of America’s unipolar primacy. Although individual policies, decisions or actions undertaken by a particular state-actor may not provide a sufficiently clear-cut datum or book-end for an era, I believe the world is experiencing systemic transitional fluidity precipitated by the conjunction of several distinct yet inter-related dynamics. Key among these: a widely perceived relative decline in America’s moral, economic and geostrategic leadership triggered partly by severe domestic political polarisation and consequences flowing from wars of choice that have proved exceedingly costly in blood, treasure, reputation and moral authority, primarily suffered by the USA, but also by its Western allies, not to speak of the states in which campaigns have been waged; a significant transfer of wealth, scientific-technological capabilities, management skills and accretive influence gained by non-Euro-Atlantic states, primarily China, Japan, the RoK, several ASEAN states, and other ‘emerging’ economies; China’s ability and willingness to assert its long-standing claims and interests, especially in proximate domains, until recently under overwhelming dominance of forward-deployed PACOM assets; and a struggle among China’s neighbours to balance their apparent economic interests tied to China’s economic growth and surpluses driving demand, and their security interests traditionally served by their acceptance of operational US suzerainty. Against this backdrop, two specific policy-events helped to shape the near-zero sum dynamics characterising Sino-US mutual perspectives and the strategic landscape on which this drama played out, events whose consequences have reverberated across the system since. In 1993, CPC Central Committee- and CMC members summoned a gathering of PRC analysts to review China’s strategic ecology and prospects in the post-Soviet era. A consensus of sorts emerged: over the next two or three decades, Japan, with US/RoK support, would pose the most acutely immediate security challenges to China, and the USA, aided by Japan/RoK, would pose the gravest threats to China’s strategic autonomy. Six eventful years later, in the summer of 1999, the DoD’s Office of Net Assessment, in its ‘Summer Study’, identified China as an emergent ‘constant competitor’, later described as a ‘near-peer rival’, and India emerged as a key swing-state, whose alignment would determine whether China could threaten America’s systemic primacy or America would permanently ‘contain’ China within its East Asian geopolitical perimeters. This mutual identification of strategic threat came after two decades of Sino-US covert collusion against the USSR in as disparate theatres as Central America, Southern Africa, the Horn, South Asia, Indochina and, spectacularly, Afghanistan. As both Washington and Beijing girded against each other, as America decided to actively pursue via mainly military-diplomatic means an indefinite extension of its post-Soviet systemic primacy, and Beijing began to gradually erode that primacy along China’s periphery, the core of the system experienced a process of reverting to the bipolar, although not as starkly as during the Cold War. Nonetheless, by the end of the Hu Jintao era, China’s ‘counter-intervention’ build-up and America’s countervailing avatars of the Air-Sea Battle Concept and Pivot/ Rebalance established the contours of a competitive, even adversarial, dominant system. US allies and clients, almost equally concerned over China’s ‘rise’ and its possible outcome for themselves, sought to deepen protective carapaces, their anxiety resonating with America’s primacy-sustaining drives. As with most such cases, there are dissenters – ASEAN, and even the EU, for instance, are riven by tensions between those who see more opportunities than risks in engaging with a reinvigorated China and those who are appalled by that idea. Many states in these two collectives are warily inching from one group to the other while others anxiously perch on the fence. From Beijing’s perspective, deliberate denial of strategic autonomy and overt containment (force-posture, double-envelopment via alliance build-up, BMD deployments, close-in ISR, FoNOPS) exercises pose an increasingly visible and unacceptable security threat. This is the context in which China’s ‘grand-strategic’ moves need to be viewed. Instead of mirror-imaging America’s military-focused primacy sustaining efforts, China appears to have chosen a less threatening geo-economic approach to tacit coalition-building. Judging by the attendance at the May 2017 Belt-and-Road Forum in Beijing, many potential beneficiaries seemingly approve. If that is an indicator of Chinese offers of leadership, then this leadership is of a very different kind qualitatively than what these states received from the system-manager. However, given the accretive nature of Beijing’s OBOR/BRI enterprise, accommodating many pre-2013 projects inherited from earlier responses to China’s perceived ‘Malacca Dilemma’, and articulating extensive, expansive, and some possibly unrealistic, plans and imagery, it is difficult to see BRI as a well-thought out ‘grand design’ aimed at securing global ‘leadership’ in the same vein as articulated in US official documents and statements since the turn of the century. BRI’s eventual outcome, if it is fully and successfully implemented, if the Chinese state sustains its steady evolution without major disruptions, and if US relative decline persists - all major caveats - could accrete elements of leadership for China. Given these uncertainties, I cannot assert with confidence the leadership goals of the planned bits of the ‘grand design’, although long-term outcomes could prove my scepticism misplaced.

2) Do you personally view recent initiatives from the Chinese leadership in this way?

I feel Beijing does wish to assert its long-standing claims and more recently acquired and still-expanding portfolio of interests without the constraints of restrictions imposed by the US and its allies. That, added to Beijing’s perceptions of America’s substantive frailties exposed by the 2008-2010 ‘great recession’, growing resentment of military-diplomatic ‘confinement’ and a narrowing of Chinese options, and the apparent availability of  a two decade-long ‘window of opportunity’ in which to nurture national substance and realise the ‘Chinese dream’, catalysed a more activist stance, especially by the Xi Jinping leadership. Personalities matter; however, as I have showed elsewhere, each of Deng’s successors contributed to policies designed to grow China’s ‘comprehensive national power’ and forge a more secure and globally-respected locus within the US-designed and –dominated post-Soviet international security system. Defensive insecurity has been as prominent an element of that evolution as have assertions of ‘leadership’. I do recognise, however, the likelihood that what is driven by insecurity on one side can and often is viewed as revisionist by those whose hitherto overwhelming dominance faces inevitable, if unwitting and inadvertent, erosion owing to China\s ‘national rejuvenation’. Additionally, Beijing’s geoeconomic initiatives, e.g., the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank), AIIB, and the Silk Road Fund, when combined with the overarching OBOR/BRI rubric, do present a challenge to the Washington Consensus which the latter’s adherents would find it difficult to counteract without appearing utterly selfish, myopic, and even churlish. I do not see these initiatives as directly targeting US systemic leadership; however, given the frailties of America’s often monochromatic, even simple, approach to a complex, dynamic and increasingly integrated global landscape, China’s initiatives could well deliver accretive attributes of leadership, keeping in mind the caveats noted above. My key observation: leadership is a shared dynamic binding the leader and the led; coercion can produce short-term results, but sustained and sustainable leadership can only be built with mutual consent. To reiterate, then, if and when OBOR/BRI matures and its promised benefits are seen to actually improve the lives of millions, by binding regimes, societies, institutions and praxis in a China-rooted framework, it could deliver an unstated design for extending Chinese leadership. That is possible, but at this point, not inevitable.

3) What opportunities and risks does the BRI design offer?

In terms of opportunities, both China and BRI-partner states stand to gain from a coordinated programme of massive infrastructure construction and linkage with substantial Chinese funding to seed the medium-to-long-term processes and set the ball rolling. The cumulative gains in increased production, employment, skills-and-technology-transfers, productivity, value-added assembly-fabrication-and-manufacturing, trade and people-to-people exchanges, could gradually transform both internal political-economic structures, institutions and praxis in these states and inter-state dynamics, hasten the evolution of China’s own state-society relations, build a coalition of collective interest in peaceful collaboration across Asia, maritime Afro-Asia, Europe and Latin America, raising the quality of life for over a billion people. Enhanced economic cooperation could lead to the erosion of grievances, anger and hopelessness that fester in many of these lands, and lower the potential (although perhaps not the immediate prospect) for collective violence plaguing much of BRI’s pathways. From Beijing’s perspective, this mutually beneficial (‘win-win’) proposition would also secure friendship across China’s periphery and farther afield, bind long-term interests of myriad Asian, European and African states to its own, underpin sustained and sustainable growth, rebalance Chinese and non-Sinic manufacturing tie-ups and garner geoeconomic pre-eminence securing Beijing’s grand-strategic interests without directly threatening the status quo-orientated interests shaping the dominant system. In short, OBOR/BRI could, under certain circumstances, obviate the ‘inevitability’ of the Thucydides Trap being precipitated by Sino-US strategic competition in an era of systemic transitional fluidity. Such outcomes, however, are not assured. Risks abound, and not just to the myriad projects and schemes comprising an apparently ever-expanding BRI portfolio. Several stand out: Expectations have been raised dramatically among BRI signatory states and societies. China has already pledged large sums in investment, credit and technology-transfers to a number of states where projects have already begun to be implemented (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia and Laos are just a handful among these). However, partner-states have to provide counterpart funds, land, other resources, bulk of the labour-force, and bureaucratic support. They also must ensure security of project-sites and routes, local and Chinese personnel, project infrastructure and assets, and policy stability. As many BRI partner-states are decidedly ‘soft’ in their institutional, political and economic attributes, and even in state-consolidation, projects such as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) confront severe insecurity in certain areas, in that instance, Pakistan’s Balochistan Province. Policy-stability is a risk China and BRI projects face in many partner states. Deep dependence on continuity built on an insufficient appreciation or incomplete understanding of domestic dynamics and local/regional power-balances has challenged Chinese goals in pursuing OBOR/ BRI-type projects in such countries as Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. A focus on economic rationality to the neglect of culturally and/or historically derived pressure-points can prove costly in not just sunk project-cost and time-spent, but also geopolitical gains and losses. One key risk to BRI’s eventual success resides in the systemic transitional uncertainty shaping the milieu in which partner-states must chart their policies while securing their respective interests. The future looks particularly ominous for small-to-medium-power actors inhabiting a strategic ecology dominated by powerful predators competing aggressively for dominance. Engaged in semi-survivalist struggles to strike a balance between the necessary and the possible, the former (secondary and tertiary) states are constrained continually to contort in diplomatic gymnastics and chart a safe course among bickering giants. As the USA and many of its allies, specifically Japan and India, view OBOR/BRI as a geoeconomic instrument designed to leverage China’s economic prowess with a view to extending Beijing’s geopolitical reach and footprint in domains hitherto either subservient to Western interests or subject to US influence, making choices is rendered even more complex than before. But perhaps the gravest risks reside in BRI’s impact on China itself. Having invested almost completely in the initiative, China must now ensure it largely and visibly succeeds. Given the many challenges BRI faces, its measurable success remains uncertain. If sustained financial losses in any particular segment eventually force even a partial withdrawal, Beijing’s ability to make sound judgement, ensure effective management of complex multilateral projects to completion, and provide ‘leadership’ more generally will be questioned. Such a loss of ‘face’ could trigger significant disruptions at home as well as abroad, and recovery would be moot. Another risk for China resides in the incongruity between an authoritarian CPC-regime on the one hand and an increasingly pluralist network of states joining the ranks of OBOR/BRI partners on the other. Intense intercourse envisaged in the BRI framework could convey pluralist tendencies from the OBOR’s periphery to the core, diluting the CPC’s domestic authority to a greater extent than Dengist economic liberalisation did. Should Beijing crack down on such ‘deleterious’ influences afflicting the homeland, effective realisation of China’s OBOR/BRI vision would be endangered. Failure to implement OBOR/BRI pledges would cause almost equally disruptive domestic difficulties. In short, BRI is a tiger Beijing cannot jump off.

4) Is China's seeming willingness to assume regional and international leadership reassuring?

Depends on where the observer stands and where her/his analytical sympathies lie. Western, especially US and West European, as well as Japanese, Indian and some Australian commentary betrays deep unease over China’s seeming shift from Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Hide and Bide’ dictum to a more assertive international stance. Fundamentally, after five centuries of Euro-Atlantic (put more coarsely, Caucasoid) domination of the world’s political-economic, scientific-technological, military-diplomatic and popular-cultural realms, China’s seeming ability and willingness to assume leadership, in whatever guise, and to whatever extent, challenges not just how the world is ordered, but how individuals and societies visualise their own places in it. The prospects of dramatic change and uncertainty over what the future will look like, who will gain and what the losers’ status will be in that new order, are already proving so unsettling that even well-regarded academic observers have contributed to a burgeoning body of nationalistic literature denigrating, even demonising, most things Chinese. This outburst, while human and understandable, detracts from a rational discourse and prevents meaningfully forensic examinations of trends and processes currently in train. While some in China’s neighbourhood or farther afield may find it reassuring that China is, after two centuries of deeply distressed introspection, now appearing to resume its ‘natural’ role in the region, their relief is founded on perceptions of injustice and unfairness afflicting the current order as it affects them, not on a recognition of the systemic turbulence the present transition to an unknowable future is slowly unleashing. This view reflects a victory of sorts of hope over experience, and the expectation that Chinese domination, if it comes to pass, will somehow be more benign and advantageous than their experience of successive and varied mixes of Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, French, British and US hegemony proved to be. Not all polities are uniformly consensual on the nature of the international security system and their national interests within that broad framework. Despite intra-mural divergences, though, most states reach a broadly-popular view of where their medium-to-long term interests lie. In a competitive milieu marked by major-power rivalries seeking support of secondary and tertiary alignments, ruling elites seek wiggle-room to pursue their more modest but much more acutely-urgent interests. As long as US power looked insuperable, America’s ‘un-needed’ allies strongly believed in the import of their alliance without overt emphases on it – because there was little fear of a threat emerging. Now that China has been formally designated a ‘near peer rival’ for nearly two decades and treated as such, America’s allies must worry about the existential reliability of this relationship for their own defence against their protector’s rival. This convergence of China-rooted anxiety among both America and its allies/clients is a ‘natural’ response to China’s ‘rejuvenation’ after a long period of absence of an overtly assertive and independent Chinese foreign policy. However, some regional actors are more comfortable, for their own national reasons, with China’s growing clout. They, like Cambodia in a recent Foreign Policy headline, want China to be their ‘backyard bully’. China’s rise is more reassuring for them than Japan’s re-armament, for instance. Beijing’s quest to reinforce this reassuring perception will demand sustained effort, perception which will be shaped by Chinese action, not words. But will Xi’s successors share that sense of priority?

5) What are the major concerns (strategic, economic or socio-cultural) about the implementation of BRI - as you see things, and from the perspective of your own country? Will the new 'grand design', for instance, entail new rules and the shift away from established regional and/or global institutions?

Security appears to trump prosperity on almost all occasions, and this transitional period is no exception. Beneficiaries of the current order fear loss of control, power, influence or stature, and are determined, to varying degrees, to prevent this from affecting them adversely. China’s BRI-partners seem to have chosen to pursue economic, if not strategic, bandwagoning with China. However, insulating the economic from the strategic, or vice versa, over the medium-to-long term may prove challenging. Also, economic integration and increased dependence may fashion new linkages and erode fears, and thereby alter the security landscape in ways that cannot always be predicted with confidence. Still, as OBOR/BRI projects embark on implementation and Chinese credit starts flowing and begin to make a difference, AIIB, the Silk Road Fund and the NDB will acquire growing salience, perhaps at the cost of pre-existing multilateral institutions led by the USA and Japan. However, Beijing’s offer to collaborate with the latter and their sponsors should serve to allay, if partially, zero-sum fears. A corollary process flowing from BRI-funded-and-managed transactions will deepen Beijing’s bilateral engagements with partner states. As implementation matures, the projects’ impact and salience could colour fiscal policy and influence extra-project decision making processes. This is not necessarily a guaranteed gain for Beijing as Sri Lankan and Vietnamese experience has shown, but generally speaking, bilateralism may acquire greater import than it has enjoyed hitherto in China-focused diplomacy. ASEAN’s economic and political community could be affected in ways that cannot be predicted with confidence. And if ASEAN’s cohesion is negatively impacted, then the US-led coalition’s effectiveness in balancing China will suffer. However, this will depend on US and Chinese conduct vis-à-vis each other and with other actors, perceptions of Chinese ‘threats’ and US reliability, and the assessment of states’ own interests. As many of these categories betray some measure of fluidity, predicting outcomes at any given time in the indeterminate future is fraught. If the purpose of cogitation is to identify the parameters of realistic policy-proposals for managing inevitable uncertainties born of change, then state-parties should be encouraged to engage in candid exchanges with the USA and China, and with each other, on developing pathways to a tolerable end-state in which core interests of all actors can be secured while accommodating changes, essentially an elevated stature accorded to China within the Indo-Pacific regional subsystem, and the dominant system more generally, and fashioning a more collegial and collaborative institutional praxis. If the goal, in contrast, is to identify ways of preventing change, short of effecting regime-change in Beijing, this is likely to prove wasteful, ineffective, and possibly foolhardy.

6) Do you see your own country developing any significant responses to China's BRI / 'grand design'?

Both Britain and Malaysia, while wary of China’s geostrategic and territorial ambitions, appear to have decided that it is in their respective economic interest to engage with China and its BRI vision. Trains carrying Chinese and British goods are now regularly travelling between the two trade-partners, traversing the Eurasian ‘world-island’. Chinese investments in both Britain and Malaysia have grown in recent years, a trend that has been welcomed by both governments and commercial elites in all three countries. British and Malaysian uncertainties over what to expect from the USA under the Trump Administration, Britain’s Brexit worries, and Malaysia’s 1MDB fallout erode the attraction of anti-Chinese stances in both London and Kuala Lumpur, while highlighting the benefits of economic engagement with China. Some Chinese investments and projects in Britain and Malaysia precede Xi’s 2013 launch of his OBOR/BRI vision, but BRI reinforced trends in economic collaboration already underway by then. I have to note, however, that both Britain and Malaysia remain closely tied to the US-led alliance systems in Europe and Asia, and neither is expected exit these in favour of Chinese links. In fact, some trends suggest the opposite. Royal Navy contingents have engaged in combat-drills with US, Japanese and other regional counterparts in waters close to China’s shores; Malaysia regularly hosts PACOM assets close to waters disputed with China. So, what we will probably see is an eclectic mix of growing economic engagement with China via BRI and continuing security ties to the USA. Whatever the merit of such hybrid dynamics, the balance will likely change only when partner-states’ perceptions of China-rooted threats and America’s reliability as their defender change significantly. This could happen over BRI’s lifetime; if it did, that would be its strategic success.